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ARTICLES
Surveillance and the Tyrant Test
ANDREw

GUTHRIE FERGUSON*

How should society respond to police surveillance technologies? This
question has been at the center of nationaldebates aroundfacial recognition, predictive policing, and digital tracking technologies. It is a

debate that has divided activists, law enforcement officials, and academics and will be a central question for years to come as police surveillance
technology grows in scale and scope. Do you trustpolice to use the technology without regulation? Do you ban surveillance technology as a

manifestation of discriminatory carceralpower that cannot be reformed?
Can you regulate police surveillance with a combination of technocratic
rules, policies, audits, and legal reforms? This Article explores the taxonomy of past approaches to policing technologies and-finding them all
lacking-offers the "tyrant test" as an alternative.

The tyrant test focuses on power. Because surveillance technology
offers government a new power to monitor and control citizens, the

response must check that power. The question is how, and the answer is
to assume the worst. Power will be abused, and constraints must work
backwards from that cynical starting point. The tyrant test requires institutional checks that decenter government power into overlapping community institutions with real authority and enforceable individual rights.
The tyrant test borrows its structurefrom an existing legalframework
also designed to address the rise of a potentially tyrannicalpower-the
U.S. Constitution and, more specifically, the Fourth Amendment. Fearful
of a centralizedfederal government with privacy invading intentions, the
Fourth Amendment-as metaphor and methodology-offers a guide to
approaching surveillance; it allows some technologies but only within a
self-reinforcing system of structural checks and balances with power
centered in opposition to government. The fear of tyrannicalpower motivated the original Fourth Amendment and still offers lessons for how

society should address the growth of powerful, new surveillance
technologies.

* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. © 2021, Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson. Thank you to the commentators at the 2021 Privacy Law Scholars Conference and to my copanelists at the Association of American Law Schools Conference panel on Deep Surveillance. Thank
you to commentators at the inaugural meeting of the Columbia University Sociology of Algorithms
Workshop.

205

206

THE

GEORGETOWN

LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 110:205

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.

I.

THE TRUST LENS. .................................................

214

A.

214

B.

II.

III.

208

..........................................................

WHY DEFAULT TO TRUST? .................................

1.

Tradition ....................................

2.

Professionalism ................................

3.

Tactical Secrecy ..............................

.

218

4.

C apacity ....................................

.

218

5.

Political Power ................................

219

6.

Procurem ent ..................................

219

RESULTS OF A TRUST-BASED APPROACH TO SURVEILLANCE .......

.

215
216

... 220

1.

Los A ngeles ..................................

221

2.

C hicago......................................

224

C.

WHY TRUST IS INADEQUATE .....................................

226

D.

CONCLUSION ON THE TRUST LENS ................................

229

THE TRAP LENS. ..................................................

230

A.

WHY SURVEILLANCE IS A TRAP ..................................

231

B.

THE RESULTS OF THE TRAP LENS .................................

233

1.

Public M obilization............................

.

234

2.

Corporate Self-Restraint .........................

.

235

3.

Theoretical Development ........................

236

C.

WHERE THE TRAP TEST FALTERS .................................

240

D.

CONCLUSION ON THE TRAP LENS .................................

246

246

THE TECHNOCRATIC LENS. ..........................................

A.

WHY REGULATE?........................................

1.

Democratic Accountability .......................

2.

Foreseeable Errors ..............................

.

.

247

247
249

2021]

SURVEILLANCE AND THE TYRANT TEST

B.

IV .

207

RESULTS OF A TECHNOCRATIC LENS .............................

250

1.

Legislative Responses ..........................

.

250

2.

Community Oversight Response ...................

.253

3.

Independent Audits ............................

.

4.

Academic Response ............................

254
258

C.

LIMITATIONS ON THE TECHNOCRATIC LENS ....................

..

259

D.

CONCLUSION ON THE TECHNOCRATIC LENS ....................

..

262

THE TYRANT LENS ..........................................

A.

B.

WHY A FOURTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK? ...................

.

262
263

1.

T yranny ....................................

.

265

2.

Surveillance Power ............................

.

266

3.

Race and Tyranny ..............................

268

4.

A Tyranny Paradigm ..................................

270

THE TYRANT TEST........................................

270

1.

271

2.

C.

.

Structural Checks ..............................
a.

Legislative Checks..........................

b.

Executive Branch Checks ....................

c.

JudicialChecks ............................

.

273

d.

Rights-BasedChecks ........................

.

277

e.

Local ParticipatoryChecks ...................

.

279

f.

EqualProtectionChecks .....................

.

282

g.

Systemic Checks ...........................

..

283

Substantive Limitations on Surveillance Power ........
a.

Papersand Tyranny ........................

b.

Dataand Tyranny ..........................

LIMITS ON THE TYRANT TEST ....................................

..

272
273

.

283
284

.

287

288

208

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

CONCLUSION .............................................................

[Vol. 110:205
290

INTRODUCTION

Surveillance is being mainstreamed into everyday life.' Consumer surveillance
sounds with every swipe of a smartphone.2 Social media surveillance links us by
every share, like, and click.3 Public safety surveillance is changing how governments monitor protests and disorder.4 The digital clues of life are being mined,
monetized, and monitored in unprecedented ways.5
Law enforcement has embraced this development, capturing these digital trails
and capitalizing on the insights available.6 Data-driven policing has moved from
theory into practice with rapid speed.7 Predictive policing technologies target highrisk neighborhoods and people.8 Video analytics, police body cameras, and automated license plate readers record movement and travel. 9 Mass aerial surveillance

1. See, e.g., JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION: A QUEST FOR PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND FREEDOM IN
A WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE 3 (2014) ("We are living in a Dragnet Nation-a world of
indiscriminate tracking where institutions are stockpiling data about individuals at an unprecedented
pace.").
2. See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Natasha Singer, Michael H. Keller & Aaron Krolik, Your
Apps Know Where You Were Last Night, and They're Not Keeping It Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/10/business/location-data-privacy-apps.html.
3. See Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Private Eyes, They're Watching You: Law Enforcement's

Monitoring of Social Media, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 997, 998 (2019) ("[P]olice are using social media not
only to send information out to the public but also to keep track of what people are doing both online and

off.").
4. See, e.g., Matthew Guariglia, How to Identify Visible (and Invisible) Surveillance at Protests,

ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/06/how-identify-visibleand-invisible-surveillance-protests [https://perma.cc/3ANB-AF7C]; Caroline Haskins, Almost 17,000
ProtestersHad No Idea a Tech Company Was Tracing Their Location, BUZZFEED (June 25, 2020, 2:40
PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/carolinehaskins 1/protests-tech-company-spying [https://

perma.cc/X4LQ-DPRS].
5. See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN
FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 8 (2019).
6. See generally ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE,
RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017) (describing how new technology is changing
how police do their jobs); DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE (2017)
(recognizing that new surveillance technologies allow law enforcement officers to track citizens, and
revealing how the Fourth Amendment can provide security in an age of increasing government
surveillance).

7. Andrew D. Selbst, DisparateImpact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 113 (2017)
(describing the rise of data-driven policing technologies).
8. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109,

1143-44 (2017).
9. See JAY STANLEY, ACLU, THE DAWN OF ROBOT SURVEILLANCE: Al, VIDEO ANALYTICS, AND
PRIVACY 17-19 (2019), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/061819-robot_surveillance.

pdf [https://perma.cc/6E9Q-YBXF] (discussing video analytics); Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts
and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 897, 908 (2017) (discussing police body cameras);
Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 281,
285-87 (discussing automatic license plate recognition surveillance).
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and localized drones monitor criminal incidents. 10 Location-tracking devices, the
"Internet of Things," 1 smart cars, and a host of digital devices provide fresh clues
for law enforcement officers investigating crimes.1 2 And, all of this information is
being gathered in growing, aggregated databases to be mined, manipulated, and
studied by powerful computer analytics to identify evidence useful in criminal
prosecutions."
Each of these policing technologies has fueled a fight between privacy advocates and law enforcement professionals, with an almost predictable pattern of
suspicion, scandals, and setbacks following each new innovation. The debate
swirls without finding shared first principles14 from which to chart a way forward.
Privacy and racial-justice advocates see little reason to concede anything to "surveillance creep" at this early stage of the rhetorical battle over use of surveillance
technology. Similarly, police-convinced of the value of powerful monitoring
capabilities-have shown little interest in filling the legal void with voluntary
regulations. Finally, moderate voices seeking to regulate, reform, and curtail the
growth of surveillance find themselves criticized from all sides for being too accommodating to police (and thus fueling oppression) or too bureaucratic in practice (and thus stifling innovation).
Facial recognition technology offers a recent example of this tension. Among
many era-defining mass surveillance technologies, facial recognition has arisen
as a flash point for a heated national debate." Police have embraced the

10. See Chris Francescani & Aaron Katersky, The NYPD, the Nation's Largest Police Department,

Puts Its Eyes in the Skies with New Drone Program, ABC NEWS (Dec. 4, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://
abcnews.go.com/Technology/nypd-nations-largest-police-department-puts-eyes-skies/story?id=59599207
[https://perma.cc/9EX5-JBCC];

Above, BLOOMBERG

Monte Reel, Secret Cameras Record Baltimore's Every Move from

BUSINESSWEEK

(Aug. 23,

2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-

baltimore-secret-surveillance/; Craig Timberg, New Surveillance Technology Can Track Everyone in an
Area for Several Hours at a Time, WASH. POsT (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/

technology/new-surveillance -technology-can-track-everyone-in-an-area-for-several-hours-at-a-time/
2014/02/05/82f1556e-876f-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html.
11. Kevin Ashton, That 'Internet of Things' Thing, RFID J. (June 22, 2009), http://www.rfidjournal.
com/articles/view?4986; see also Kelsey Finch & Omer Tene, Welcome to the Metropticon: Protecting

Privacy in a Hyperconnected Town, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1581, 1599 (2014) ("The 'Internet of
Things' is . .. a term used to describe the array of internet-enabled devices (like cars and traffic lights
but also coffee pots and clothes) that are entering our everyday lives. These devices not only collect
increasingly specific personal information; but they also can share that data with other people and other
devices." (footnote omitted)).
12. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects,

104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 819-20 (2016) (cataloging the rise of digital tracking sensor devices).
13. See Justin Jouvenal, The New Way Police Are Surveilling You: Calculating Your Threat 'Score,'
WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/the-new-way-police-

are-surveilling-you-calculating-your-threat-score/2016/01/10/e42bccac-8e 15-11e5-baf4-bdf37355da0c_
story.html; Sarah Brayne, The Criminal Law and Law Enforcement Implications of Big Data, 14 ANN.

REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 293, 294 (2018).
14. I use the termfirst principles to explain a worldview or attitude toward policing technologies.
15. Facial recognition threatens to become a constant, privacy-eviscerating technology that captures
images without notice, identifies people in public, and chills protected First Amendment protest
activities. As such, it has captured national attention and concern when used by police. See CLARE
GARVIE, ALVARO M. BEDOYA & JONATHAN FRANKLE, GEORGETOWN L. CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH., THE
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technology to identify criminal suspects mostly without legal limits. 16 In
response, facial recognition abolitionists have sought a complete ban on the technology (or, at a minimum, a moratorium on its use). These advocates believe
that regulation concedes too much-that a regulated police "superpower" is never
going to actually be limited in practice. 18 Such positioning stakes out first principles around the inability to regulate police power and thus the need for a complete
ban. After all, a dystopia with thoughtful regulation is still a dystopia.
This divide on first principles has been the unspoken battle around all new policing technologies. Without a shared stance on how to approach the promise and
the threat of new surveillance technology, we lack a constructive starting point
from which to move forward. The question of "where we go next with policing"
keeps getting thwarted by where we start.
This Article seeks to reset the starting point for the debate on policing technologies. Specifically, this Article reexamines the question of first principles, offering four framing lenses to examine the different ways society has approached
new policing powers. 19 These lenses are: (1) the trust lens, (2) the trap lens, (3)
the technocratic lens, and (4) the tyrant lens; together they offer a rough taxonomy to analyze all future police surveillance technologies. The hope is to provide
a descriptive and theoretical framework to evaluate the best approach to new surveillance technologies used by the police.
The trust lens has been our default model to regulate policing technology for
much of the century. With some exception, most policing technologies remain
unregulated on a federal, state, or local level, allowing police to develop best
practices on a theory that expertise is a reason to trust police. 20 Companies invent
a new surveillance technology, sell the technology to police, and then police operate it without significant formal accountability, oversight, or transparency
PERPETUAL LINE-UP: UNREGULATED POLICE FACE RECOGNITION IN AMERICA 1 (2016); see

also Andrew

Guthrie Ferguson, Facial Recognition and the Fourth Amendment, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1105, 1167-91
(2021) (discussing the legal and ethical debate over facial recognition).
16. See Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/learview-privacy-facial-recognition.
html; Jon Schuppe, How Facial Recognition Became a Routine Policing Tool in America, NBC NEWS
(May 11, 2019, 4:19 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/how-facial-recognition-became-

routine-policing-tool-america-n1004251 [https://perma.cc/HMV7-HYMU].
17. See Malkia Devich-Cyril, Defund Facial Recognition, ATLANTIC (July 5, 2020), https://www.
theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/07/defund-facial-recognition/613771; Tawana Petty, Defending
Black Lives Means Banning Facial Recognition, WIRED (July 10, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.

com/story/defending-black-lives-means-banning-facial-recognition.
18. See Hamid Khan & Peter White, Police Surveillance Can't Be Reformed. It Must Be Abolished,
VICE (Mar. 10, 2021, 10:36 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/xgzj7n/police-surveillance-cant-be-

reformed-it-must-be-abolished [https://perma.cc/WKS6-D6HL].
19. The different lenses discussed are not mutually exclusive and include some overlap, but they
offer framing mechanisms to see the underlying philosophy of how some groups have approached the
problem of new surveillance technologies.
20. See Barry Friedman & Elizabeth G. Jnszky, Policing's Information Problem, 99 TEx. L. REV. 1,
30 (2020) ("In most states, invasive technologies like drones, license plate readers, and predictive
policing algorithms remain unregulated altogether. Any sort of legislative regulation of policing is
patchwork and episodic at best." (footnote omitted)).
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mechanisms. 1 Predictive policing algorithms, automated license plate readers,
video analytics, gunshot sensors, stingray devices, drones, robots, and other innovations have grown from an interesting idea to government adoption without significant regulation or public oversight.2 2 The default position of those who adopt
the trust lens has been to maintain a healthy, hands-off approach to regulation.
Trust is placed in the underlying incentives of public safety priorities.2 Most policing technologies easily pass the trust test, if you start with faith in law
enforcement.
In contrast to the trust lens, the trap lens involves the fear that giving police
any new surveillance power is a trap that will essentially create new social control
methods to be used against the less powerful. The trap is set by providing seemingly new innovations under the guise of progress or objectivity. The trap springs
when those technologies reify existing social hierarchies, structural power dynamics, and racial bias. The trap lens looks over the long history of policing in
America and says there are no good counterexamples when police power was not
used against racial minorities and the poor.24 Policing is the problem, and hightech policing will not solve the underlying power dynamics.2 5 The movement to
"abolish the police" is in large measure a response to this distrust.2 6 The argument

21. See generally Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 91 WASH. L. REV.
1595, 1595 (2016) (using case studies from Seattle, Oakland, and San Diego to "comprehensively
consider the intersection of procurement and local surveillance policy making"); Elizabeth E. Joh, The
Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 19, 20
(2017) ("Private surveillance technology companies wield an undue influence over public police today
in ways that aren't widely acknowledged, but have enormous consequences for civil liberties and police
oversight.").
22. For more on the impact of big data policing technologies, see generally FERGUSON, supra note 6.
23. See Robin K. Magee, The Myth of the Good Cop and the Inadequacy of FourthAmendment
Remedies for Black Men: Contrasting Presumptions of Innocence and Guilt, 23 CAF. U. L. REV. 151,

157, 160-61 (1994) (describing the "good cop paradigm" and the "false myth of the police officer as a
law-abiding citizen who is chiefly, if not totally, motivated by law enforcement interests when
appropriate and who can be trusted to behave within constitutional parameters" (footnote omitted)).
24. As will be discussed in Part II, throughout history, American policing protected capital, white
property, and cultural norms that constrained Black economic or social power. See generally PAUL
BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 59-61 (2017); ALEX S. VITALE, THE END OF POLICING

(2018).
25. See Alvaro M. Bedoya, The Color of Surveillance, SLATE (Jan. 18, 2016, 5:55 AM), https://slate.
com/technology/2016/01/what-the-fbis-surveillance-of-martin-luther-king-says-about-modern-spying.
html [https://perma.cc/5BMF-C9DD]; Dorothy Roberts & Jeffrey Vagle, Opinion, Racial Surveillance

Has a Long History, HILL (Jan. 4, 2016, 5:11 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/264710-racialsurveillance-has-a-long-history [https://perma.cc/R5WL-DQHG].
26. The abolitionist movement and those who advocate to abolish policing, police surveillance, and
other forms of carceral restraint have created a rich literature of theory and practical advice. See, e.g.,
MARIAME KABA, WE DO THIS 'TIL WE FREE US: ABOLITIONIST ORGANIZING AND TRANSFORMING

JUSTICE 4-5 (Tamara K. Nopper ed., 2021); Mariame Kaba, Opinion, Yes, We Mean Literally Abolish
the Police, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/opinion/sunday/floydabolish-defund-police.html. The trap lens framework does not seek to incorporate or be incorporated
into this existing literature. Instead, the trap lens offers a generic term to address some of the same
concerns arising from this movement.
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is to keep surveillance powers completely out of the hands of police because
police cannot abuse technology that they do not have (or that does not exist)."
The technocratic lens evolved as a counterweight to the trust and trap paradigms. Led by civil society groups and academics, the idea that rules; structures;
and sustained, front-end accountability must go into the adoption of new technology is growing.28 Toolkits, policies, and local legislative accountability laws
have been adopted.29 The technocratic lens emphasizes ex ante rules, transparent
policies, and audits as external accountability mechanisms to address potential
misuse. In addition, this approach embraces existing law and remains conscious
of the legal, social-economic, and racial realities when technology interacts with
an unequal society. If the trust lens defaults to a defense that "technology is a tool
to be used for good," the technocratic lens defaults to a defense that "an unregulated tool is a dangerous tool." The technocrat's solution involves detailed use
policies, audits, legal remedies, and a level of expert oversight and engagement
to address concerns about accountability, transparency, bias, and misuse. A policing technology only passes the technocratic test if a system of accountability,
transparency, and rulemaking has been designed to regulate it with appropriate
democratic authorization.
Trust, trap, and technocratic perspectives offer three approaches to surveillance
technology. But, as will be discussed, they are all inadequate to the task. This
Article offers a fourth alternative-the tyrant lens. The tyrant lens assumes that
the technology will be misused by a metaphorical tyrant and focuses on centering
power away from the government and into the hands of the people. The tyrant
lens is not framed as an absolute ban on technologies (like the trap lens) nor a
mere reform (like the technocratic lens), but it fits somewhere in between. The tyrant lens starts with a structural suspicion of government power and works

27.

Cf

RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY: ABOLITIONIST TOOLS FOR THE NEW JIM CODE

184 (2019) (noting that "computer programmers and others in the tech industry are beginning to
recognize their complicity in making the New Jim Code possible").
28. This technocratic lens is an inexact category for scholars who have approached the problem of
policing from various democratic or administrative approaches. This category might include what
Professor Andrew Crespo and Professor Wayne Logan have called the "New Administrativists." See
Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129

HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2057-59 (2016); Wayne A. Logan, Fourth Amendment Localism, 93 IND. L.J. 369,
386 (2018) ("[S]everal scholars have urged that courts defer to rules regulating police when the rules
result from local executive and quasi-executive entities."); see also Mailyn Fidler, Local Police
Surveillance and the Administrative Fourth Amendment, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 481, 555
(2020); Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1874-

75 (2015); Maria Ponomarenko, Rethinking Police Rulemaking, 114 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 51-56 (2019);
Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1043

(2016); Selbst, supra note 7, at 117; Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L.
REV. 91, 120-21 (2016). These scholars are not necessarily focused on police technologies (although
some are) but instead on the power to regulate policing via administrative and technocratic means.
29. As will be discussed in Part III, academics and civil rights groups have developed a handful of
white papers and toolkits to assist police departments and city governments about how to address the
threats of new surveillance technologies. See infra Section III.B.4.
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backwards from that distrust with overlapping checks and balances, and rights
and remedies built within the authorizing legislation.
The tyrant lens (or what I will call the tyrant test) borrows its structure from an
existing legal framework also created to address the rise of tyrannical powerthe U.S. Constitution and, more specifically, the Fourth Amendment. 30 Fearful of
a centralized government with privacy-invading powers, the Fourth Amendment
-as metaphor and methodology-offers a helpful guide to allow some policing
technologies but only within a self-reinforcing system of structural limitations
with power centered in opposition to government. 31 As a first principle, the tyrant
test needs a structural approach, distrusting malleable, executive branch policies
and requiring an entire system of interlocking power centers, checks and balances, community institutions, and rights-based remedies. This was the initial hope
of the Fourth Amendment's drafters who faced a history of real tyranny and had a
goal to situate power in the hands of citizens.32 While the Fourth Amendment in
modern practice has failed to restrain government power, as metaphor, the tyrant
test crystalizes the goal of designing a systemic and citizen-based response to
government surveillance. As practical methodology, it frames technocratic solutions and trap concerns into an enforceable legal framework with powers outside
of the executive branch.
A form of tyranny also motivated the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.33
The arbitrary and oppressive police powers of slave catchers and the first Southern
police forces directly influenced those who ratified the Reconstruction Amendments. 4
A modem understanding of the Fourth Amendment must incorporate this fear of racial
tyranny by lawful police authority, a fear shared by modem police abolitionists and the
original antislavery abolitionists.
This Article explores these four first-principle lenses. Part I begins with an
analysis of the trust lens, examining how the default position of trusting the police
evolved as the dominant position around new police surveillance tech. This Part
also examines why this trust has been misplaced and looks at two specific examples of big data policing in Los Angeles and Chicago. Part II examines the trap
lens and how surveillance has been misused against those with less social, economic, and cultural power. The analysis foregrounds current debates about abolishing police surveillance technology against an examination of America's long
history of racially biased police surveillance. Part III examines the rise of a technocratic response to surveillance reform. The technocratic lens blends democratic

30. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31. Part IV details the justification for basing the tyrant test on a Fourth Amendment framework.
32. See Magee, supra note 23, at 190 ("The limitation on government expressed in the Fourth
Amendment was a rational response informed by the intense history of political oppression and tyranny
by the British Crown over the colonists and outspoken subjects of Britain proper.").

33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
34. See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF SEARCH
AND SEIZURE, 1789-1868, at 256 (2006); Andrew E. Taslitz, Slaves No More!: The Implications of the
Informed Citizen Ideal for Discovery Before Fourth Amendment Suppression Hearings, 15 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 709, 748 (1999) (discussing the link between policing slavery and Fourth Amendment principles).
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accountability principles with policy proscriptions to rebalance the excesses and
errors of unregulated technology, but, as will be discussed, it ultimately fails to
offer a sufficient check on police power. Finally, Part IV details the tyrant test as
a new response to growing police surveillance. By presuming the technology will
be abused by a metaphorical tyrant, legal and institutional power structures can
be developed to limit the potential harms before use.
Each Part addresses the justification, results, limitations, and promise of these
different first principle approaches. Each also evaluates whether any of the tests are
sufficient to answer the fundamental question of whether it is possible to regulate
new, liberty-eroding police surveillance technologies. This Article argues that,
although likely unsatisfying to trust, trap, and technocratic adherents, the tyrant test
offers the best way forward to allow some policing technologies within limits.
I. THE TRUST LENS

Policing technology operates on a trust basis.35 Despite ample examples of
police misconduct 36 and abuse," most police departments operate without significant oversight and with the benefit of trust. Even police departments operating
under federal consent decrees 38 or cities that have faced protests to defund the
police 39 still allow surveillance technologies to exist mostly unregulated, unexamined, and unfettered. Trust is the default for policing, and this is especially true
when it comes to new surveillance technologies.
A.

WHY DEFAULT TO TRUST?

Unpacking why police have been trusted to use surveillance technologies without substantial oversight is complicated by the fragmented nature of policing. 40

35. See Rachel Moran, In Police We Trust, 62 VILL. L. REV. 953, 966-68, 993 (2017) (detailing the
history of Supreme Court deference to police power in the later part of the twentieth century).
36. See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) ("Much police misconduct is not accidental, incidental, or inevitable. Instead,
it is systemic, arising out of departmental deficiencies that undermine officer adherence to legal rules.");
Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 4-10
(2001) (detailing a long history of police corruption).
37. See, e.g., Hallie Ryan & Jon Greenbaum, Though the Technology Is New, Police Abuse Is Not, 42

HUM. RTs. no. 1, 2016, at 1, 22 (2016); David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be
Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465,466 (1992).
38. For example, Baltimore, Maryland, was under a federal consent decree when it adopted a pilot
program of Pervasive Surveillance System planes. See CIV. RTs. Div., DOJ, INVESTIGATION OF THE
BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 11 (2016); see also Kevin Rector, Baltimore Surveillance Flight

Data Suggest Homicides, Shootings Were Captured, BALT. SUN (Oct. 7, 2016, 4:30 PM), http://www.
baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/investigations/bs-md-sun-investigates-surveillance-dates-20161007story.html [https://perma.cc/N6SK-NCAC] (reporting that the Baltimore police's "aerial surveillance
plane" flew above the city during "at least nine homicides and 21 shootings").
39. New York City, Los Angeles, Baltimore, and Chicago have all seen defund the police protests
and yet all have significantly invested in big data policing systems. See infra notes 61, 174.
40. See Mark Berman, Most Police Departments in America Are Small. That's Partly Why Changing
Policing Is Difficult, Experts Say., WASH. POST (May 8, 2021, 4:59 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/nation/2021/05/08/most-police-departments-america-are-small-thats-partly-why-changing-policingis-difficult-experts-say/.
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With almost 18,000 different law enforcement entities in the United States, it is
difficult to make generalizations. 41 But the tiny number of localities that require
any independent oversight of police surveillance proves the point that most cities
do little but hope that the police use the technologies appropriately. 42 Seattle,
Oakland, San Francisco, Santa Cruz, New York, and a few smaller cities have (after years of advocacy) adopted local surveillance oversight ordinances. 43 Most
others have no regulation.
This Section breaks down the trust lens, examining why many jurisdictions
have defaulted to a trust lens for viewing policing technologies. While not an
exclusive list, reasons of tradition, professionalism, tactical secrecy, capacity, political power, and procurement policies all act to insulate police technology from
significant oversight.
1. Tradition
Traditionally, police have been allowed to innovate without much public
accountability. New weapons, 44 new communication systems,45 and new policing
tactics 46 have all been adopted without significant public input. While scholars
can debate whether police-as an institution-are overregulated or underregulated, 47 there is little question that new technologies over the past decades have

41. See Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Wicked Crypto, 9 U.C.

IRVINE

L. REV. 1181, 1208 (2019) ("[T]he vast

majority of crime, and the vast majority of law enforcement investigations, occur within the jurisdiction
of the nearly 18,000 state, county, and local police departments and law-enforcement agencies across
the country.").
42. The Samuelson Law, Technology, & Public Policy Clinic at University of California, Berkeley
Law School recently published an excellent white paper analyzing sixteen localities that have attempted
formal oversight mechanisms. ARI CHIVUKULA & TYLER TAKEMOTO, SAMUELSON L., TECH. & PUB.
PoL'Y CLINIC, LOCAL SURVEILLANCE OVERSIGHT ORDINANCES (2021), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/

wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Local-Surveillance-Ordinances-White-Paper.pdf

[https://perma.cc/NH6K-

JHW5].
43. See Fidler, supra note 28, at 545 & n.274 (noting that "[a]s of August 2020, fourteen local
government entities-thirteen cities and one county-have passed laws formalizing administrative
control over police use of sophisticated investigative technologies," and providing citations to local

ordinances); see also Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy Localism, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1961, 1982-2020 (2018)
(providing a detailed example of the role of privacy ordinances in Seattle and New York City).
44. For a fascinating look at how police adopt new police surveillance technologies, see MATT
STROUD, THIN BLUE LIE: THE FAILURE OF HIGH-TECH POLICING 91-128 (2019) (describing how tasers
were adopted across America).
45. See, e.g., Phil Goldstein, NG911 Technology: What State and Local Communities Need to Know,
STATETECH (Sept. 13, 2019), https://statetechmagazine.com/article/2019/09/ng911-technology-whatstate-and-local-communities-need-know-perfcon [https://perma.cc/4H9M-MBXV].
46. See, e.g., Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV.
211, 246-52 (2017) (detailing the changes of police use of force over time); Seth W. Stoughton,
Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and Guardian Officers, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 611, 666-67
(2016) (discussing the evolution of a "[g]uardian" approach to policing as opposed to a "[w]arrior"
approach).
47. There is a wealth of scholarship discussing the ways police are regulated. See, e.g., Rachel A.
Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 764 (2012); Lawrence Rosenthal, Good and

Bad Ways to Address Police Violence, 48 URB. LAW. 675, 678 (2016); Frank Rudy Cooper, A
Genealogy of Programmatic Stop and Frisk: The Discourse-to-Practice-Circuit, 73 U. MLA. L. REV. 1,
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been adopted without significant regulatory limits. 48 Data-driven innovations
such as CompStat in New York49 and predictive policing in Los Angeles 50 were
adopted because a nationally known police leader, William Bratton, promoted
the idea.5 1 Video surveillance systems,5 2 drones,5 3 audio sensors, 54 and automated

license plate readers55 have encircled major cities such as Chicago, Detroit, and
New York with little public notice. 56 Data-driven platforms control operation
centers and shape investigations with few external oversight mechanisms.57 The
default has been to allow police to make decisions they thought were best for their
institutions, personnel, and communities.
2. Professionalism
This traditional deference rests in part on the perceived professionalism of
police. 58 As a general matter, police departments in America are insular

31-32 (2018); Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 736-38
(2017); Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2182 (2014).
48. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.

49. James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastrofski & David Weisburd, Making Sense of COMPSTAT: A
Theory-BasedAnalysis of Organizational Change in Three Police Departments, 41 LAW & SoC'Y REV.

147, 148 (2007).
50. Caroline Haskins, Dozens of Cities Have Secretly Experimented with Predictive Policing
Software, VICE (Feb. 6, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en-us/article/d3m7jq/dozens-of-citieshave-secretly-experimented-with-predictive-policing-software [https://perma.cc/99TH-QV6J].
51. See Ferguson, supra note 8, at 1126.
52. See, e.g., Eoin Higgins, Pre-CrimePolicing Is Closer than You Think, and It's Freaking People
Out, VICE (June 12, 2018, 3:47 PM), https://www.vice.com/enus/article/7xmmvy/why-does-hartfordhave-so-many-cameras-precrime [https://perma.cc/3N7G-HTSW].
53. See How Law Enforcement Can Harness the Benefits of an Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
Program, NAT'L INST. JUST. (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/operations/
aviation/Pages/harnass-benefits-of-unmanned-aircraft-systems.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3UFU-GCE8]
("According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, only about 350 law enforcement agencies in the U.S. had
aviation programs in active use.").
54. See, e.g., Cale Guthrie Weissman, The NYPD's Newest Technology May Be Recording
Conversations, INSIDER (Mar. 26, 2015, 1:05 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-nypds-newesttechnology-may-be-recording-conversations-2015-3 [https://perma.cc/8V78-3EQY].
55. See Kaveh Waddell, How License-Plate Readers Have Helped Police and Lenders Target the
Poor, ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/howlicense-plate-readers-have-helped-police-and-lenders-target-the-poor/479436/.
56. See JOHN S. HOLLYWOOD, KENNETH N. MCKAY, DULANI WOODS & DENIS AGNIEL, RAND
CORP., REAL-TIME CRIME CENTERS IN CHICAGO: EVALUATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT'S

STRATEGIC DECISION SUPPORT CENTERS 36, 38 (2019) (Chicago); Project Green Light Detroit, CITY OF
DETROIT,
https://detroitmi.gov/departments/police-department/project-green-light-detroit
[https://

perma.cc/ZX77-UHH9] (last visited Sept. 11, 2021) (Detroit); Colleen Long, NYPD, Microsoft Create
Crime-Fighting Technology; City Could Make Millions in Business Deal, YAHOO! NEWS (Feb. 20,
2013),

https://news.yahoo.com/nypd-microsoft-create-crime-fighting-technology-city-could-033128

315.html [https://perma.cc/V3KN-P8RK] (New York City).
57. See Sarah Brayne, Big Data Surveillance: The Case of Policing, 82 AM. SoCio. REV. 977, 987
(2017); Matt McFarland, A Rare Look Inside LAPD's Use of Data, CNN (Sept. 11, 2017, 11:42 AM),
https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/11/technology/future/lapd-big-data-palantir/index.html

[https://perma.

cc/F97A-JX3W].
58. See CHRISTOPHER STONE & JEREMY TRAVIS, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. & NAT'L INST. OF JUST.,

TOWARD A NEW PROFESSIONALISM IN POLICING 11-12, 14-15 (2011) (describing a push for a "[n]ew [p]
rofessionalism" in policing).
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institutions with specialized training academies, 59 hierarchical command structures,6 0 and broad authority to reduce crime rates.61 Police officers operate with
a significant level of autonomy due to their perceived training and experience. 62 Although accountable to a politically appointed or elected chief of
police, 63 the complexity of managing a large institution tasked with a wideranging set of responsibilities has led to significant deference to professional
judgments. 64 The thinking is that police know "police stuff," and this deference
to expertise carries over to technology. After all, if we trust police to enforce
the law, why would we not also trust them with the technology to support those
law enforcement policy goals? While unthinking deference has been eroded in
recent years with protests over police misconduct and video evidence of brutality,65 police have managed their operations with a high level of independence
for decades. 66

59. See Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 46, at 250 (describing use of force training, and noting that
"[a]s of 2013, the most recent year for which data are available, about 45,000 police recruits enrolled in,
and about 38,600 graduated from, one of the more than 650 police academies scattered across the
country, where they received an average of 840 hours of training"); see also Yuri R. Linetsky, What the
Police Don't Know May Hurt Us: An Argument for Enhanced Legal Training of Police Officers, 48

N.M. L. REV. 1, 14-19 (2018) (providing a brief history about police training).
60. See Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 722
(2017) ("Police departments are hierarchical, with a chain of command as in the military and a sharp
division between the leadership and the rank-and-file." (footnote omitted)).

61. See Barry Friedman, Disaggregating the Policing Function, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 949-54
(2021) [hereinafter Friedman, Disaggregating] (describing research into actual police responses to
criminal activity); Barry Friedman, Secret Policing, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 99, 106-07 [hereinafter
Friedman, Secret Policing] ("Most policing agencies operate under extraordinarily broad delegations of
authority that instruct them only to enforce the substantive laws.").

62. See Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 2006
(2017) ("Where did police officers derive their expert insights? One source was basic experience: the
instinctive wisdom about criminal activity gathered through an officer's exposure to the streets.").
63. See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 28, at 1831 (describing how "police chiefs typically
serve at the pleasure of the mayor, police commission, or city council, and sheriffs are directly elected

by the people").
64. Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing: Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 199, 206 (2007) ("The exercise of discretion results from influences on the police both at the
organizational and individual level. At the organizational level, local police department [sic] must
choose some 'priorities of enforcement' over others. These choices reflect social and political choices
that prevent a police organization from 'full enforcement:' enforcing the law every time a violation is
observed." (footnotes omitted) (quoting Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal

Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 559-61 (1960))).
65. See, e.g., Nick Statt, Nicole Wetsman, Sarah Jeong, James Vincent, Cameron Faulkner, Ashley
Carman, Monica Chin, Justine Calma, Loren Grush, Megan Farokhmanesh & Russell Brandom, The
Peace Reporters: The Police Dressed for War. The People Showed Up with Cameras., VERGE, https://
www.theverge.com/2 13551 22/police-brutality-violence-video-effects-trauma-civil-rights-black-lives-

matter [https://perma.cc/37PC-REVL] (last visited Oct. 13, 2021).
66. See generally Lvovsky, supra note 62, at 2066 (critiquing the rise of a presumption of police
expertise); Samuel Walker, Governing the American Police: Wrestling with the Problems of
Democracy, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 615, 629 (critiquing the rise of professionalism in the context of
studying the history of policing in America).
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3. Tactical Secrecy
Such deference is especially true when the technology is used as part of tactical
operations that rely on secretive surveillance. Monitoring technology is arguably
less effective when the surveilled subject is aware of the monitoring. 67 While
some forms of surveillance technology are meant to deter crime, police usually
seek to keep the tactical surveillance systems secret. 68 Further, the proprietary nature of the technology adds pressure to keep many types of police surveillance
opaque. 69 In some extreme cases, police have signed nondisclosure agreements
with the private companies forbidding the government from revealing the existence of the technology, even to judicial authorities. 70 The alignment of tactical
secrecy and corporate secrecy has been a powerful force against transparency and
accountability in the criminal justice system.7 1
4. Capacity
Trust is not just a reflection of expertise but also a reflection of oversight
capacity. Few institutions or people have the capacity to conduct oversight over
the police and fewer still can analyze police surveillance technologies. In many
cities, the issue is not just that police do not want oversight but that no entity has
the resources and capacity to conduct the type of oversight necessary. When sophisticated and proprietary technology is involved, this oversight role is even
more difficult because the underlying information is complex and hard to obtain.
The entities that have the capacity to audit data-driven systems or examine the
legal risks of surveillance are few in number." The result is that without forcing
67. See Friedman, Secret Policing, supra note 61, at 120-21 ("Policing ... is like a game of cat and
mouse-as the cats get smarter, the mice adapt. The longer police are able to keep their investigative
strategies secret, the longer they can maintain the upper hand.").
68. See Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA.
L. REV. 9, 34 (2004) ("[L]aw enforcement benefits in several ways from the secrecy of its surveillance.
The less people know about surveillance, the more information surveillance reveals and the less law
enforcement needs to spend on counter-surveillance efforts.").
69. See generally Crump, supra note 21 (discussing secret acquisition of surveillance equipment by
police); Joh, supra note 21 (discussing the erosion of transparency caused by private surveillance
company influence on policing).
70. See Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big Data, and
Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 15, 39 (2016) ("Nondisclosure agreements bar police departments
adopting the technology from disclosing 'any information' relating to the surveillance equipment to any
third parties, private and public." (footnote omitted)); Jonathan Manes, Secrecy & Evasion in Police
Surveillance Technology, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 503, 515 (2019) (discussing nondisclosure
agreements).

71. See Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 2028 (2017); Rebecca Wexler, Life,
Liberty, andTrade Secrets:Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343,

1395 (2018).
72. See, e.g., Rubinstein, supra note 43, at 1987-91 (detailing the complexity and difficulty of local
surveillance oversight in Seattle).
73. Academic institutions and civil liberties groups have interest, expertise, and capabilities, but only
a handful of groups can do it at the scale needed. See, e.g., About EFF, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://

www.eff.org/about

[https://perma.cc/LL74-8CC2]

(last visited Oct.

13, 2021)

("EFF advises

policymakers and educates the press and the public through comprehensive analysis, educational guides,
activist workshops, and more."); Our Mission, POLICING PROJECT, https://www.policingproject.org/our-
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mechanisms to make those audits occur (and to pay for them), the accountability
processes simply do not happen. In many ways, trusting the police becomes the
default when there is no other alternative.
5. Political Power
A lack of capacity to conduct oversight is not accidental. Police have long used
political means to fight accountability measures. 74 While surveillance technology
is relatively new, the consolidation of police power and the resultant avoidance of
accountability is not. For decades, in local elections, it was imperative for local
politicians to have the backing of the police.7 5 This proximity to power discouraged robust oversight over policing and led to a culture of unaccountability in
some police departments. Police unions furthered this hands-off approach to
oversight. 76 Further, politicians and police were mostly aligned in wanting more
surveillance as an effort to sell a vision of crime reduction and even shape how
"crime" is defined.77 In many instances, city officials could see trusting police as
helpful to their political self-interest. 78
6. Procurement
Finally, the rules governing police procurement (including buying new technologies) encouraged opaqueness around surveillance. In some cases, the local

mission [https://perma.cc/C9CW-N94F] (last visited Oct. 13, 2021) ("We Partner With Communities
And Police To Promote Public Safety Through Transparency, Equity, and Democratic Engagement.");
Privacy and Surveillance, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/national-security/privacy-and-

surveillance [https://perma.cc/CGW9-JJ6Z] (last visited Oct. 13, 2021) ("The ACLU has been
at the forefront of the struggle to prevent the entrenchment of a surveillance state . . . .").
74. See Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability:The U.S. Justice Department

"Pattern or Practice" Suits in Context, 22 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 11-12 (2003) ("[G]enerations
of police managers have strenuously fought the actual or threatened intrusions into their managerial
prerogatives, whether by the U.S. Supreme Court, citizen oversight agencies, or police unions."); see
also Benjamin Levin, What's Wrong with Police Unions?, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1333, 1400 (2020)
("Police unions have fought to shield their members from public scrutiny and legal accountability.").
75. See, e.g., Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Different Lyrics, Same Song: Watts, Ferguson, and the

Stagnating Effect of the Politics ofLaw and Order, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 305, 320, 338 (2017).
76. See generally Fisk & Richardson, supra note 60, at 747-59 (discussing how and why police
unions have been obstacles to reform); Levin, supra note 74, at 1340-54 (discussing two critiques of
police unions, and noting that police unions "have served as a significant impediment to many reformist
and transformative efforts").
77. See Alec Karakatsanis, The Punishment Bureaucracy: How to Think About "Criminal Justice

Reform," 128 YALE L.J.F. 848, 855-56 (2019) (critiquing the choices for what society criminalizes, who
is targeted, and the legal rules that allow these choices to be justified).
78. See Stuart Schrader, To Protect and Serve Themselves: Police in US Politics Since the 1960s, 31
PUB. CULTURE 601, 603 (2019) ("Professionalization, moreover, conferred on police a monopoly of
expertise in the particular social region of crime control. This situation created a structural trap: police
gained more resources and ideological support even when they could not or did not curtail crime
because officials had made campaign promises that assumed police would succeed and officials were
thus loath to criticize their failures. Police gained prodigious political power in the process, touted for
isolated successes and fiscally rewarded because of the mistaken belief that more resources would
finally turn the tide in the fight against crime.").
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government was simply unaware of police purchases. 79 This is not because they
were secret but because no one really cared to be informed. As scholars Catherine
Crump and Elizabeth Joh have written, procurement policies for new surveillance
technology received little public notice and even less public scrutiny. 80 For decades, police departments spent their budgets as they saw fit with irregular, if any,
accountability measures or community engagement. For example, in Los
Angeles, police adopted systems of predictive policing, automated license plate
readers, and social network analysis with almost complete autonomy. 81 In
Seattle, police bought drones and a camera network without informing the local
city council. 2 Recently, many police departments have experimented with facial
recognition without giving notice to local elected officials. 83 Because the rules
around procurement are boring and mundane, and the technology is highly technical and specialized, purchases just have not been the focus of much public interest or debate.
The trust lens has-for better or worse-been the status quo operating assumption when it comes to policing technology. In some cases, the trust is intentionally
placed, deferring to police professionalism or experience. In other cases, the trust
reflects a gap in oversight because no one has the capacity or competence to regulate effectively. As will be discussed in the next Section, the default to trust has
produced negative outcomes, leading to abuses, mistakes, and a movement to
abolish police surveillance technology.
B.

RESULTS OF A TRUST-BASED APPROACH TO SURVEILLANCE

A trust-based approach to police technology resulted in a decade's worth of
data-driven police surveillance mistakes. From around 2010 to 2021, the first era
of big data policing seeded new surveillance technologies across the nation.84 As
will be discussed, these technologies ranged from pilot projects created by tiny
79. See, e.g., Ali Winston, Palantir Has Secretly Been Using New Orleans to Test Its Predictive

Policing Technology, VERGE (Feb. 27, 2018, 3:25 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/27/
17054740/palantir-predictive-policing-tool-new-orleans-nopd [https://perma.cc/RUD9-LKPD].
80. See generally Crump, supra note 21 (discussing how law enforcement agencies obtain
surveillance technologies without the knowledge of elected officials or the general public); Joh, supra
note 21 (discussing how private surveillance technology vendors undermine the transparency of police
departments).
81. See SARAH BRAYNE, PREDICT AND SURVEIL: DATA, DISCRETION, AND THE FUTURE OF POLICING

8-11, 41 (2021) (detailing the scope of the Los Angeles Police Department's big-data surveillance

tools).
82. See Rubinstein, supra note 43, at 1987 ("The city council adopted the surveillance equipment
ordinance following negative media reports and a public outcry in response to two incidents: the city's
secretive acquisition of two small drones and its installation of surveillance cameras (along with a 'mesh
network') at Seattle's waterfront.").
83. See Elizabeth Dwoskin, Amazon Is Selling Facial Recognition to Law Enforcement -for a Fistful
of Dollars, CHI. TRIB. (May 22, 2018, 10:36 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-bizamazon-facial-recognition-program-20180522-story.html.
84. This decade timeframe is a contestable, but ultimately defensible, claim. Starting around 2010,
with the rise of predictive policing, the media has accelerated an awareness of how new surveillance
technologies have impacted policing. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, High-Tech Surveillance Amplifies
Police Bias and Overreach, CONVERSATION (June 12, 2020, 8:15 AM), https://theconversation.com/
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start-up ventures85 to powerful corporate digital platforms run by billion-dollar
companies.86
Although not representative of the full diversity of police technology, a study
of Los Angeles and Chicago, two cities that have led the nation in big data surveillance, paints the picture of how technology can transform policing strategies.87 Both cities show how a trust-based approach has led to tremendous
growth in big data surveillance despite numerous mistakes, scandals, and problematic uses.
1. Los Angeles
Los Angeles, California, has led the nation in experimenting with new forms
of data-driven policing. 88 In 2011, the Foothill Division of the Los Angeles
Police Department (LAPD) began a double-blind study using an algorithm to see
if police could predict property crimes, including burglary, car theft, and theft
from automobile. 89 The simple idea was to use past crime data (calls for service
of those crimes) to predict future crime patterns. 90 The underlying theory was that
certain crimes have a contagion effect because of environmental vulnerabilities
that encourage crime, such as poor lighting or a lack of police presence. 91 Chief
William Bratton gave the greenlight to PredPol, a small start-up company leading
high-tech-surveillance-amplifies-police-bias-and-overreach- 140225 [https://perma.cc/C9UE-3HLP]
(discussing the recent history of big data policing).
85. See, e.g., Ellen Huet, Server and Protect: Predictive Policing Firm PredPol Promises to Map
Crime Before It Happens, FORBES (Feb. 11, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/

2015/02/11/predpol-predictive-policing/?sh=dbad68e4f9bf.
86. See, e.g., Mark Harris, How Peter Thiel's Secretive Data Company Pushed into Policing, WIRED
(Aug. 9, 2017, 9:40 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/how-peter-thiels-secretive-data-companypushed-into-policing.
87. In a series of articles and books, I have written about each of these cities and their embrace of big
data policing in great detail. The summary above is necessarily limited. For more detail, see generally
FERGUSON, supra note 6; Ferguson, supra note 8; and Ferguson, supra note 84.

88. See Joel Rubin, Stopping Crime Before It Starts, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2010, 12:00 AM), https://
www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-aug-21-la-me-predictcrime-20100427-1-story.html

http.

89. See G. O. Mohler, M. B. Short, P. J. Brantingham, F. P. Schoenberg & G. E. Tita, Self-Exciting
Point Process Modeling of Crime, 106 J. AM. STAT. Ass'N 100, 100, 105 (2011); see also Sidney
Perkowitz, Crimes of the Future: Predictive Policing Uses Algorithms to Analyse Data and Cut Crime.

But Does It Really Work, and Should It Be Trusted?, AEON (Oct. 27, 2016) https://aeon.co/essays/
should-we-trust-predictive-policing-software-to-cut-crime
[https://perma.cc/FBF4-S6X3] (discussing
the double-blind nature of the PredPol/LAPD pilot study in Los Angeles); Justin Jouvenal, Police Are
Using Software to Predict Crime. Is It a 'Holy Grail' or Biased Against Minorities?, WASH. POST (Nov.
17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/police-are-using-software-to-predict-

crime-is-it-a-holy-grail-or-biased-against-minorities/2016/11/17/525a6649-0472-440a-aae

1-

b283aa8e5de8_story.html (discussing the LAPD's use of PredPol in the Foothill Division).
90. See G. O. Mohler, M. B. Short, Sean Malinowski, Mark Johnson, G. E. Tita, Andrea L. Bertozzi
& P. J. Brantingham, Randomized Controlled Field Trials of Predictive Policing, 110 J. AM. STAT.

Ass'N 1399, 1399-400 (2015); Josh Koehn, Algorithmic Crimefighting, SANJOSE.COM (Feb. 22, 2012),
https://www.sanjose.com/2012/02/22/sheriffsofficefights_property_crimes_with_predictivepolicing/

[https://perma.cc/47DA-LTCD].
91. See Huet, supra note 85; Rubin, supra note 88; Samantha Melamed, Can Atlantic City's Bold

Experiment Take Racial Bias Out of Predictive Policing?, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 10, 2017), https://
www.inquirer.com/philly/news/crime/atlantic -city-risk-terrain-modeling-rutgers-predictive-policing-

joel-caplan-20170810.html.
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the pilot, and place-based predictive policing was born. 92 For almost a decade,
PredPol shaped police patrols across greater Los Angeles. 93
In 2011, the LAPD adopted a person-based predictive policing strategy called
the Los Angeles Strategic Extraction and Restoration (LASER) program. 94 The
LASER program was funded by the Smart Policing Initiative-a project of the
U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance. 95 The creators callously described their goal: "The basic premise is to target with laser-like precision
the violent repeat offenders and gang members who commit crimes in the specific
target areas. The program is analogous to laser surgery, where a trained medical
doctor uses modern technology to remove tumors or improve eyesight." 96
The removal goal was to be effectuated by two related strategies-one focused
on people and the other on places. First, the LASER program created a Chronic
Offender Bulletin that identified high-risk people for additional police attention. 97
Second, the LASER program created LASER Zones, which identified high-risk
places for additional police patrols. 98 Police were expected to contact identified
Chronic Offenders99 and patrol the identified zones. Chronic Offenders were labeled as such by a point system that added up criminal history and other risk

92. Cf Interview by James H. Burch II & Kristina Rose with William Bratton, former Chief of Police

of the L.A. Police Dep't, in L.A., Cal. (Nov. 18-20, 2009), https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh
186/files/publications/podcasts/multimedia/transcript/TranscriptsPredictive_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CGT8-7MHH] (documenting that Chief Bill Bratton believes predictive policing allows law
enforcement agencies to "gather information more quickly than ever in the past, analyze it, and from
that, actually begin to predict that certain actions ... are going to occur and seek to prevent them").
93. As will be discussed later in this Article, PredPol changed its name to Geolitica in 2021. See
Geolitica: A New Name, a New Focus, GEOLITICA (Mar. 2, 2021), https://geolitica.com/blog/geolitica-anew-name-a-new-focus/ [https://perma.cc/6WXE-GJGM]. Because this Article looks at retrospective
facts, PredPol will be used to designate the company.
94. Brayne, supranote 57, at 986.
95. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., L.A. POLICE COMM'N, REVIEW OF SELECTED LOS ANGELES POLICE
DEPARTMENT DATA-DRIVEN POLICING STRATEGIES

3

(2019); CRAIG D. UCHIDA, MARC SWATT, DAVID

GAMERO, JEANINE LOPEZ, ERIKA SALAZAR, ELLIOTT KING, RHONDA MAXEY, NATHAN ONG, DOUGLAS
WAGNER &

MICHAEL D. WHITE, BUREAU

OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, DOJ, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

SMART POLICING INITIATIVE: REDUCING GUN-RELATED

VIOLENCE THROUGH OPERATION LASER 3

(2012).
96. UCHIDA ET AL., supra note 95, at 6.
97. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 95, at 5 ("[T]he overall goal of the Chronic Offender
Program was initially to identify persons who were committing violent crimes in a target area and to
remove them from the area, presumably by arresting them. This goal appears to have evolved over time,
with more recent documentation about the program suggesting engagement strategies that appear
designed to deter future crime, such as by notifying identified Chronic Offenders that the police are
aware of their criminal activity." (footnote omitted)).
98. Id. at 7 ("LASER Zones or hotspot corridors, are selected based on a historical analysis of gunrelated crime data, and they are meant to be maintained for a period of at least nine months. Each
LASER Zone is entered into the Palantir data analytics platform, which then allows the Department to
conduct detailed tracking of crimes occurring in each zone as well as the amount of time officers spend
there.").
99. Id. at 5 ("Once a Chronic Offender is selected, using pre-determined criteria, a Chronic Offender
Bulletin is generated and disseminated to field personnel. These bulletins are intended to 'assist officers
in identifying crime trends and solving current investigations, and to give officers a tool for proactive
police work (e.g., a list of offenders to proactively seek out).').
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factors. 100 Patrol strategies, thus, evolved to contact targeted individuals both as a
measure of social surveillance and data collection, which was inputted into the
LAPD's digital investigative platform run by a private company, Palantir.101
Palantir has a multimillion dollar contract to assist LAPD in keeping track of the
various crime patterns in the city.10 2 As Professor Sarah Brayne has revealed in
her book on the Palantir-LAPD partnership, the goal was to collect as much data
as possible on criminal groups for possible intervention and investigative
purposes. 103
Augmenting these types of place-based, person-based, and group-based predictive technologies were more traditional surveillance technologies. LAPD
invested in drones, automated license plate readers, facial recognition pilots, and
a host of digital tracking technologies. 1 0 In addition, legacy databases, such as
100. Id. at 6. The Chronic Offender Program's point system has changed since the program was first

implemented. Specifically,
At the inception of the program, each person who was the subject of a work-up received the

following:
* 5 points if the individual is a gang member.
* 5 points if the individual is on parole or probation.
* 5 points if the individual had any prior arrests with a handgun.
* 5 points if the individual had any violent crimes on his or her rap sheet.
* 1 point for every "quality police contact" in the last two years.
In 2017, two criteria in the point system above were modified to include the following
considerations:
* Identify the number of violent crime arrests the individual had over the last two years.
Apply 5 points for each violent crime arrest.
* Determine whether the individual has used a gun in the course of his/her activities.
Apply 5 points for each incident involving a gun over the last two years.
Id. (footnote omitted).
101. See id. at 7 ("Based on Department materials provided to the OIG, the Department's
recommended follow-up activities included: 1) sending a letter to the offender; 2) conducting warrant
checks; 3) conducting parole/probation compliance checks; and 4) conducting door knocks and advising
the offender of available programs and services designed to reduce the risk of recidivism. Personnel who
are assigned an offender are to provide a status update to their Commanding Officer every two weeks
regarding what actions have been taken with that offender. This information is also entered into a
database."); see also Matt Burns, Leaked Palantir Doc Reveals Uses, Specific Functions and Key

Clients, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 11, 2015, 7:37 PM), http://techcrunch.com/2015/01/11/leaked-palantir-docreveals-uses-specific-functions-and-key-clients/ [https://perma.cc/3MTJ-5J2N] ("Detectives love the
type of information it [Palantir] provides. They can now do things that we could not do before. They can
now exactly see great information and the links between events and people." (alteration in original)).
102. See Harris, supra note 86.

103. See BRAYNE, supra note 81, at 37-45.
104. See Henry Kenyon, CaliforniaPoliceAre Lax in Securing License Plate Data, Audit Finds, CQ
ROLL CALL (Feb. 24, 2020), 2020 WL 880515 (automated license plate readers); Kate Mather, LAPD
Becomes Nation's Largest Police Department to Test Drones After Oversight Panel Signs Off on
ControversialProgram, L.A. TiMEs (Oct. 17, 2017, 9:05 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/lame-ln-lapd-drones-20171017-story.html (drones); Kevin Rector, LAPD PanelApproves New Oversight

of Facial Recognition, Rejects Calls to End Program, L.A. TimEs, (Jan. 12, 2021, 4:00 PM), https://
www.latimes.com/california/story/2021-01-12/lapd-panel-approves-new-oversight-of-facial-recognitionrejects-calls-to-end-program (facial recognition).
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CalGang, and federal fusion centers rounded out the growing data-driven power
of police.105
At no point in the development of predictive policing, Palantir's platform, or
other surveillance technologies were any significant legislative or judicial limits
imposed. Police innovated and were mostly left alone because of a default to
trust. While advocates complained about the growing systems of surveillance, 106
police were given free rein to adopt new technologies without significant public
accountability or transparency.
2. Chicago
Running a close second to Los Angeles, Chicago also invested heavily in big
data surveillance. 107 The Chicago Police Department developed strategies around
predictive policing, surveillance cameras, sensors, social media surveillance, and
video analytics 108-all without significant regulation or legislative authorization.
Chicago was one of the first cities to experiment with a person-based predictive
policing strategy called the Strategic Subjects List (colloquially known as the
Heat List). 109 Inspired by sociologists who advocated for a public health approach
to violence, Chicago started identifying individuals it believed were most likely
to be perpetrators or victims of violent crime.1
Employing an algorithm
invented by academics at the Illinois Institute of Technology, the police began
rank ordering "at risk" individuals with the goal of guiding police intervention toward these higher risk people."1 The inputs for the algorithm-what became
105. See CAL. STATE AUDITOR, THE CALGANG CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM: AS THE RESULT OF
ITS WEAK OVERSIGHT STRUCTURE, IT CONTAINS QUESTIONABLE INFORMATION THAT MAY VIOLATE

INDIVIDUALS' PRIVACY RIGHTS, REPORT 2015-130, at 1 (2016), https://auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2015-

130.pdf [https://perma.cc/R97M-F4EJ]

(explaining that CalGang is a shared criminal intelligence

system that allows law enforcement officers to enter information on suspected gang members); see also
Petra Bartosiewicz, Beyond the Broken Window: William Bratton and the New Police State, HARPER'S

MAG. (May 2015), https://harpers.org/archive/2015/05/beyond-the-broken-window/

("The LAPD, for

example, retains all [Suspicious Activity Reports], even those that prove unfounded, for at least one
year, and shares them with the local fusion center, which keeps them for up to five.").
106. See, e.g., STOP LAPD SPYING COAL., BEFORE THE BULLET HITS THE BODY: DISMANTLING
PREDICTIVE POLICING IN LOS ANGELES 5, 29-31 (2018), https://stoplapdspying.org/wp-content/uploads/

2018/05/Before-the-Bullet-Hits-the-Body-May-8-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3ME-ZVJZ].
107. See Mark Guarino, Can Math Stop Murder?: In Besieged Chicago, How Police Are Tapping Big
Data to Try to Curb Gang Violence, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 20, 2014), https://www.csmonitor.
com/USA/2014/0720/Can-math-stop-murder.
108. See HOLLYWOOD ET AL., supra note 56, at 9-13.
109. See Jeremy Gorner, Chicago Police Use 'HeatList' as Strategy to Prevent Violence, CHI. TRIB.

(Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2013-08-21-ct-met-heat-list-20130821story.html. The Strategic Subjects List is also known as the Crime and Victimization Risk Model
(CVRM). The name change corresponded with negative publicity about the use of person-based
predictive policing technologies. See HOLLYWOOD ET AL., supra note 56, at 12 ("The Crime and
Victimization Risk Model (CVRM) is a revision of the earlier Strategic Subject List (SSL) tool that
assessed the risk that a person would be a party to gun violence (either as a victim or perpetrator).").
110. See Andrew V. Papachristos & David S. Kirk, Changing the Street Dynamic: Evaluating
Chicago's Group Violence Reduction Strategy, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 525, 533 (2015).
111. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Police Are Using Computer Algorithms to Tell if You're a

Threat, TIME (Oct. 3, 2017, 11:29 AM), https://time.com/4966125/police-departments-algorithms-

chicago/;

Nissa Rhee, Can Police Big Data Stop Chicago's Spike in Crime?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
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known as the Heat List-changed over time but included arrests for narcotics,
arrests for weapons offenses, arrests for assaults, being assaulted oneself, age,
and (in earlier iterations) gang membership. 1 2 The list initially predicted 400
high-risk targets for police intervention, but the list eventually grew to over
300,000 individuals.1 3 Interventions included home visits by police, custom notification letters detailing why these individuals were at risk, and greater street surveillance.1 4 Until the program was shut down, almost everyone arrested in
Chicago was given a numerical, predictive threat score (with scores ranging from
zero through over 500) based on this risk index. 1 5
Chicago also adopted a place-based, predictive patrol management system
with Hunchlab. 116 This partnership involved a similar predictive policing strategy
that directed patrol units to identified higher risk areas. Hunchlab's algorithm
used inputs for risk that included crime, date, location, weather, days of the week,
and other environmental factors." 7 In 2018, Hunchlab was acquired by
ShotSpotter, a gunshot detection system also utilized by Chicago police to identify the location of gunshots for police investigation.118
Most controversially, Chicago invested in over 30,000 networked video cameras connected to local control centers called Strategic Decision Support Centers
(SDSCs). 119 These command centers aggregated numerous different surveillance
technologies. 120 Information flowing to these command centers include automated license plate readers, social network analysis charts, and information about

(June 2, 2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2016/0602/Can-police-big-data-stop-Chicagos-spike-in-crime.

112. See Mick Dumke & Frank Main, A Look Inside the Watch List ChicagoPolice Fought to Keep
Secret, CHI. SUN-TIMES (May 18, 2017, 9:26 AM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/what-getspeople-on-watch-list-chicago-police-fought-to-keep-secret-watchdogs.
113. See Ferguson, supra note 111; HOLLYWOOD ET AL., supranote 56, at 12.
114. See Ferguson, supra note 111.

115. See id.
116. Timothy Mclaughlin, As Shootings Soar, Chicago Police Use Technology to Predict Crime,
REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2017, 6:25 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-chicago-police-technology/asshootings-soar-chicago-police-use-technology-to-predict-crime-idUSKBN1AL08P
[https://perma.cc/
9937-9HX8]; see also AZAVEA, HUNCHLAB: UNDER THE HOOD 5 (2015), http://cdn.azavea.com/pdfs/

hunchlab/HunchLab-Under-the-Hood.pdf

[https://perma.cc/BM8Y-EP7X]

(providing

history

on

Hunchlab).
117. AZAVEA, supra note 116, at 10.
118. See HOLLYWOOD ET AL., supra note 56, at 10 (ShotSpotter has been running a risk analytics
program called ShotSpotter Missions that builds off of Hunchlab's technology); Andrew Westrope,
Gunshot Detection Company ShotSpotterAcquires PredictivePolicing Software, Gov'T TECH. (Oct. 15,
2018),
https://www.govtech.com/biz/Gunshot-Detection-Company-ShotSpotter-Acquires-Predictive-

Policing-Software.html [https://perma.cc/N3KX-28YU].
119. See HOLLYWOOD ET AL., supra note 56, at 8-9 (detailing the network of 35,000 cameras); see

also Timothy Williams, Can 30,000 CamerasHelp Solve Chicago's Crime Problem?, N.Y. TIMES (May
26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/26/us/chicago-police-surveillance.html.
120. See HOLLYWOOD ET AL., supra note 56, at 8 ("These centers include predictive crime software
that helps district leadership make deployment decisions, additional cameras, gunshot detection
systems, and mobile phones to officers in the field who receive real-time notifications and intelligence
data at their fingertips.").

226

THE GEORGETOWN LAW

JOURNAL

[Vol. 110:205

suspects from police databases.121 Digital video cameras with analytic capabilities watch entire neighborhoods. 122 These video feeds are analyzed along with
crime data and human intelligence in an effort to identify the crime drivers in an
area.

123

Despite complaints about predictive policing and a growing realization that the
Heat List was racially biased and flawed," Chicago Police have embraced datadriven policing without serious oversight or accountability mechanisms. Fueled
by philanthropic donations and federal grants, police technology is now front and
center of Chicago's future.1 2 5
C.

WHY TRUST IS INADEQUATE

A trust-based police surveillance lens should be resisted for one simple reason:
it has failed in practice. The precise argument here is that the trust-based
approach-not the policing technologies-has failed, but the series of reversals
and mistakes may well suggest a broader failure that includes both the approach
and the underlying technologies.
As to actual practice, both cities discussed above have had to walk back or
reject their use of the technologies touted as the "next new thing" to fight crime.
Beginning with Los Angeles, the LAPD canceled its contract with PredPol in
2020.126 Although the LAPD cited budget cuts as the reason it would stop using

121. Id. at 9-13 ("The CPD has developed a social network analysis tool that displays, for a given
subject, the first- and second-degree co-arrest links around them. This tool also permits drill-downs on
selected subjects, bringing up criminal history information about them.").
122. Id. at 34 ("They have been granted access to a system to run automated analytics on video that
supports keyword searching for specific types of features and events, but they are often limited by usage
quotas and the required bandwidth to transfer video into the analytic system.").
123. Id. (noting that applications included (1) "conducting virtual surveillance missions, looking for
suspicious activity in progress," (2) "providing near-real-time surveillance of a reported crime scene,
identifying perpetrators, victims, and potential witnesses," (3) "providing overwatch support to units
responding to a crime scene, helping officers deploy to scene effectively and safely," and (4) "looking
for suspects and their vehicles fleeing a crime scene").
124. See Brianna Posadas, How Strategic Is Chicago's "Strategic Subjects List"? Upturn
Investigates., MEDIUM (June 22, 2017), https://medium.com/equal-future/how-strategic-is-chicagosstrategic-subjects-list-upturn-investigates-9e5b4b235a7c [https://perma.cc/954F-YVQ3].
125. See, e.g., Bryan Llenas, Brave New World of 'PredictivePolicing' Raises Specter of High-Tech

Racial Profiling, Fox NEWS (Jan. 11, 2017), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2014/02/24/brave[http://perma.cc/VG5W-WV93]
new-world-predictive-policing-raises-specter-high-tech-racial-profiling/
("[T]he Chicago Police Department, thanks to federal funding, is now helping to drive policing into
territory previously only dreamed of in science fiction: The ability to essentially predict who will be the
next perpetrator or the next victim of a crime."); Craig Wall, Chicago Given $1OM to Expand Predictive

Policing, Officer Training, ABC 7 CHI. (Apr. 11, 2018), https://abc7chicago.com/chicago-given-$10m-toexpand-predictive-policing-officer-training/3327651/ [https://perma.cc/B62D-CDKC] ("Chicago police
are getting a $10 million dollar [sic] donation to help with crime fighting technology.").
126. See Caroline Haskins, The Los Angeles Police Department Says It Is Dumping a Controversial
Predictive Policing Tool, BUZZEEED NEWS (Apr. 21, 2020, 7:34 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
article/carolinehaskins1/los-angeles-police-department-dumping-predpol-predictive
[https://perma.cc/

4FSH-Q3PJ].
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the software, the real reasons were community pressure and a lack of evidence
that the predictive policing system had any meaningful impact on crime rates.'"
Similarly, a devastating Inspector General's audit of the LAPD LASER program demonstrated that the system was flawed in numerous ways. 1 28 The
Inspector General's investigation was the direct result of community activists
who protested, petitioned, and exposed the problems in the program. 129 This was
not so much an example of police checking themselves as much as the community forcing their hand. The Inspector General's audit of the LASER program
revealed how trust was an insufficient check on police power. Among other
things, the audit found that the LASER program encouraged unconstitutional
stops,130 had few rules,131 no training protocols, 13 2 and reified existing racial disparities.133 Most troublingly, the data-driven point system based on arrests, contacts, and criminal history was being applied haphazardly. Some high-priority
targets on the LASER list had no points from the system,134 forty-four percent
had only one or zero arrests,13 5 and nearly ten percent of Chronic Offenders did

127. See id. An internal agency audit found that the LAPD "struggled to measure PredPol's effect on
crime - or prove that it works." Id.
128. See generally OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 95 (analyzing the LASER program,
identifying "significant barriers" and concerns, and proposing recommendations).
129. See Eva Ruth Moravec, Do Algorithms Have a Place in Policing?: How a Pakistani-Born
Retired Pilot Took on a Controversial, Data-Driven Policing Program in Los Angeles-and Won,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/09/do-algorithms-have-

place-policing/596851/.
130. See OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 95, at 11 ("[T]he language related to making stops
of Chronic Offenders lacked precision. After suggesting that officers who see designated Chronic
Offenders 'may stop them, do a field interview, and let them go, if appropriate,' the document also states
that '[i]n many situations, however, as with all stops, [the stops] should be constitutional and legal."'
(second and third alterations in original)).

131. See id. at 12.
132. See id. ("The OIG found that training practices related to Operation LASER also appeared, in
many cases, to be informal.").

133. See id. at 15.
134. See id. ("[I]t appeared that some Areas were not assigning points at all when selecting offenders,
relying instead on referrals from detectives or patrol personnel. Apparently as a result, 37 people listed
as 'Active,' as well as 75 people listed as 'Inactive,' were added to the database with a total of zero
points.").

135. Id. at 16. The report found:
Due to the Chronic Offender Program's focus on individuals who are most actively involved
in violent and/or gun-related crime, the OIG also reviewed the points assigned for these categories, where available, and found the following:
* While some Chronic Offenders were listed as having a large number of arrests for violent crimes, nearly half - 44 percent - of those with detailed point calculations were
listed as having either zero or one such arrest.
* While about half of Chronic Offenders were listed as having one or more reported arrests
for gun-related crimes, about half were listed as having no such arrests.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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not have any "quality police contacts" registered in the system. 136 The information was also rarely updated or double checked.13' In 2020, the LAPD shut down
the LASER program completely. 13 8
Chicago also cancelled its once touted Strategic Subjects List after the RAND
Corporation conducted an audit and revealed its flaws. 139 RAND undertook a
complete review of the big data technologies used by the Chicago Police
Department and found, among other things, that person-based predictive policing
in the form of the Strategic Subjects List (and second-generation versions) were
neither effective nor accurate. 14 0

Two significant problems surfaced. First, the models identifying at-risk individuals were overbroad. Even in the best-case scenario, the model forecasted risk
eighteen months out and included over 10,000 high-risk people and hundreds of
thousands of others with risk scores. 14 1 Targeted intervention models need to
respond quickly, and identifying risk over a year and a half time frame did not
help police reduce risk on a daily basis. 142 In addition, the 10,000 number, while a
small percentage of Chicago residents, was too large for police to target effectively. Second, and relatedly, the risk-identification system did not offer any suggested intervention strategies. 14 3 So even an accurate and timely list of 10,000
people did not provide police with any actionable information to reduce crime
(except a target list). 14 4 In short, people were being identified, but there was no
strategy or follow-through to reduce the risk of violence. 14 5

Additionally, the inputs used-arrests-were too easily influenced by police
action, leading the identification process to be infected by selection bias and

136. Id. ("Nearly 10 percent of the Chronic Offenders in the database did not have any 'quality police
contacts' recorded, and the majority had less than five such contacts. Alternatively, several Chronic
Offenders were listed as having been contacted by the police anywhere from 20 to 45 times.").

137. See id. at 17-18.
138. See Haskins, supra note 126.
139. See HOLLYWOOD ET AL., supra note 56, at 36-38; Sam Charles, CPD Decommissions 'Strategic

Subjects List,' CHI. SUN-TIMEs (Jan. 27, 2020), https://chicago.suntimes.com/city-hall/2020/1/27/
21084030/chicago-police-strategic-subject-list-party-to-violence-inspector-general-joe-ferguson.
140. See HOLLYWOOD ET AL., supra note 56, at 36-38.
141. See id. at 36, 38 ("The CVRM or SSL provides risk scores for everyone arrested in Chicago at
some point over the past four to five years, which constitutes hundreds of thousands of people. As noted
above, only a few thousand had high-risk labels, with the remaining several hundred thousand largely
discounted from further consideration.").
142. See id. at 36 ("[T]he full process (administrative and technical) of running the model takes
several months, and has taken up to years, to come up with updated data sets. This pace is in contrast
with the commonly held perspective that the real-world risks of violence can escalate very quickly, and
the CPD must be able to diagnose and respond quickly.").
143. See id. at 35 ("[T]he CPD did not identify a specific intervention to take action directly on those
whom the model flagged as being in the high-risk bands.").
144. See id. at 37 ("The CVRM input data can provide some insight into what services and other
interventions a person might need, but really understanding a person's needs would require information
outside traditional police records management systems. This information includes human intelligence,
social service, educational, and even medical and (especially) mental health records and diagnostics.").

145. See id. at 35-38.
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personal discretion.146 As I have previously written, the use of police-influenced
inputs, such as arrests or contacts, necessarily distorts the risk analysis because
police are developing suspicion through their own actions independent of the targeted person's actions. 147 Essentially, police are predicting their own future arrest
patterns based on past policing patterns.
While Chicago's predictive policing systems have ended, other big data surveillance systems continue to guide strategy with little more than trust as oversight. As discussed earlier, localized SDSCs fueled by video and analytics have
supercharged the same type of targeted surveillance. 148 Growing digital camera
networks show no signs of shrinking or of being regulated. 149 Audio sensors and
place-based predictive policing are still used in the city. Real-time surveillance
and response are becoming the norm. In fact, the same RAND report that critiqued predictive policing validated Chicago's embrace of other big data surveillance technologies.150 Even in the face of documented failure, trust remains the
dominant approach.
D.

CONCLUSION ON THE TRUST LENS

Los Angeles and Chicago show the impact of relying on a trust-based approach
to new technologies. A general deference to police power was combined with the
increased deference to policing technology, and the result was predictably harmful to those policed. Until advocates and journalists started exposing the flaws in
the predictive systems, police embraced them and used them without much second thought. Despite clear problems reflecting structural biases, the technologies
increased police power, redirected surveillance against minority communities,
and generated significant community concern.
The above examples in Los Angeles and Chicago were not simply failures of
technology but failures of vision. The focus on data collection and data analysis
came with a blindness to a host of social, economic, and racial issues that are
problematic to surveillance. As I have written about before, predictive policing

146. See FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 75 ("Predictive systems based primarily on arrests will mirror
policing more than predictive systems focused on reported crimes will.").
147. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Illuminating Black Data Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 503,
515 (2018) ("[P]erson-based predictive models may result in seemingly racially discriminatory effects.
For example, if the algorithm that identifies people on the [H]eat [L]ist includes information about prior
arrests, or connections with people who are arrested, then where police are looking for arrests will
impact the resulting risk identification system.").
148. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
149. See Chicago Police Launch Their Latest 'Nerve Center' in Bid to Fight Crime with High-Tech

Tools, CBS CHI. (June 25, 2020, 1:23 PM), https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2020/06/25/chicago-policelaunch-their-latest-nerve-center-in-bid-to-fight-crime-with-high-tech-tools/
[https://perma.cc/P2P9S6CK] (noting that Chicago has expanded its use of technology to reduce crime and SDSCs are in place
in twenty-one of Chicago's twenty-two police districts).
150. See HOLLYWOOD ET AL., supra note 56, at 46-48. The RAND report on Chicago's Real Time
Crime Centers offers a counterpoint to the critiques of big data technologies. The RAND report details
the utility of centralized data sources, linked camera systems, and ever-increasing data aggregation. Id.
at 25-27. For investigators, unconcerned with implications of privacy and security, the additional
information and ease of access allows a powerful new tool to investigate crimes.
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systems failed to address problems of data error, methodology, security, transparency, accountability, and vision."1 In addition, the surveillance systems failed to
account for concerns about race, transparency, unequal data sources, and a host
of other constitutional problems.15 2
Equally concerning, the growth of big data policing led to a concentration of
surveillance on the poorest communities and communities of color. In Los
Angeles and Chicago, most individuals caught in the lens of surveillance are
Black and brown, young and poor.153 Patterns of systemic overenforcement in
historically minority communities were replicated in the deployment of surveillance cameras and algorithmically nudged patrols.154 All big data policing is
encoded with race, and so the same "black data" problems that exist in policing
were mirrored in the adoption of police surveillance systems."5
The takeaway from this list of setbacks and systemic failures is that trusting
the police to develop and implement surveillance technology without oversight,
accountability, or checks may be unwise. Independent of the merits of the technology, the lack of oversight and the default to trust have failed in practice. And,
on the merits, the use of new policing technologies may be dangerous to certain
communities. As discussed in the next Part, the rapid growth and deployment of
big data policing technologies quickly created a movement to ban them.
II.

THE TRAP LENS

Policing has never been without its critics. Concerns about tactics, bias, and
systemic patterns of oppression have followed the institution of policing since its
creation. 156 This criticism has grown louder with the increased power of surveillance technology, and louder still after the murder of George Floyd and the
national reckoning with systemic police racism.' Policing has been challenged

151. See Ferguson, supra note 8, at 1180-84 (discussing problems of vision).
152. See Ferguson, supra note 147, at 504 (detailing the argument that all big data policing has a
"black data" problem, involving race, transparency, and constitutional distortion). "[B]ig data policing
technologies must address this lack of transparency, the legacy of racial discrimination, and the
constitutional uncertainty arising from application in the real world." Id.

153. Cf. Alisa Tiwari, Disparate-ImpactLiability for Policing, 129 YALE L.J. 252, 267 (2019)
("Excessive enforcement and surveillance practices fuel mass incarceration and the accumulation of
criminal records in minority neighborhoods."). For a discussion of the disproportionate percentage of
young men of color under police surveillance, including on the Chicago and Los Angeles predictive
policing lists, see infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
154. See Bedoya, supra note 25; Roberts & Vagle, supranote 25.
155. See Ferguson, supra note 147, at 504 (discussing race and big data policing).

156. See infra Section II.A.
157. See Aaron Ross Coleman, MinneapolisMay Be the First City to Dismantle the Police, Vox

(June 8, 2020, 3:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/8/21283980/minneapolis-defund-the-policegeorge-floyd-black-lives-matter. See generally Derek Thompson, Unbundle the Police: American
Policing Is a Gnarl of Overlapping Services That Should Be Demilitarized and Disentangled,
ATLANTIC (June 11, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/unbundle-police/
612913/ (commenting that "[m]odern law enforcement has become a gnarl of unnecessary violence
and heavily armed street counseling," and proposing that disentangling police functions could make
cities safer).
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as being the problem. Calls to abolish the police or defund the police have redirected the national conversation in radical and powerful ways. 158 As part of that
conversation, surveillance technology-as a mechanism of social control-has
been seen as another oppressive tool of police power. 159 Critics maintain that any
additional technology, even if adopted for benign reasons, will eventually be
used against the groups that have historically seen the blunt end of police brutality, abuse, and carceral control. 160
A.

WHY SURVEILLANCE IS A TRAP

The easiest way to distill the trap lens critique is to ask a simple question: has
there ever been a time when police power was not turned against Black, brown,
minority, and poor citizens in an effort to exert social control? Because the historical answer is no,161 the trust lens holds little purchase.
Historians have cataloged how policing in general and surveillance in particular have been deployed against freed slaves, poor workers, civil rights activists,
and dissenting voices in American history.16 2 In the North and South-and in every century throughout American history-the law justified unequal treatment
against African-American citizens via lawful police force. 163 Almost every era
158. See Amna A. Akbar, Demands for a Democratic Political Economy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 90,
106-12 (2020) (discussing the movement to defund the police).

159. See Devich-Cyril, supra note 17.
160. See, e.g., Khan & White, supra note 18.
161. See M Adams & Max Rameau, Black Community Control over Police, 2016 Wis. L. REV. 515,
527 ("The specific system of power used to enforce the economic and social relationship between lowincome Black communities in the United States and the larger White community in general, and
corporate interests in particular, is the domestic colony. In the context of the domestic colony, the police
are responsible for maintaining the coercive exploitative and oppressive relationship by serving as an
occupying force in low-income Black communities."); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Supreme Court 2018
Term-Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26 (2019) ("Police normally treat
residents in communities of color in an aggressive fashion - shouting commands, handcuffing even
children, throwing people to the ground, and tasing, beating, and kicking them. For young men of color,
the risk of being killed by the police is shockingly high and police use of force is among the leading
causes of death. Black women, women of color, and queer women are especially vulnerable to gendered
forms of sexual violence at the hands of police." (footnotes omitted)).
162. See SIMONE BROWNE, DARK MATTERS:

ON

THE SURVEILLANCE OF BLACKNESS

12-17

(2015);

VITALE, supra note 24, at 46-47; I. Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV.

1241, 1288-89 (2017); Larry Redmond, Why We Need Community Control of the Police, 21 Loy. PUB.
INT. L. REP. 226, 227 (2016) ("After the Civil War, and because income inequality was rapidly
increasing, the economic elite began using police department personnel to break strikes and quell
protests against worker oppression. Social control became defined as crime control by isolating
'dangerous classes' as the embodiment of the crime problem. These 'dangerous classes' consisted
mainly of immigrants and free blacks." (footnotes omitted)).
163. See Redmond, supra note 162, at 226 ("In the 1700s, watchmen in northern states and slave
catchers in southern states were the genesis of modern police departments."); Roberts, supranote 161, at
20-21 ("Beginning in the early 1700s, southern white men formed armed groups that entered
slaveholding properties and roamed public roads to ensure that enslaved people did not escape or rebel
against their enslavers. Slave patrols monitored enslaved people to prevent them from engaging in
forbidden activities such as 'harboring weapons or fugitives, conducting meetings, or learning to read or
write."' (footnote omitted) (quoting VITALE, supra note 24, at 46)); id. at 21 ("Modern police forces are
descendants of armed urban patrols like the Charleston City Guard and Watch, which was established as
early as 1783 to constantly monitor and inspect both enslaved and free black residents to 'minimize
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has required formal commissions to investigate systemic police misconduct."
Yet, the problems remain and run deep within structural levers in society.
Thousands of people have been killed and millions traumatized by lawful (and
unlawful) police force. 16 Millions more people are routinely processed through
misdemeanor courts, hit with fines and fees for violations, and stopped in humiliating police encounters.166 Even more have become accustomed to sacrificing
liberty under the guise of lawful surveillance.
This Section details the trap lens' concerns. The argument against police surveillance technologies begins with the argument against police. 167 The trap lens
echoes abolitionists' concerns that seek to dismantle prisons, policing, and the
larger carceral power structure. 168 The trap lens, like the abolitionist movement,
starts with the premise that the institution of policing is anti-Black, with a history
and practice of valuing the economic and property interests of white citizens at
Negro fraternizing and, more especially, to prevent the growth of an organized colored community."'
(quoting VITALE, supra note 24, at 47)); Seth W. Stoughton, The Blurred Blue Line: Reform in an Era of
Public & Private Policing, 44 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117, 123 (2017) ("In the American South, an economy
heavily dependent on slavery gave rise to a different set of institutions that shared some of the
responsibility for policing functions."); id. at 124 (Southern anxieties about slave revolt were not limited
to rural plantations. Early on, cities and towns' 'enforcement [was] entrusted to private individuals and
the existing watch,' but soon the model of the rural slave patrol was adopted in the form of city guards."
(alteration in original) (quoting KRISTIAN WILLIAMS, OUR ENEMIES IN BLUE: POLICE AND POWER IN

AMERICA 41 (2007))).
164. See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J.
2054, 2069 (2017) ("A high watermark was the 1968 Kerner Commission Report, commissioned by the
Johnson Administration in the wake of twenty-three episodes of urban unrest during the mid- and late
1960s. The Report concluded that, for many African Americans, the 'police have come to symbolize
white power, white racism, and white repression."' (footnote omitted) (quoting NAT'L ADVISORY
COMM'N ON CIV. DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 5

(1968),
https://belonging.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/kernercommission_full_report.pdf?file=1&
force=1 [https://perma.cc/VGG3-7MP7])); see also Redmond, supra note 162, at 228 ("Over the years,
various attempts, including commissions, have been made to control the abuses perpetrated by the
police. However, none of them have worked. Commissions inform the public, but they have little lasting
impact on police practices." (footnote omitted)).
165. See Moran, supra note 35, at 993 ("Whether wittingly or not, the legal system's deeplyingrained deference to police officers has, for decades, effectively rubberstamped the widespread
mistreatment of minorities, and allowed police departments to turn a blind eye to abuses by their own
officers."). See generally BUTLER, supra note 24 (discussing how the criminal justice system is
institutionally construed to watch and control Black men); POLICING THE BLACK MAN: ARREST,
PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT (Angela J. Davis ed., 2017) (exploring the critical issues of race and
justice in America, and critiquing how the criminal justice system affects Black boys and men at every
stage of the criminal process, from arrest through sentencing).
166. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, ManagerialJustice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611,

629-32 (2014); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2012).
167. See generally Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, The Emerging Movement for Police and Prison
Abolition, NEW YORKER (May 7, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/theemerging-movement-for-police-and-prison-abolition (discussing police reform, and noting that police
and prisons are not solving problems related to crime and violence but instead "are a part of the
problem").
168. I do not presume to speak for abolitionists and have used the trap lens terminology to create a
related but different conception of a philosophy deeply skeptical of police surveillance technology. The
trap lens is shorthand for those who believe that surveillance is a trap to ensnare the poor and, more
specifically, communities of color.
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the expense of everyone else. 169 Examining the deployment of surveillance technologies confirms the suspicions of an unequal focus on Black, brown, and poor
communities in order to benefit those with existing social and economic capital. 17 0 As discussed, the individuals on Chicago's Heat List were primarily Black
men.171 At its height, more than half the Black men ages twenty to twenty-nine
years old in Chicago were on the list.1 2 Similarly, in Los Angeles, most of the
men targeted through the LASER program were Black and Latino. 1 73 Because
these policies were designed to direct police attention toward one group and
away from other groups, it matters that the groups chosen for surveillance are
Black and brown. By adopting predictive policing models with racially biased
inputs, one necessarily adopts the recommendations that can create racially biased outputs. Similar concerns have long been raised about gang databases,
which also collect more data about young men of color than other populations. 174
These examples show how modern policing technologies have not escaped the
critique leveled for centuries about discriminatory policing. The systems are technologically biased in design because the people who use and create the technology are enmeshed in social contexts that are racially biased. Surveillance, like
policing, is structurally unequal, leading to legitimate claims of racial bias and a
fear that any enhancement of that power is a trap to be used against those with
less power.
B.

THE RESULTS OF THE TRAP LENS

To look at this consistent pattern of anti-Black, opaque, and inherently biased
policing history with clear-eyed sight is to see the trap ahead with policing

169. See Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 449-50
(2018) ("Over time, police have been central to the agenda of racial capitalism and the devaluation of
Black life. The rise of mass incarceration, overcriminalization, and zero-tolerance or broken windows
policing is seen as an evolution of the regime of control, exclusion, and exploitation that began with
slavery, convict leasing, the Black Codes, and segregation."); see also Bell, supra note 164, at 2071 ("A
large body of historical research has documented the entanglement of police in the long-running
national project of racial control.").
170. See, e.g., Amy Harmon, As Cameras Track Detroit's Residents, a Debate Ensues over Racial

Bias, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/08/us/detroit-facial-recognitioncameras.html; J. Cavanaugh Simpson, Prying Eyes: Military-Grade Surveillance Keeps Watch over
Baltimore and City Protests, but Catches Few Criminals, BALTIMORE (Aug. 5, 2020, 1:08 PM), https://
www.baltimoremagazine.com/section/community/surveillance-planes-watch-over-baltimore-but-catch-

few-criminals/ [https://perma.cc/D8TW-LQVF].
171. See Dumke & Main, supra note 112 ("[T]he vast majority of people with the highest score - 85
percent - were African-American men.").
172. Yana Kunichoff & Patrick Sier, The Contradictions of Chicago Police's Secretive List,

CHICAGO (Aug. 21, 2017, 8:44 AM), http://www.chicagomag.com/city-life/August-2017/ChicagoPolice-Strategic-Subject-List/ [https://perma.cc/2PDQ-53FW] (detailing how fifty-six percent of
African-American men ages twenty to twenty-nine received a police Strategic Subjects List score).
173. See OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 95, at 15 (documenting that eighty percent of the
men listed as chronic offenders were Latino and African-American).
174. See, e.g., Larry Smith, Former Baltimore Police Officer Criticizes the Department's Gang
Database, APPEAL (July 23, 2018), https://theappeal.org/former-baltimore-police-officer-unloads-ondepartments-gang-database/ [https://perma.cc/2UGX-QR4A].
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technology. Surveillance, the argument goes, will never be used as anything other
than a tool for oppressing those with less political, cultural, and economic
power. 17 5 For this reason, many advocates have pushed for an absolute ban on
new police technology. Early targets have involved predictive policing and facial
recognition technology (with some local success). 176
As a first-principles argument, the trap lens toggles between a rhetorical push
to ban all surveillance technologies and an acknowledgment that community control may be a second-best alternative. This Section examines the logic of the
more extreme position, saving a more moderate response for the next Sections.
Those who favor the former approach-surveillance abolitionists-argue that
any regulation short of a full ban legitimatizes illegitimate power. 17 7 In other
words, a true trap mentality recognizes the need for a full ban as a first-principles
starting (and ending) point. In recent years, trap lens advocates can point to three
clear victories from this approach: public mobilization, corporate moratoriums,
and the development of a theoretical framework to abolish police surveillance
technology.
1. Public Mobilization
The trap lens has been an effective mobilizing tool to rally communities
against encroaching police technology. 178 Even before the murder of George
Floyd, the fear of surveillance provided community activists with a clear target
for complaint. 179 In many ways, police surveillance technologies offered a proxy
attack on policing in general. For example, while defunding an entire police
department might be difficult for political or policy reasons, dropping a particular
vendor or predictive software program is much easier. As a matter of community
sentiment and protest organizing, rallying against surveillance created a new
movement against police power.
This grassroots organizing had real impact. Community leaders in Detroit,
New York City, and other cities across the nation challenged particular technologies such as facial recognition. 180 In the heart of Silicon Valley, the American

175. See Khan & White, supra note 18.
176. See, e.g., Avi Asher-Schapiro, California City Bans Predictive Policing in U.S. First, REUTERS
(June 24, 2020, 2:33 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-police-tech-trfn/califomia-city-bans-

predictive-policing-in-u-s-first-idUSKBN23V2XC; Kate Conger, Richard Fausset & Serge F.
Kovaleski, San Francisco Bans Facial Recognition Technology, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/us/facial-recognition-ban-san-francisco.html;
Kashmir Hill, How One
State Managed to Actually Write Rules on Facial Recognition, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.
nytimes.com/2021/02/27/technology/Massachusetts-facial-recognition-rules.html.

177. See Devich-Cyril, supra note 17.
178. See Chinyere Tutashinda & Malkia Cyril, An End to the Mass Surveillance of Black
Communities, and the End to the Use of Technologies That Criminalize and Target Our Communities
(Including IMSI Catchers, Drones, Body Cameras, and Predictive Policing Software)., MOVEMENT FOR
BLACK LIVES, https://m4bl.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/End-Mass-Surveillance-Policy-Brief.pdf

[https://perma.cc/9D62-BU2W].
179. See Moravec, supra note 129.
180. See, e.g., Evan Selinger, Q&A: The Battle over Face Surveillance Is About to Heat Up, BOs.

GLOBE (Apr. 28, 2021, 11:59 AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/04/28/opinion/qa-battle-over-
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Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Northern California-with local assistancesucceeded in building a national coalition to ban facial recognition, resulting in
local bans in significant cities such as San Francisco, Oakland, and Berkeley. 181
Across the country in Massachusetts, the ACLU-again with local support-successfully organized in Boston against facial recognition.18 2 These complete bans
were not only successful abolitionist policy wins for facial recognition, but they
are some of the clearest legislative wins on any surveillance technology anywhere. 183 In addition, other surveillance oversight ordinances and entities came
into existence with growing public support. 184
2. Corporate Self-Restraint
Beyond political mobilization and legislative bans, a second result has been to
pressure technology companies themselves. In 2020, Microsoft, IBM, and
Amazon halted the sale of facial recognition services to law enforcement.185
While these companies have been undercut by start-up ventures like
ClearviewAI, which ignored calls to limit use, the symbolism of Big Tech deferring investment in law enforcement was significant, even if police departments

face-surveillance-is-about-heat-up/. Other advocacy leaders such as Alvaro Bedoya, Joy Buolamwini,
Albert Fox-Cahn, Clare Garvie, Evan Greer, and Tawana Petty, and organizations such as the Detroit
Community Technology Project, Stop Surveillance Oversight Project, Fight for the Future, Algorithmic
Justice League, and the Georgetown Law Center on Privacy & Technology Center have also
successfully advocated for a ban on facial recognition technology that drew national attention. See, e.g.,
Civil-Rights Group Letter to President Biden Calling for Facial Recognition Ban, WASH. POsT (Feb. 17,
2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/context/civil-rights-group-letter-to-president-biden-calling-

for-facial-recognition-ban/ad27090b-7b93-4f44-9ca9-1793157666b6/?itid=lkinline_manual_4;

Civil

Rights Concerns Regarding Law Enforcement Use of Face Recognition Technology, ELEC. PRIV. INFO.
CTR.
(June 3,
2021), https://epic.org/wp-content/uploads/privacy/facerecognition/Civil-Rights-

Statement-of-Concerns-LE-Use-of-FRT-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/EE9Z-XQJF]; Steve Neavling, Just
Say No to Facial Recognition, Says Detroit Coalition of Civil Rights Groups, DETROIT METRO TIMES
(Aug. 1, 2019, 3:14 PM), https://www.metrotimes.com/news-hits/archives/2019/08/01/just-say-no-tofacial-recognition-says-detroit-coalition-of-civil-rights-groups [https://perma.cc/9UVH-7NHZ].
181. See Conger et al., supra note 176; Sarah Ravani, Oakland Bans Use of Facial Recognition

Technology, Citing Bias Concerns, S.F. CHRON. (July 17, 2019, 8:33 AM), https://www.sfchronicle.
com/bayarea/article/Oakland-bans-use-of-facial-recognition-14101253.php/;
Levi
Sumagaysay,
Berkeley Bans Facial Recognition: It's Fourth U.S. City to Prohibit Public Agencies' Use of the

Technology, MERCURY NEws (Oct. 16, 2019, 4:23 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/10/16/
berkeley-bans-facial-recognition/.
182. See Nik DeCosta-Klipa, Boston City Council Unanimously Passes Ban on Facial Recognition

Technology: Marty Walsh's Office Says They Will Review the Ordinance,BOSTON.COM (June 24, 2020),
https://www.boston.com/news/local-news/2020/06/24/boston-face-recognition-technology-ban

[https://

perma.cc/RT46-TM44].
183. See Susan Crawford, FacialRecognition Laws Are (Literally) All over the Map: From Portland
to Plano, Local Governments Are Placing Different Limits on the Use of Biometric Data. That's a Good
Thing, WIRED (Dec. 16, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/facial-recognition-laws-areliterally-all-over-the-map.
184. See CHIvUKULA & TAKEMOTO, supra note 42, at 1 n.1 (providing an excellent overview of
existing local surveillance ordinances).
185. Jay Greene, Microsoft Won't Sell Police Its Facial-Recognition Technology, Following Similar
Moves by Amazon and IBM, WASH. POST (June 11, 2020, 2:30 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2020/06/11/microsoft-facial-recognition.
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retained other avenues for accessing these tools. 186 This move of corporate selfrestraint was not based on altruism but on community pressure. Activists targeted
corporate America because of repeated media stories about growing surveillance
power.
3. Theoretical Development
A final outcome has been the articulation of theories to ban-not just regulatesurveillance technologies. This abolitionist philosophy has helped reset debates
about how hard to push against any accommodation in possible police adoption. 187
Such theories emerge from many places, but three distinct voices from different
parts of the advocacy and scholarly spectrum offer clear examples of the tech abolitionist theory.
One voice comes from technology and race scholars, such as Professor Ruha
Benjamin who published a book titled Race After Technology: Abolitionist Tools
for the New Jim Code.188 Professor Benjamin argues that society has coded societal inequality into our surveillance technology without seeing the bias inherent
in the design. 189 The New Jim Code (like the New Jim Crow)190 allows a new
form of racial discrimination based on software code that is "designed to stratify
and sanctify social injustice as part of the architecture of everyday life." 191
Professor Benjamin calls for an abolitionist mindset that rejects reform models
that reify existing power structures or fail to excavate the underlying racial biases
in society. 19 2 The abolitionist goal is to reshape the "moral imagination" and create a "socially conscious approach to tech development that would require prioritizing equity over efficiency, [and] social good over market imperatives." 193 Most
technological solutionism is just another line of Jim Code, superficially

186. See Ina Fried, Clearview Brings Privacy Concerns from Facial Recognition into Focus, AXos

(Feb. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/6DFY-A3GT.
187. Cf. Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Obscurity: A Better Way to Think About Your Data
Than 'Privacy,' ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/01/
obscurity-a-better-way-to-think-about-your-data-than-privacy/267283 (explaining information obscurity,
and discussing the concept in relation to Facebook's new search tool, Graph, and other similar
technologies, such as license plate readers, GPS trackers, and facial recognition tools). Professors Evan
Selinger and Woodrow Hartzog have argued that facial recognition should be banned for all governmental
and commercial purposes. See Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Opinion, Why You CanNo Longer Get
Lost in the Crowd: Once, It Was Easy to Be Obscure. Technology Has Ended That., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/opinion/data-privacy.html (noting that "obscurity is crucial
to democracy" and that "[f]acial recognition technology poses an immense danger to society").
188. See generally BENJAMIN, supra note 27.
189. Id. at 160 ("The power of the New Jim Code is that it allows racist habits and logics to enter
through the backdoor of tech design, in which the humans who create the algorithms are hidden from
view.").
190. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS (rev. ed. 2012) (arguing that the U.S. criminal justice system is a contemporary
system of racial control, even though it adheres to the principles of colorblindness).

191. BENJAMIN, supra note 27, at 17.
192. See id. at 168.
193. Id. at 183.
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improving a fundamentally broken carceral system. The abolitionist goals are
broader. The shift requires rethinking who designs policing technology. 194 It
encourages coded equity audits that would check for racial discrimination in technology and a democratized, independent group centered in the community that
would oversee the technology. 195 Professor Benjamin offers a way to reimagine
technology, not as a tool of surveillance but as a narrative of emancipation. 196 In
providing the tools for abolition, Professor Benjamin provides the intellectual
framework for a different approach to policing technologies-one that is radically decentered and deeply skeptical. 197
No less compelling but far less academic is the argument put forward by grassroots activists who work together as the Stop LAPD Spying Coalition. 198 This
group spearheaded the protests against predictive policing in Los Angeles and
forced the LAPD to conduct the audit that eventually revealed the LASER program's flaws and ended PredPol's contract. 199 Their work in dismantling police,
surveillance, and the entire "[s]talker [s]tate"200 rests on a clear rejection of police
power and what they call the Algorithmic Ecology of intersecting institutional
layers of social control.2 1 One of the most vocal critics of surveillance in Los
Angeles is Hamid Khan, a community organizer and founder of the Stop LAPD
Spying Coalition. 20 2 Khan has explained his antisurveillance mission in unapologetic terms. 20 3 For example, he stated:

194. See id. at 178-79.
195. See id. at 186-90.
196. See id. at 193.
197. See generally id. Other scholar activists have also helped develop the intellectual framework for
a surveillance abolition critique. See, e.g., Brendan McQuade, Police Surveillance Is Criminalization
and It Crushes People, COUNTERPUNCH (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.counterpunch.org/2020/10/15/

police-surveillance-is-criminalization-and-it-crushes-people/ [https://perma.cc/XLM8-U6NG]; Shakeer
Rahman & Brendan McQuade, Police Bureaucracy and Abolition: Why Reforms Driven by Professionals
Will Renew State Oppression, COUNTERPUNCH (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.counterpunch.org/2020/09/
17/police-bureaucracy-and-abolition-why-reforms-driven-by-professionals-will-renew-state-oppression/

[https://perma.cc/ZHC7-GUL7].
198. See About Us, STOP LAPD SPYING COAL., https://stoplapdspying.org/about-slsc/ [https://perma.
cc/9QYR-SAXN] (last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
199. See Letter from Hamid Khan, Campaign Coordinator, Stop LAPD Spying Coal., to Mark P.
Smith, Inspector Gen., Off. of the Inspector Gen. (May 8, 2018), https://stoplapdspying.org/wp-content/

uploads/2018/05/Ltr-to-OIG-May-8-2018-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/KB2U-VNAY].
200. Fuck the Police, Trust the People: Surveillance Bureaucracy Expands the Stalker State, STOP

LAPD SPYING COAL. (June 24, 2020), https://stoplapdspying.org/surveillance-bureaucracy-expandsthe-stalker-state/ [https://perma.cc/FY64-B2SF] [hereinafter Fuck the Police, Trust the People].
201. See Stop LAPD Spying Coal. & Free Radicals, The Algorithmic Ecology: An Abolitionist Tool
for Organizing Against Algorithms, MEDIUM (Mar. 2, 2020), https://stoplapdspying.medium.com/thealgorithmic-ecology-an-abolitionist-tool-for-organizing-against-algorithms-14fcbd0e64d0
[https://

perma.cc/HP8G-7N7Y].
202. See Moravec, supra note 129.
203. See Tate Ryan-Mosely & Jennifer Strong, The Activist Dismantling Racist Police Algorithms,

MIT TECH. REV. (June 5, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/05/1002709/the-activistdismantling-racist-police-algorithms/ (documenting Khan's responses to interview questions about
police surveillance, the coalition's guiding principles, and issues with predictive policing).
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We are fiercely an abolitionist group, so our goal is to dismantle the system.
We don't engage in reformist work. We also consider any policy development
around transparency, accountability, and oversight a template for mission
creep. Any time surveillance gets legitimized, then it is open to be expanded
over time.

The goal is always to be building power toward abolition of these programs,
because you can't reform them. There is no such thing as kinder, gentler racism, and these programs have to be dismantled.24

As the Stop LAPD Spying activists explain, surveillance reform policieseven with good intentions-are actually a step away from racial progress:
Police reform is inherently anti-Black because it improves the operation of an
institution that has been white supremacist at every moment of its history.
Surveillance is the tip of policing's knife, and it originates in slave patrols, indigenous extermination, lantern laws (forcing Black people to illuminate their
bodies in public), infiltration of organized dissent, and enforcement of
apartheid.

-

Surveillance bureaucratization can whitewash that history, allowing the state
to treat surveillance as a mostly fine endeavor that occasionally tips into
excess. This lets police claim community "approval" for their oppression. It
also gives elite institutions yet more input in state violence (the history of
wealthy funders capturing civil rights advocacy is long). And it puts lawyers
the profession most complicit in rebuilding and legitimating the carceral state
- in greater control of police. In short, it makes policing more powerful, more
lawful, and more difficult to dismantle. 205

The argument combines several important themes discussed earlier: anti-Black
history, co-opting control, 206 centering power with police and not with communities, 207 and a realistic view that nothing short of abolition will actually alter the
existing carceral logic of coercive state power. 208 As a first-principles approach,

abolition offers an intellectually consistent response. Banning all police and all
police surveillance is the only escape from the technology trap.

204. Id.
205. Fuck the Police, Trust the People, supra note 200.
206. See id. ("Surveillance bureaucracy trusts police to self-audit and self-govern, when we know
that police can never be trusted and that laws facilitating the use of police technology will be used to
build new oppression.").
207. See id. ("Surveillance bureaucracy trusts that the concerns of those most harmed by surveillance
will be well understood and represented by police and politicians, when all that these people consistently
do is excuse or expand state violence.").
208. See id. ("Surveillance bureaucracy pretends policing can be reduced with new rules and criteria,
when we know that this just leads police to invest more resources and personnel into monitoring and
avoiding 'compliance."').
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The final voice comes from legal scholars who are building abolitionist theory
around the protests of community groups. The argument to abolish the police
finds roots in early movements to abolish prisons and the larger carceral solutions
to poverty. 20 9 It looks to build alternative methods of social improvement that do
not involve methods of social control like policing or incarceration. 2 0 The modern movement looks to defund, decenter, and end the role of police and police
surveillance in poor communities. Professor Amna Akbar writes, "The movement
is focused on shifting power into Black and other marginalized communities;
shrinking the space of governance now reserved for policing, surveillance, and
mass incarceration; and fundamentally transforming the relationship among state,
market, and society." 211 Abolition includes the banning of surveillance technologies because those tools empower police, disempower individuals, and solidify
the unequal distribution of coercive force. 212 The movement looks not to reform,
because that would leave the status quo unchanged, but to a revolutionary shift in
who controls the levers of coercive power. 213
The logic of the trap lens involves a structural understanding of power.
Because centuries of disenfranchisement, disinvestment, and discrimination
through legal means have created the perceived need to police the resulting economic, social, housing, mental health, and educational gaps in society, the solution cannot be rooted in police. Fixing policing without simultaneously
remedying the structural gaps in society will not alter the power dynamics. 214
Instead, the argument is that money and attention need to be diverted to address
209. See Roberts, supra note 161, at 19 ("Although prison abolitionists work to end prisons, their
ultimate aspiration is to end carceral society - a society that is governed by a logic of incarceration.");
see also ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY, BEYOND EMPIRE, PRISONS, AND TORTURE 95-96

(2005); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 28-36 (2003) (discussing Black and labor history
in America).
210. See Akbar, supra note 169, at 412 ("Contemporary racial justice movements are not simply
arguing the state has created a fundamentally unequal criminal legal system. They are identifying
policing, jail, and prison as the primary mode of governing Black, poor, and other communities of color
in the United States, and pointing to law as the scaffolding.").
211. Id. at 408 (footnote omitted); see also Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy,
132 HARv. L. REV. 1613, 1615 (2019) ("Justice in abolitionist terms involves at once exposing the
violence, hypocrisy, and dissembling entrenched in existing legal practices, while attempting to achieve
peace, make amends, and distribute resources more equitably. Justice for abolitionists is an integrated
endeavor to prevent harm, intervene in harm, obtain reparations, and transform the conditions in which
we live.").
212. CHARLENE A. CARRUTHERS, UNAPOLOGETIC: A BLACK, QUEER, AND FEMINIST MANDATE FOR

RADICAL MOVEMENTS, at x (2018) (defining abolition as "a long-term political vision with the goal of
eliminating imprisonment, policing, and surveillance and creating lasting alternatives to punishment and
imprisonment").
213. Reformist Reforms vs. Abolitionist Steps in Policing, CRITICAL RESISTANCE, https://staticl.

squarespace.com/static/59ead8f9692ebee25b72f17f/t/5b65cd58758d46d34254f22c/1533398363539/
CR_NoCops_reform_vs_abolition_CRside.pdf [https://perma.cc/62P7-HCGE] (last visited Oct. 20,
2021) (stating that pushing for community oversight boards "further entrenches policing as a
legitimate, reformable system, with a 'community' mandate. Some boards, tasked with overseeing
them, become structurally invested in their existence").
214. See VITALE, supra note 24, at 30 ("Policing will never be a just or effective tool for community
empowerment, much less racial justice.").
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the structural lack of investment and political power in those same communities.215 If done correctly, law enforcement will not be needed to police the gaps
because the gaps will be filled by the community improving itself. In addition,
the control over that community power will remain within the community. 216 The
way to force such structural change is to end existing policing power, including
enhanced police surveillance. Anything less is a trap that will be used against the
powerless.
C.

WHERE THE TRAP TEST FALTERS

The trap approach pushes absolute bans because bans are clear and unambiguous. And if you start from the first principle that policing is the problem (and thus
technology that enhances police power must also be a problem), then there is little
space for anything less than a ban. An uncompromising abolitionist would end
the debate here: banning police technology and policing as we know it. The problem is that such a complete ban on policing is not politically feasible in the near
term. Without addressing the social and economic gaps that generate criminal activity and without developing alternatives to police, abolishing all law enforcement will not happen overnight. Abolitionist theory presumes the creation of
alternative forms of community safety to replace the need for police-alternatives that do not currently exist at scale.
Thus, if you concede some role for police, and decouple policing from police
surveillance technologies, the question of whether police should be able to take
advantage of advanced technology becomes more difficult. This is the challenge
for those in the trap lens camp. Two related problems arise. The first is theoretical
and the second political, and both turn on first-principles assumptions.
As theory, assuming police are going to be a part of society-even in a reimagined, decentered way-the question of their use of new technologies necessarily
arises. Anything short of a complete ban requires line drawing in terms of what
technologies are used, and who decides, how, why, where, and against whom the
technologies are directed. Those questions likely find answers in existing democratic systems, which lead us down a more technocratic path; the technocratic
lens will be discussed in the next Part.21

215. See Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal
Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1475 (2016) ("I want to support a frame alignment around the term
'Third Reconstruction,' which some activists and scholars have used to refer to a coordinated effort to
address institutional racism and inequality. The term is evolving to describe not only changes in public
policy and legal doctrines, but also a broad-based social movement focused on racial justice."); I.
Bennett Capers, Afrofuturism, CriticalRace Theory, and Policing in the Year 2044, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1, 59-60 (2019) (discussing the idea of "a Third Reconstruction" to address racial inequality (emphasis
omitted)).
216. See, e.g., Community Control, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://m4bl.org/policy-platforms/
community-control/ [https://perma.cc/LV6U-J3KW] (last visited Oct. 20, 2021) ("We demand a world
where those most impacted in our communities control the laws, institutions, and policies that are meant
to serve us .... ").

217. See infra Part III.
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Beyond a process argument, how do you determine the substantive limits of
the technology? We know technologies exist that police believe can help them,
so ban adherents need to make a normative claim of why government should
blind officers to additional data that might be available and helpful. If police officers are recording data about crime reports, one needs to make an argument about
why police administrators should not study that data for insights about future
crime patterns. Why is predicting criminal risk from the data you already collect
a problem? There are good arguments to be made on both sides, but once you
concede the need for some response to crime, prohibiting the police from gaining
access to available information needs an answer that will look less abolitionist
and more regulatory. 218
One answer might be to develop technology that avoids police and recenters
community interventions for public safety. This seems to be the direction
Professor Benjamin suggests in Race After Technology.2 19 But even Professor

Benjamin's call to rethink who designs the technology and add coded equity
audits presumes some use of surveillance technology. Even with a democratized,
independent group centered in the community that is conscious of building tools
for emancipation and not incarceration, the end result is still building surveillance
technology to monitor some subset of the population. And that type of technology
is going to need someone to decide rules and policies, which forces line drawing
that is again more regulatory than abolitionist.
More fundamentally, you need to make an argument about why policing does
not deserve to evolve in a digital world. Almost every other professional enterprise has benefited from technological innovation, including data collection and
analytics. It would be odd if police were unable to advance in similar digital ways
(with smart cars, smart phones, digital video, data management systems, and predictive analytics). This argument is even odder when the pretechnological status
quo was bad enough that it has led to for calls for police abolition. 220 Eliminating
data-driven analysis just sends police back to the bad old days. While abolitionists have an answer to this puzzle (eliminate police), for those who concede police
are necessary in some roles, there needs to be an answer to why this pretechnological solution is better than a data-driven version.
Demands for clear answers are not justifications for surveillance technologies
per se. Police should have the burden of explaining why an innovation or datadriven insight is necessary and not harmful. Many innovations are likely misguided or involve too great a risk to privacy or civil liberties. But if some might
add value, then the hard question becomes what renders certain upgrades more
permissible than others. The point is that once you concede some role for police

218. There are also important differences between private data collection and government data
collection, as well as important procedural hurdles that need to be raised, but those are process questions
and not prohibition questions. Prohibiting the surveillance technology is the goal of many trap lens
advocates. See supra Section II.B.
219. See generally BENJAMIN, supra note 27.
220. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
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-even limited to investigating violent crime 2 2 1 -you need to engage in hard
line-drawing questions about which technologies should be available to assist
police and then come up with rules and policies for their use. 222
The second problem is political. Sometimes the calls for technological bans
are politically expedient but miss their mark. As an example, the campaign to ban
place-based predictive policing and to end PredPol's contract with the LAPD
offers an instructive tale about what success really means. As discussed earlier,
PredPol in Los Angeles is a place-based predictive policing system that uses past
crime data to "predict" where police should patrol to deter future crime. 223 In Los
Angeles, the system focused on three crimes-burglary, car theft, and theft from
automobile. 224 The inputs for the algorithm were rudimentary: calls for service
from past crimes (such as "my home was burglarized" or "my car was stolen"),
time, location, and type of crime. 225 Police officers were given paper printouts or
computer maps of 500-by-500-foot areas of predicted crime and told to patrol.226
Their task was to monitor those areas when not responding to ordinary calls for
service. The hope was to be in the right place at the right time to deter crime. 227
There are numerous criticisms of the PredPol model. I have previously written
about constitutional, data, and efficacy concerns. 2 28 I have also questioned the
gaps left behind at a structural level by focusing on certain crimes (property) as
opposed to others (violent or interfamily offenses) and the opportunity cost of
investing in data-driven policing at the expense of other social services. 2 2 9 Those

problems and more have surfaced over the years. In fact, the LAPD Inspector
General audit on PredPol revealed many flaws in application, 230 including data

221. The term "violent crime" has its own contested history. See generally DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY,
A PATTERN OF VIOLENCE: HOW THE LAW CLASSIFIES CRIMES AND WHAT

IT

MEANS FOR JUSTICE (2021)

(discussing the debate and choices around defining violent crimes).
222. The choice of what we consider crime is a contested definition that cannot be disentangled from
racial and economic discrimination and practices. See Alec Karakatsanis, Why "Crime" Isn't the
Question and Police Aren't the Answer, CURRENT AFFS. (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.currentaffairs.
org/2020/08/why-crime-isnt-the-question-and-police-arent-the-answer
[https://perma.cc/BM2Q-BZHD]
("The concept of 'crime' is constructed by people who have power. Throughout history, powerful people
have defined 'crime' in ways that benefit wealthy people and white people. For example, cocaine,
marijuana, and opium were made illegal to target specific racial minorities. And even within categories of
acts that are classified as 'crimes,' powerful people decide where to look for those acts, when to look for
them, and which ones to ignore and which to document.").
223. See supra notes 85, 88-92 and accompanying text.
224. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259,

267 (2012) (discussing the PredPol pilot).
225. See id. at 266-67.
226. Id. at 267.
227. See id. at 266-67.
228. See generally FERGUSON, supra note 6; Ferguson, supra note 8; Ferguson, supra note 111;
Ferguson, supra note 224.
229. See FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 175 (discussing why it is easier to invest in policing than
underlying social services).
230. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 95, at 25-30.
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collection, 23 1 officers' reluctance to obey an algorithm, 232 and most significantly,
the complete inability to show if PredPol reduced crime by any meaningful
measure. 2 3 3
But those problems were not the justification that activists used to push a ban.
Instead, the push to ban PredPol centered on claims of racism and a desire to limit
any form of algorithm-enhanced policing. 234 This was a push for abolition
because the trap lens allows no quarter for police, let alone technologically
enhanced policing. 235 Examining the technology in the face of the evidence
reveals that the attacks on PredPol were somewhat misdirected (even if successful). It also reveals the complexities of defaulting to an abolitionist trap lens.
The campaign to ban PredPol started with the claim that predictive policing
was racially discriminatory. 236 It did so by focusing on two arguments, one quite
defensible and one less so. The defensible claim is that all policing is racially discriminatory and so predictive policing is discriminatory. 237 The second is that
because arrests are discriminatory and substantially dependent on patrol patterns
and because drug arrests are discriminatory against Black and Latino people,
PredPol uses a racist algorithm. 238 Unpacking these two arguments shows how
the trap lens can blur policy choices.
As discussed earlier, policing has been structurally racist and discriminatory
since the beginning. 239 Predictive policing, because it involves policing, will replicate this reality. This is absolutely true and is the basis of Professor Benjamin's
indictment of the New Jim Code, 2 4 but it is also an argument against policing
(not just predictive policing). Ending predictive policing does not alter the underlying problem of police power. Ending PredPol's contract with the LAPD did not
reduce police patrols. It did not alter any racial bias or efforts at social control inherent in traditional policing. It just removed one data-driven tool, without

231. See id. at 27-29 (noting several collection issues such as "under- and over-reporting" by
officers, "automated" data collection issues near or at LAPD facilities, and more).
232. See id. at 28-29 (detailing total visits and duration of visits at PredPol identified locations by

LAPD vehicles).
233. See id. at 29-30 ("[T]he OIG's review of PredPol dosage revealed potential discrepancies with
how dosage data is being collected that made it difficult to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of
the system in reducing vehicle or other crime.").
234. See, e.g., Lena Nguyen, Opinion, Predictive Policing Algorithm Perpetuates Racial Profiling by
LAPD, DAILY BRUIN (May 2, 2019, 10:47 PM), https://dailybruin.com/2019/05/02/predictive-policing-

algorithm-perpetuates-racial-profiling-by-lapd [https://perma.cc/N8YZ-6HY4].
235. See supra Section II.C.
236. See Predictive Policing: Profit Driven Racist Policing, STOP LAPD SPYING COAL. 2 (Dec. 7,
2016), https://stoplapdspying.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Statement-of-Concern-on-Upturn-Predictive-

Policing-Report-December-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/59G8-65CM].
237. See supra Section II.A.
238. See Aaron Cantu, Algorithms and Future Crimes: Welcome to the Racial Profiling of the

Future, SAN DIEGo FREE PRESS (Mar. 1, 2014), http://sandiegofreepress.org/2014/03/algorithms-andfuture-crimes-welcome-to-the-racial-profiling-of-the-future/ [https://perma.cc/4UMU-ZMKX]
whether predictive policing will perpetuate discriminatory arrests).

239. See supra Section II.A.
240. See generally BENJAMIN, supra note 27.
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impacting the underlying power dynamics of who decides which policing technologies are deployed.
Second, the claims about discriminatory arrests and drug crimes as inputs
would be absolutely correct if PredPol used either of those inputs in their system. 2 4 1 During the LAPD contract, PredPol never used arrests or drug crimes as
inputs. The reason the racial bias argument gained traction was a study that
hypothesized that if PredPol's algorithm-or any similar algorithm that "uses
unadjusted police records to predict future crime[s]"-were used on drug arrests
in Oakland, California, the resulting algorithm would be racially biased against
minority communities. 2 4 2 The study presented a hypothetical model about a
potential problem, offering a valuable warning to the use of predictive policing.243 The study's authors were absolutely correct that it would be a racially discriminatory policing policy to use PredPol against drug crimes in Oakland. But
this was not the reality of the actual technology being used in Los Angeles. This
nuance was ignored by those who wanted to use the study to attack the technology as racist.24 4 In fact, the PredPol inputs in Los Angeles avoided both identified
problems by choosing calls for service for completed crimes and not arrests, and
by choosing property crimes that have already occurred (not drug crimes). 2 45
The point is not that PredPol avoids racial discrimination. Its own founders
reported that PredPol essentially mirrors existing racial disparities of policing in
Los Angeles (which has a history of racial discrimination), but that the fault for
this difference lies in policing, not the algorithm. 2 46 From an abolitionist firstprinciples position (or trap lens), this is a distinction without a difference because,

241. From the original pilot study to the final audit, the PredPol system in Los Angeles focused on
property crimes. See Ferguson, supra note 224.
242. Kristian Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, SIGNIFICANCE MAG., Oct. 2016, at 14,
17-19; see also William S. Isaac, Hope, Hype, and Fear: The Promise and Potential Pitfalls of Artificial

Intelligence in Criminal Justice, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 543, 547-53 (2018) (describing the study and
responding to its critics).
243. See Lum & Isaac, supra note 242, at 19. I have both praised this study for warning about
possible concerns and criticized it as being mischaracterized by many media outlets without correction.
See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Truth About PredictivePolicing and Race, APPEAL (Dec. 7, 2017),
https://theappeal.org/the-truth-about-predictive-policing-and-race-b87cf7cO7Obl
[https://perma.cc/EL8T-

FVS5].
244. See, e.g., Jack Smith IV, Crime-Prediction Tool PredPol Amplifies Racially Biased Policing,
Study Shows, Mic (Oct. 9, 2016), https://mic.com/articles/156286/crime-prediction-tool-pred-pol-onlyamplifies-racially-biased-policing-study-shows#.a7kBWFQyI [https://perma.cc/EM2F-LKZF].
245. Calls for service are not arrests. The former usually involve calls from a reporting victim for
assistance after a past crime, so does not necessarily depend on police discretion. Arrests are generated
from police making contact with an individual suspected of committing a crime and may involve
discretion. Calls for assistance can occur without arrests and arrests can occur without calls for service.
Burglaries, car thefts, and thefts from cars are types of crime that are regularly reported for insurance
reasons and do not necessarily depend on police discretion. Some calls for service can reify racial bias,
as one might imagine calls for "suspicious people" could be codewords for racial discrimination. But
calls for car break-ins and burglaries fall outside of the challenged suspicion data and rest on more solid
ground.
246. See P. Jeffrey Brantingham, Matthew Valasik & George O. Mohler, Does Predictive Policing
Lead to Biased Arrests? Results from a Randomized Controlled Trial, 5 STAT. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 5 (2018).
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again, the goal is to abolish both policing and policing technology.24 7 It is also a
difference that does not justify use. If the technology does not improve racially
disparate policing, that is reason enough not to use it. But the accusation of racial
bias based on misdirected analysis (about drug arrest inputs in a different city)
does show a rhetorical overreach for those who are not trying to ban both policing
and predictive policing. 248
Ironically, the final result from the victory of ending the PredPol contract was
to have LAPD reinvest in yet other data-driven technologies, just without the
catchy buzzwords. 2 49 A review of the LAPD 2019 - 2021 Strategic Plan shows an
increase in data-driven metrics, including hotspot analysis and data-driven
patrols. 2 0 The LAPD budget even increased, not decreased, after these trapfocused attacks.25 1 While the plan does not claim to rely on predictive policing
anymore, it does rely on analytics of past crime data to direct future patrols,
which essentially doubles down on the same data collection and predictive analysis. While trap advocates should take credit for winning a significant early battle,
the war is decidedly not over.
Equally important, the power of who controls surveillance did not change in
Los Angeles. Advocacy resulted in the unilateral shutdown of one type of predictive policing by one vendor, but it was the police department's decision. Unlike
some of the technocratic fixes suggested in the next Part, there is little stopping
police administrators from signing a new contract with the next new name in surveillance technology. There is no legislative accountability, little institutionalized
oversight, and no formal community power structure in Los Angeles. The actual

247. And there is good sense to this argument. If all policing is racist, adding racist technology to
racist policing is not progress. See supra notes 202-08 and accompanying text (discussing the work of
activists making this argument).
248. Perhaps as an admission of the limits of the direct critique but also as an acknowledgement of
the structural powers at play, some activists have shifted to a more systemic critique. For example, when
analysis was done about the location of the hotspots near Skid Row, activists from the Stop LAPD
Spying Coalition concluded that the hotspots were not self-reinforcing feedback loops, as they would
have been if tracking drug arrests; instead, they were designed to encircle areas of less economic wealth,
essentially trapping those living in Skid Row with police presence. Stop LAPD Spying Coal. & Free
Radicals, supra note 201. The data shows how police can be used to control areas economically and
racially by relying on data-driven strategies. This result reveals similar effects of race-based
discrimination, but it is a different argument that has been the dominant argument to rally opposition
against the technology. See id. ("Given the prevailing notion that algorithmic policing would create
'feedback loops,' our expectation was to find Skid Row .. . to be laden with PredPol hotspots. But the
hotspots were instead clustered at the periphery of the community. Rather than visualizing the hyperpolicing that we know occurs in Skid Row, the PredPol hot spot maps appears [sic] to be drawing a
digital border to contain, control, and criminalize Skid Row.").
249. See L.A. POLICE DEP'T, THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT STRATEGIC PLAN 2019 - 2021,

at 21-24, https://perma.cc/3LHK-EX94.
250. See id.
251. See Libby Denkmann, LA City's $11.2 Billion Budget Boosts LAPD Spending andDedicates $1
Billion for Homelessness, LAIsT (June 2, 2021, 4:05 PM), https://laist.com/news/politics/mayorgarcetti-signs- 11-2-billion-city-budget-with-more-lapd-spending-1 -billion-for-homelessness
[https://
perma.cc/7EH5-EYK7].
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power to adopt or reject surveillance still rests exclusively in the control of
police.
The coda to the Los Angeles fight was that the successful movement to attack
PredPol as a manifestation of misguided predictive policing caused PredPol to
change its name and modify its guiding philosophy. PredPol became Geolitica,
and its focus (at least from marketing materials) turned to police technology that
improves transparency, accountability, and effectiveness. 252 This branding move
toward a more open, public-safety orientation is exactly the push the technocratic
lens seeks to develop. As will be discussed in the next Part, this shift also fails to
address the structural power dynamics at play in policing.253
D.

CONCLUSION ON THE TRAP LENS

Trap lens arguments and the larger call to defund policing technology have
reshaped the national debate. Although sweeping and ambitious, the call to completely dismantle surveillance systems has had real organizing appeal. The argument is intellectually consistent and-if one begins with the assumption that
certain police departments will always protect property and privilege and thus be
in the business of disciplining those who threaten those interests-accurate. In
addition, in large urban police departments such as those in Los Angeles,
Chicago, and New York City-which have never avoided scandal, corruption,
and abuse-the argument that anything can avoid policing excesses rings hollow.
Policing is the problem and surveillance-empowered policing is just a bigger
problem.
The open question is whether the movement to abolish surveillance can work
at scale. Early results show modest budget cuts and improved awareness around
policing in general but fewer revolutionary changes.254 In addition, political backlash has tempered transformative cultural change around policing. But momentum for big data policing technologies has noticeably slowed, and the warnings of
the trap ahead have been heard loud and clear. Defunding police surveillance has
become a more achievable proxy battle in the fight over police power and one
that seems possible to win.255
III.

THE TECHNOCRATIC LENS

On the spectrum between complete trust and abject distrust of policing surveillance, a third approach has emerged as a way to regulate the use of police

252. See Trusted Services for Safer Communities: We Run Operationsfor Public Safety Teams to Be

More Transparent, Accountable, and Effective, GEOLITICA, https://geolitica.com/ [https://perma.cc/
YQK3-NYPR] (last visited Oct. 22, 2021).
253. See infra Part III.
254. See Fola Akinnibi, Sarah Holder & Christopher Cannon, Cities Say They Want to Defund the
Police. Their Budgets Say Otherwise, BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.

com/graphics/2021-city-budget-police-funding/.
255. See, e.g., DEFUND SURVEILLANCE, https://www.defundsurveillance.org/ [https://perma.cc/
(last visited Oct. 22, 2021) (detailing the Defund Surveillance campaign's demands to
defund the police and surveillance).
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technologies. Born out of a sense of reformist pragmatism, this technocratic
approach emphasizes democratic accountability, external transparency, and internal front-end evaluations, policies, and limitations to cabin the use of new policing technologies. The idea is to avoid the obvious mistakes of early iterations of
surveillance technologies, conduct front-end privacy and civil rights audits before
launching the technology, then rigorously audit the practice on the back end.
Some technologies might be banned, some allowed, but all would be rigorously
evaluated for racial biases, privacy harms, and constitutional infringements. The
hope is that the well-founded concerns about bias, opacity, and privacy could be
minimized through rules and enforceable laws.
A.

WHY REGULATE?

The urge to regulate has arisen from two overlapping ideas. First, as a matter
of democratic theory, the idea that policing technology should be democratically
accountable makes good sense in a democracy. 25 6 Second is the belief that the
unforced errors of the first generation of surveillance technologies did not have to
occur (even though they did).25 The argument was made that much of the bias
and discriminatory application could have been minimized (if not averted) with
study, reflection, and planning that was conscious of the structural biases in society. 258 While a blanket trust approach had failed, a ban would not be necessary if
certain reform measures could be adopted.
The hope was that a practical, technocratic approach to regulation and reform
could offer concrete progress to those who wished to move past the binary stalemate between the trust and trap advocates. A technocratic approach offers
insights from legal and technology experts to create a third way, neither trusting
the technologies nor banning them but instead regulating them with due concern
for privacy, liberty, civil rights, and the structural racial and power inequalities in
which policing technologies operate.
1. Democratic Accountability
The technocratic approach begins with the belief that police have a role in
ensuring public safety, but that this role must be democratically accountable. 2 59
256. See infra Section III.A.1.
257. Error may, in fact, be a too charitable term, as the failure to see the harms caused by new
technologies goes beyond good-faith inadvertence and into structural blindness and avoidance. The
failure to foresee bias and future harms is a choice for which the technology creators should be held
accountable.
258. A good example of this technocratic approach to the problems of government surveillance can
be seen in the Federation of American Scientists' report on the future of digital surveillance. The report
interviewed numerous stakeholders to examine how issues of bias, discrimination, and privacy harms
could be minimized with better regulation and planning. See generally ISHAN SHARMA, FED'N OF AM.
SCIENTISTS,

A

MORE

RESPONSIBLE

DIGITAL

SURVEILLANCE

FUTURE:

MULTI-STAKEHOLDER

(2021).
259. See David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1706 (2005);

PERSPECTIVES AND COHESIVE STATE & LOCAL, FEDERAL, AND INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS

Jonathan M. Smith, Closing the Gap Between What Is Lawful and What Is Right in Police Use of Force
Jurisprudence by Making Police Departments More Democratic Institutions, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L.

315, 340-41 (2016).
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This police role need not be the same role that caused deep concern about policing in recent decades, but some role is to be played (distinguishing this from the
abolitionist position). 260 Surveillance technologies that enhance democratically
legitimate policing also have a role if approved by democratic processes and if
held accountable through democratic mechanisms.
Much of the theoretical work for democratic policing comes from legal scholars
who have studied the undemocratic structure of policing.2 1 As Professors Barry
Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko have recognized, unlike many other agencies,
police operate under little democratic authorization. 2 2 This fact raises both legitimacy concerns 26 3 and practical concerns and suggests that new forms of democratically connected rulemaking and oversight should be adopted. 264 Whether this
oversight sounds in administrative rulemaking, 265 local involvement, 2 6 or

260. See generally Barry Friedman, Brandon L. Garrett, Rachel Harmon, Christy E. Lopez, Tracey
L. Meares, Maria Ponomarenko, Christopher Slobogin & Tom R. Tyler, Changing the Law to Change
Policing: First Steps, YALE L. SCH., https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/justice/

document/changeto-change-final.pdf

[https://perma.cc/2A58-LEP2]

(last visited Oct. 22, 2021)

(offering "immediate, concrete steps federal, state, and local governments can take to address enduring

problems in policing").
261. See, e.g., Statement of Principles on Democratic Policing, POLICING PROJECT, https://static1.
squarespace.com/static/58a33e881b631bc60d4f8b31/t/59dfa277a803bb57bb93252e/1510756941918/
Democratic+Policing+Principles+9_26_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CC6-RWTC] (last visited Oct.
22, 2021).
262. See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 28, at 1843 ("Policing agencies-for that is what
they are, agencies of executive government-fail to play by the rules of administrative governance.
Because the usual requisites of democratic authorization are lacking with policing, we can have little
confidence that policing at present is efficacious, cost-effective, or consistent with the popular will.");
see also Ponomarenko, supra note 28, at 50-56 (characterizing policing as both "a problem of
democracy" and a problem caused by the absence of democratic oversight); Renan, supra note 28, at
1091-92 (arguing for an administrative law approach to Fourth Amendment enforcement, in part to
promote "greater . . . democratic accountability"); Slobogin, supra note 28, at 95, 140 (arguing that
police departments must "accept the fact that they function in a democracy" and thus "should have to
abide by the same constraints that govern other agencies").

263. See Joshua Kleinfeld, Three Principles of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 Nw. U. L. REV.
1455, 1483 (2017) ("[T]he administration and enforcement of criminal law should be by and of the
people-that is, solidaristic, public, embedded in local communities .. . primarily under lay rather than
official control .... ").
264. See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 28, at 1832 ("Rather than attempting to regulate
policing primarily post hoc through episodic exclusion motions or the occasional action for money
damages, policing policies and practices should be governed through transparent democratic processes
such as legislative authorization and public rulemaking."); see also Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of

Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 Nw. U. L. REV. 1367, 1371, 1374-77 (2017) (discussing
"democratizing criminal justice"); Tracey Meares, Policing and Procedural Justice: Shaping Citizens'

Identities to Increase Democratic Participation, 111 Nw. U. L. REV. 1525, 1534-35 (2017) (discussing
improvements in procedural justice as they relate to the possibility of ensuring "that all will be able to
participate").
265. See Ponomarenko, supra note 28; Slobogin, supra note 28.
266. See Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for "Community Engagement"

Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 801 (2016) ("The primary theories
of deliberative democracy emphasize the right, opportunity, and capacity of anyone subject to a
collectively made decision to participate in a meaningful way in deliberations regarding decisions that
affect him or her."); Fidler, supra note 28.
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community contestation,26 the goal is to have people (through their representatives) authorize the use of police power. These community-focused but technocratically led mechanisms and events would be spaces for democratic debate
about the wisdom of adopting police surveillance technologies.
2. Foreseeable Errors
Another motivating force for the creation of technocratic solutions to surveillance technologies is that the original design errors were foreseeable. Almost every policing technology in recent memory was adopted without privacy risk
assessments, published policies, or background analyses of the potential civil
rights harms. Most were pushed out by technology companies trying to sell product, with police-not citizens-as the primary customer. 2 8 Legal experts and the
impacted communities were almost never consulted before implementation. The
results are observable in the mistakes detailed in the first Part of this Article, and
most could have been predicted.
For example, using inputs that replicate policing patterns, not reported crimes,
and targeting locations that correlate with socioeconomically disadvantaged areas
raise legitimate bias concerns. 2 69 Using facial recognition technologies that are
primarily trained on datasets of white, male faces with the resulting identification
failures across race and gender is plainly mistaken (morally and practically). 270
These systems did not have to be built or developed the way they were. The
blindness of structural racism and the lack of interest to think about systemic
biases contributed to a flawed design process. 271 The simple truth is that in the
rush to invent and sell new technology, companies chose to ignore the social,
racial, or legal contexts of how the technology would be used in a world rife with
inequality.

267. See Jocelyn Simonson, Essay, The Place of "The People" in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM.
L. REV. 249, 265-66 (2019) ("An agonistic stance toward public participation in criminal legal
institutions would allow groups to participate in the processes of those institutions while still remaining
opposed to the dominant priorities of the state actors in charge of them. . . . In order to do so
productively, such paths of critique must include and even prioritize the voices of those marginalized
populations who are most directly impacted by criminal procedural practices. For it is the people at the
bottom of the 'penal pyramid'-defendants, victims, and their families, friends, and neighbors who
come from under-resourced neighborhoods-who are least likely to have the political power necessary
to voice critiques of the system." (footnote omitted)).
268. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
270. See Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in
Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACH. LEARNING RSCH. 1, 11 (2018) ("The most
improvement is needed on darker females specifically."); Joy Buolamwini, When AI Fails on Oprah,

Serena Williams, and Michelle Obama, It's Time to Face the Truth, MEDIUM (July 4, 2018), https://
medium.com/@Joy.Buolamwini/when-ai-fails-on-oprah-serena-williams-and-michelle-obama-its-timeto-face-truth-bf7c2c8a4119 [https://perma.cc/AQC8-PQES] ("Error rates were as high as 35% for
darker-skinned women....").
271. See Joy Buolamwini, Opinion, When the Robot Doesn't See Dark Skin, N.Y. TIMES (June 21,

2018),

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/opinion/facial-analysis-technology-bias.html

systems are shaped by the priorities and prejudices design them....").

conscious and unconscious -

("A.I.

of the people who
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The technocratic approach assumes that starting with those oft-ignored concerns can minimize the harms of the technologies. Just as bad inputs in a datadriven system generate bad outputs, good policy design generates good practices
too.
B.

RESULTS OF A TECHNOCRATIC LENS

The results of the technocratic approach to policing surveillance can be seen in
rules, policies, audits, and academic reports that have sought to regulate surveillance technologies. The goal is to identify potential risks from inputs, socioeconomic-racial contexts, privacy harms, or other biases that could be avoided by
limiting use. The goals of transparency, accountability, and fair process are central to the technocrat's toolkit. This Section examines how these goals can be
operationalized through legislation, oversight boards, audits, and academic
research.
1. Legislative Responses
The most comprehensive and successful technocratic response to police surveillance technology has been the Community Control Over Police Surveillance
(CCOPS) movement. 2 72 Led by the ACLU and supported by dozens of civil rights
groups, 273 the goal is to require local legislative permission before any new surveillance technology is adopted.274 More than twenty jurisdictions have adopted
some form of democratic check on the implementation of new technologies. 275
These laws are strong technocratic approaches, requiring actual legislative grants
of authority as opposed to mere internal guidance or best practices subject to internal accountability. 276
As a model legislative response, a CCOPS bill imagines a formal local ordinance that requires preapproval for all new surveillance technologies. 277 In addition, the operating legislation would require surveillance impact reports, use
policies, annual audits, public hearings and reports, whistleblower protections,
272. Information on CCOPS can be found on the ACLU's webpage. See Community Control over
Police Surveillance: (CCOPS), ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillancetechnologies/community-control-over-police-surveillance [https://perma.cc/6XVJ-4WYC] (last visited

Oct. 23, 2021).
273. See Dave Maass, Join the Movement for Community Control over Police Surveillance, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/09/join-movement-communitycontrol-over-police-surveillance [https://perma.cc/23HQ-LK7P] (describing the diverse coalition of
groups involved).
274. For full disclosure, I have been an advocate of this approach to regulation. See Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson, Opinion, It's Time for D.C. to Regulate Police Surveillance Technology, WASH. POST (June
26, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/local-opinions/its-time-for-dc-to-

regulate-police-surveillance-technology/2020/06/25/9e94feb6-b57a-1lea-aca5-ebb63d27elffstory.html.
275. See Community Control over Police Surveillance: (CCOPS), supra note 272.
276. See Fidler, supra note 28, at 555-57 (describing some of the successes of the administrative
approach).
277. Versions of the CCOPS bills also require review of technologies that police currently use.
ACLU, AN ACT TO PROMOTE TRANSPARENCY AND PROTECT CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES WITH

RESPECT TO SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY 4 (2021), https://www.aclu.org/other/community-control-

over-police-surveillance-ccops-model-bill [https://perma.cc/8YVU-NX34].
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and legal remedies for failures to follow the law. 278 The goal is to make sure that
jurisdictions have deeply considered the privacy and civil liberty risks of the technology, designed policies to minimize those risks, established auditing processes
to double check the planned use, and developed feedback mechanisms from the
community for public approval. The power of the legislation rests with the local
governing body (usually a city council), but much of the work to develop impact
statements, policies, audits, and reviews requires expert knowledge. Although not
spelled out in the legislation, to work as designed, a CCOPS law needs experts in
surveillance technology and privacy law to conduct risk analyses and write
reports on behalf of the polity.
Although several cities have adopted the CCOPS model, 279 Seattle provides an
example of how a CCOPS-like system works in practice. 280 As will be discussed,
the CCOPS model requires significant investment in technical, political, and
community-based oversight mechanisms.
The Seattle Surveillance Ordinance arose in response to a series of scandals
involving surveillance technology being used without public notice. 281 Before
any new surveillance technology is adopted, the ordinance requires a "[s]urveillance [i]mpact [r]eport," which includes "an in-depth review of privacy implications, especially relating to equity and community impact." 28 2 The ordinance
requires community meetings and a public comment period as part of the surveillance impact report. 283 In addition, the Seattle City Council must review all new
surveillance technologies before approval. 284 Finally, the ordinance requires
"detailed reports on surveillance technology use, community equity impact, and
non-surveillance technology acquisitions." 25 The Seattle ordinance covers all government surveillance technologies, not just police technologies, with "[s]urveillance" being broadly defined 2 6 and publicly detailed in a "master list." 287

278. Id. at 1-8.
279. See CHIVUKULA & TAKEMOTO, supra note 42, at 1 & n.1 (examining the structure and scope of
sixteen local surveillance ordinances).
280. See About Surveillance, SEATTLE.GOV, https://www.seattle.gov/tech/initiatives/privacy/surveillancetechnologies/about-surveillance- [https://perma.cc/CGU2-VKJW] (last visited Oct. 23, 2021); see also
Rubinstein, supra note 43, at 1986-91 (discussing the history and practice of the Seattle Surveillance
Ordinance).
281. See Rubinstein, supra note 43, at 1987.
282. About Surveillance, supra note 280.

283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. See id. ("Surveillance is defined as technologies that 'observe or analyze the movements,
behavior, or actions of identifiable individuals in a manner that is reasonably likely to raise concerns
about civil liberties, freedom of speech or association, racial equity or social justice."').
287. CITY

OF SEATTLE, MASTER LisT OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES 2, 5-10 (2019), https://

perma.cc/W62D-ALCT ("The list in this report represents the best effort of departments to identify
existing technologies based on the definition and criteria outlined in the Surveillance Ordinance. Should
additional technologies that were in use as of September 1, 2017 be discovered, this report will be
amended and resubmitted.").
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As might be imagined, the time and effort to create surveillance impact reports,
policies, and audits and to provide the Seattle City Council with the information
needed to make decisions is quite substantial. The City hired a full time Chief
Privacy Officer who oversees an office of privacy experts and legal professionals
to fulfill the mandate of the ordinance. 2 8 Because the list of surveillance technologies is long and the front-end and back-end accountability documentation
requirements so vast, 289 the workload has led to significant delays. 290 Perhaps
more significantly for the technocratic lens, the work has been centered on privacy specialists who control the analysis and debate. 291 Although the final vote
for approval is democratic, the bulk of the accountability rules are technocratic in
nature. 292

The CCOPS bills, and related model bills such as the New York City Public
Oversight of Surveillance Technology (NYC POST) Act, 293 are positive steps toward transparency and accountability. The NYC POST Act resulted in the production of use policies for dozens of previously secret technologies by the
NYPD. 294 Although the NYC POST Act lacks real enforcement mechanisms and
has been criticized as too weak,295 it does require transparent choices to be made
about privacy, equity, and police power. 2 96 This, in turn, allows for public notice

and comment. 297 Compared to a simple trust lens, the requirement to justify use
288. Rosalind Brazel, City of Seattle Hires GingerArmbruster as ChiefPrivacy Officer, TECH TALK
(July 11, 2017), https://techtalk.seattle.gov/2017/07/11/city-of-seattle-hires-ginger-armbruster-as-chiefprivacy-officer/ [https://perma.cc/S99P-GLVV]. The Chief Privacy Officer's staff is a clear example of
a technocratic approach to surveillance oversight. The individuals hired into these roles are well versed
in technology, law, and compliance work.
289. The Seattle Surveillance Ordinance requires policies, audits, engagement, and reporting for
each technology. See supra notes 282-85 and accompanying text. The documentation requirements of
existing technologies consume a significant amount of time and effort.
290. Melissa Hellmann, Seattle's Oversight of Surveillance Technology Is Moving ForwardSlowly,

(June 5, 2019, 5:11 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/technology/seattlesoversight-of-surveillance-technology-is-moving-forward-slowly/.
291. See id.
292. See id.
293. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE tit. 14, ch. 1, § 14-188 (2021), https://codelibrary.
amlegal.com/codes/newyorkcity/latest/NYCadmin/0-0-0-124303 [https://perma.cc/NT84-XGVF]; The
Public Oversight of Surveillance Technology (POST) Act: A Resource Page, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
SEATTLE TIMES

(Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/public-oversight-surveillancetechnology-post-act-resource-page [https://perma.cc/R4J7-SAHL].
294. See Lucas Ropek, NYPD Announces How It Plans to Spy on You This Year, GIzMODO (Jan. 14,

2021, 8:55 PM), https://gizmodo.com/nypd-announces-how-it-plans-to-spy-on-you-this-year-1846062795
[https://perma.cc/3E8F-MPBB];see also Policies, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP'T, https://wwwl.nyc.gov/site/nypd/
about/about-nypd/public-comment.page [https://perma.cc/ET2P-ZZGR] (last visited Oct. 24, 2021) ("The
Public Oversight of Surveillance Technology (POST) Act requires the NYPD to publish impact and use

policies for the surveillance technologies used by the Department.").
295. Rebecca Chowdhury, Abolishing Police Surveillance in NYC: Will TransparencyHelp or Make
it Harder?, SHADOWPROOF (Aug. 12, 2021), https://shadowproof.com/2021/08/12/abolishing-policesurveillance-in-nyc-will-transparency-help-or-make-it-harder/ [https://perma.cc/6YAG-AE7A].
296. See The Public Oversight of Surveillance Technology (POST) Act: A Resource Page, supra note

293.
297. The success of this notice and comment effort has been mixed. Advocacy groups, such as the
Brennan Center for Justice, have compiled letters that criticize the NYPD for its lackluster response to

2021]

253

SURVEILLANCE AND THE TYRANT TEST

to a democratically elected body, even if in a technocratic manner, is a result that
seems to be a modest improvement over the status quo.
2. Community Oversight Response
A legislative response centers oversight within democratic systems with
elected representatives. Other democratic models center inclusive community
groups to play a similar role. 298 The result of local oversight boards has been a
more community-focused approach to surveillance reform.
The City of Oakland, California, for example, has developed one of the more
prominent independent community oversight bodies. 299 In response to concern
that Oakland was developing a Domain Awareness Center system without community input, a group of community organizers led by Brian Hofer began advocating for public oversight of all new surveillance technologies.300 After several
years, the city approved a standing Privacy Advisory Commission. 3 1 This commission is a body required to study and give advice about police surveillance
technologies before implementation by the city. 30 2
More specifically, the commission is a formal body of community representatives who offer technical advice to the city about the privacy risks of new surveillance, prepare public annual reports on existing surveillance technology, and
oversee public hearings on government use of surveillance technologies. 303 In the
policing context, the commission has created use policies for automated license
plate readers,304 cell site simulators, 0 5 unmanned drones,306 and infrared thermal

draft surveillance policies. See Public Comments in Response to the NYPD's Initial Disclosures Under

the Public Oversight of Surveillance Technology (POST) Act, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Mar. 5, 2021),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/public-comments-response-nypds-initialdisclosures-under-public-oversight [https://perma.cc/4SD5-KJXE].
298. See, e.g., Fidler, supra note 28, at 556-57 (discussing the Seattle ordinance's inclusion of
review by "a community stakeholder committee" and "wider community engagement provisions").
299. See generally Privacy Advisory Commission, CITY OAKLAND, https://www.oaklandca.gov/
boards-commissions/privacy-advisory-board#page-documents
[https://perma.cc/R28N-9T75]
(last
visited Oct. 24, 2021) (describing the Committee's functions and providing resources).
300. See Kate Conger, The Man Behind San Francisco's Facial Recognition Ban Is Working on

More. Way More., N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/technology/
facial-recognition-san-francisco-ban.html.
301. See Bylaws, CITY OAKLAND, https://cao-94612.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/Bylaws-for-the-

Privacy-Advisory-Commission.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZU2P-QLNN] (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
302. Alan Greenblatt, What Cities Can Learn from the Nation's Only Privacy Commission,
GOVERNING (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.goveming.com/next/what-cities-can-learn-from-the-nationsonly-privacy-commission.html.

303. See Oakland, Cal., Ordinance 13349 (Dec. 17, 2015), https://cao-94612.s3.amazonaws.com/
documents/Privacy-Advisory-Commission-final-Ordinance-13349-CMS.pdf

[https://perma.cc/A4LH-

XWAE].
304. See MICHAEL P. FORD, CITY OF OAKLAND,
AUTOMATED

PROPOSED USE POLICY FOR VEHICLE-MOUNTED

LICENSE PLATE RECOGNITION (ALPR) FOR PARKING MANAGEMENT AND ENFORCEMENT

(2019), https://cao-94612.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/ALPR-Use-PolicyFINAL-APPROVED-BYPAC_190617_231324.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7YG-9XG7].
305. See Departmental General Order I-]]: Cellular Site Simulator Usage and Privacy, OAKLAND
POLICE

DEP'T,

https://cao-94612.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/DGO-I-11-Cellular-Site-Simulator-

Draft-Use-Policy-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/GGW7-NX7M] (last visited Oct. 21, 2021).
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imaging cameras. 307 It has successfully helped ban facial recognition technology. 308 It has also created draft impact statements about various technologies,
including the Domain Awareness Center system.309 Most notably, Oakland
(under the pressure of the advisory commission) passed a city ordinance requiring
public approval before adopting new surveillance technologies. 310 This ordinance
is akin to the Seattle legislation requiring impact statements, assessments, and
public notice before adopting any new surveillance technology. The power of a
Community Oversight Board ostensibly rests with the community through its
representatives.
3. Independent Audits
The most technocratic responses to surveillance technology come from experts
who audit surveillance systems. Independent audits have played an important
role in regulating and shutting down certain technologies. In Los Angeles, the
Inspector General of the LAPD conducted the formal audit that revealed the failures of the LASER program and PredPol. 311 In Chicago, the RAND Corporation
had a central role in evaluating predictive policing programs. 312
Independent audits can take many forms, but examining the RAND audit of
the Chicago Police Department provides a useful example of how independent
auditors can be a positive form of technocratic review. The RAND report on
Real-Time Crime Centers in Chicago runs over seventy pages; addresses the
technical specifics of different technologies, the process of information flow,
organizational structures, socioeconomic and racial impacts, efficacy; and offers

306. See OAKLAND DEP'T OF TRANSP., [PROPOSED] USE POLICY FOR UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
(UAV)/DRONES, https://cao-94612.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/Proposed-Use-PolicyUAV120318.

pdf [https://perma.cc/PR5E-T6PP] (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
307. See Oakland, Cal., Resolution 85807 (Sept. 24, 2015), https://cao-94612.s3.amazonaws.com/
documents/85807-CMS-FLIR-10-6-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/XVA5-LQY8] (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
308. See Sarah Ravani, Oakland Committee Approves Ban on Facial Recognition Surveillance, S.F.
CHRON. (June 25, 2019, 10:10 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/Oakland-committeeapproves-ban-on-facial-14050026.php. The Oakland Privacy Commission's recommendation to ban
facial recognition shows that a technocratic approach can lead to abolitionist outcomes. Some
technologies are deemed too dangerous to regulate and require a ban.

309. See Oakland, Cal., Resolution 85638 (June 2, 2015), https://cao-94612.s3.amazonaws.com/
documents/DAC-Ad-Hoc-Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/R28N-9T75] (last visited Oct. 24, 2021). In
2013, the city initiated discussions with the Port of Oakland to build a surveillance system with video
cameras and other technology. See Ali Winston, Oakland Surveillance Center Raises Concerns,
SFGATE (July 17, 2013, 9:46 PM), https://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Oakland-surveillance-centerraises-concerns-4671708.php [https://perma.cc/BU4W-B3TJ]. Backlash against the idea spurred the
creation of the Oakland Privacy Commission. See Greenblatt, supra note 302.

310. Oakland, Cal., Ordinance Adding Chapter 9.64 to the Oakland Municipal Code Establishing
Rules for the City's Acquisition and Use of Surveillance Equipment (Apr. 26, 2018), https://oaklandca.
s3.us-west- 1.amazonaws.com/oakcal/groups/cityadministrator/documents/standard/oak070617.pdf

[https://perma.cc/XEC8-GG7S] ("PAC Review Required for New Surveillance Technology Before City
Council Approval"); see PAC Surveillance Technology Ordinance Approved by City Council, CITY
OAKLAND (Jan. 20, 2021, 7:59 PM), https://www.oaklandca.gov/resources/pac-surveillance-technoloy-

ordinance-approved-by-city-council [https://perma.cc/KL7L-DBSX].
311. See OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 95, at 1-30.
312. See generally HOLLYWOOD ET AL., supra note 56.
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a history of the technologies with detailed citations and sources.3" The authors
follow established social science frameworks for analysis and provide significant
documentation, charts, graphs, and data-driven analysis. 314 Whatever one's ultimate assessment of the audit's conclusions, it is unquestionably the work of
experts who spent significant time detailing facts and analyzing those facts
through established methodologies.
Importantly, both the LAPD Inspector General's audit and the RAND report led
to the shuttering of predictive policing in Los Angeles and the Heat List in
Chicago.3 " While it is evident that public protest and community sentiment
shaped the ultimate decision to shut down the programs, the formal justification in
both cases was the respective audit. Both audits used the police departments' own
statistics, practices, and lack of policies to show that the systems could not be
reformed. Spelled out with data, clear arguments, and technocratic conclusions,
the audits made it difficult for decisionmakers to ignore the expert critiques.
A third example demonstrates how technologies can be audited to limit
obvious privacy, liberty, and civil rights concerns. ShotSpotter is a company that
sells acoustic sensors to identify gunshots. 316 As a stand-alone product,3" the
gunshot detector sensors consist of microphones deployed around a city to report
when, where, and how many gunshots are detected. 318 A centralized incident
review center collects the reports of gunshots and reports them to local authorities.319 The technology is defended because it only collects the sounds of gunfire
and allows quicker deployment of police and medical assistance to the location of
detected gunshots. The concern is that police microphones across a city could
capture conversations, violate people's sense of privacy, and target communities
of color. In addition, these gunshot reports encourage an increased police presence by officers primed to respond to potential gun violence. 32 This response can

313. See generally id.
314. See generally id.
315. The link is not causal, but the timing of both shutdowns directly followed the audits.
316. Marin Perez, Shots Fired: ShotSpotter Gunfire Detection System Provides Leg Up on 911,
POLICEl
(Sep. 25, 2007), http://www.policeone.com/police-products/police-technology/articles/
1357787-Shots-fired-ShotSpotter-gunfire-detection-system-provides-leg-up-on-911/
[https://perma.cc/

T5UZ-9DKV].
317. ShotSpotter sells other surveillance technologies to police, including a platform of data-driven
policing technologies for patrol management. See ShotSpotter Connect, SHOTSPOTTER, https://www.
shotspotter.com/law-enforcement/patrol-management/
[https://perma.cc/D2LU-FDRG] (last visited

Nov. 20, 2021).
318. See Reduce Gun Crime with Proven Gunshot Detection Technology, SHOISPOTTER, https://
www.shotspotter.com/law-enforcement/gunshot-detection/ [https://perma.cc/C2S9-2MZL] (last visited

Oct. 24, 2021).
319. Veronique Greenwood, New Surveillance Program Listens for Gunshots, Get Police There in

Minutes, DISCOVER (May 30, 2012, 5:09 PM), http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/80beats/2012/05/30/
new-surveillance-program-listens-for-gunshots-get-police-there-in-minutes/.
320. See Don Babwin & Sara Burnett, Groups Say Gunshot Detection Systems Unreliable, Seek

Review, AP (May 3, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/chicago-police-crime-shootings-be9e44796b
d7e6e3c94108c5e3905ede [https://perma.cc/68KS-SJ7W].
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lead to police overreacting to perceived threats. 321
Recognizing the privacy concerns arising from a technology that deploys mini
microphones around the city, ShotSpotter retained the New York University
(NYU) Policing Project to conduct a privacy audit of the technology. 322 The
NYU Policing Project is an independent entity affiliated with the NYU School of
Law that works to improve public safety through front-end democratic accountability.3 2 3 The NYU Policing Project is staffed by law professors, lawyers, law
students, and technologists who offer expert (and technocratic) insights on a host
of privacy and civil rights issues.
The NYU ShotSpotter Privacy Audit offers a good example of how a deep
dive into the technology and the surrounding privacy risks can avoid the unforced
errors of other surveillance technologies, but it also reveals real limitations. First,
the audit unearthed many design decisions that already minimized the inherent
privacy risks of the audio recordings.324 For example, sensor data is only stored
for seventy-two hours and overwritten if no automated request is made.325
Second, the sensor system primarily involves an algorithmic alert, with a human
review of only a few seconds of audio files before and after the sound.3 26 This
process limits the amount of information heard by the analyst and purposely
keeps the confirmatory audio file away from the police. 327 Finally, while the sensor technologies have the capacity to do more than record a particular type of
sound, they are currently being utilized to only record audio files.328
The NYU Policing Project Privacy Audit built off of these technical limitations
and suggested further privacy protective actions that ShotSpotter eventually
321. See id. The MacArthur Justice Center at Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law issued
a report detailing how ShotSpotter encourages police violence in Black and Latino neighborhoods. The
report suggests that the audio technology unnecessarily deploys tens of thousands of officers in response
to alleged gunshots. See Press Release, MacArthur Justice Center, ShotSpotter Generated over 40,000

Dead-End Police Deployments in Chicago in 21 Months, According to New Study (May 3, 2021),
https://www.macarthurjustice.org/shotspotter-generated-over-40000-dead-end-police-deployments-inchicago-in-21-months-according-to-new-study
[https://perma.cc/JQJ5-GHAY]; MacArthur Justice
Center, ShotSpotter Creates Thousands of Dead-End Police Deployments That Find No Evidence of
Actual Gunfire, END POLICE SURVEILLANCE, https://endpolicesurveillance.com [https://perma.cc/

E82R-UZVE] (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
322. See POLICING PROJECT, PRIVACY AUDIT & ASSESSMENT OF SHOTSPOTTER, INC.'S GUNSHOT

DETECTION TECHNOLOGY (2019). The audit only addressed the privacy issues around the technology.
323. For several years, I have been an unpaid affiliate of the NYU Policing Project as a senior
technology fellow. I was not involved in the drafting or analysis of the Policing Project's privacy audit
of ShotSpotter.
324. See POLICING PROJECT, supra note 322, at 10-11 ("Once operational, these sensors are
continuously 'listening' and a proprietary AI-enhanced algorithm is constantly analyzing incoming
audio. The algorithm reviews the audio for loud 'impulsive' sounds-that is, loud sounds that start and
end suddenly (similar to a gunshot).... Whenever ShotSpotter's algorithm detects an impulsive sound,
the algorithm attempts to identify these sounds (e.g., 'gunfire,' 'helicopter,' 'construction'). Although all
audio, including street noise, traffic, or human voice, are inputs to the algorithm, only gunshot-like
sounds ('impulsive' sounds) actually trigger the sensor and the next stage of the process.").

325.
326.
327.
328.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 11-12.
See id. at 15.
See id. at 14.
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adopted. The audit only focused on privacy risks and did not address efficacy, accuracy, or other racial justice or civil rights concerns. For example, the audit proposed a thirty-hour retention window for collected audio files, reduced from
seventy-two hours. 329 Second, because of the privacy threat of omnipresent
microphones, the audit proposed prohibiting disclosure of sensor locations to
police. 330 While police would know where to go after a gunshot, they would be
prohibited from knowing where the sensors exist in a city. Third, to respond to
the concern of police obtaining audio footage of conversations around the gunshots, the company adopted the audit's suggestion to minimize audio collection
to just the time of the gunshot and to oppose police subpoenas for potential audio
content. 331 Among other recommendations, the audit also suggested avoiding
placing sensors in sensitive areas such as churches, schools, health clinics, or
areas that traditionally have served as public spaces for First Amendment-protected activities.332 Each of these suggestions minimized the privacy risk of otherwise invasive surveillance devices.
The point is not to defend ShotSpotter but only to show how a technocratic
understanding of a technology can minimize some harms at the front end.333 If all
surveillance companies took privacy concerns seriously and invited independent
auditors into their design process, certain foreseeable design errors could be
avoided. Planning on the front end and auditing the back end could avoid design
mistakes and minimize harms. The choices of what to audit, who audits, and how
to audit remains critical, however. For example, the NYU Policing Project Audit
did not address the racial justice aspects of police responses in Black and Latino
neighborhoods or the technology's potential to prime officers to be hypervigilant
and thus too aggressive in their responses to potential gunshots. 334 Nor did the
audit examine how audio files of suspected gunshots might be used or misused as
evidence in criminal prosecutions. 335 Because the audit only focused on one aspect of the technology (privacy) and did not address other aspects of how the
technology might impact civil liberties and civil rights, its value is limited. In
addition, one can easily see how audits could be gamed to legitimize a process
that provides no real accountability or improvement. Trap lens advocates will

329.
330.
331.
332.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
See id. at 17-18.
See id. at 20.

333. There may be other harms beyond privacy. For example, the MacArthur Justice Center at the
Northwestern Pritzker School of Law published a report that showed that ShotSpotter creates dangerous
situations where police respond to potential gunfire with heighted concerns for weapons, adding to the
likelihood of a deadly encounter. See supra note 321.
334. See Press Release, supra note 321.
335. See Garance Burke, Martha Mendoza, Juliet Linderman & Michael Tarm, How AI-Powered
Tech Landed Man in Jail with Scant Evidence, AP (Aug. 19, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/artificial-

intelligence-algorithm-technology-police-crime-7e3345485aa668c97606d4b54f9b6220

[https://perma.

cc/22XK-DGHK]; Todd Feathers, Police Are Telling ShotSpotter to Alter Evidence from Gunshot-

Detecting AI, VICE (July 26, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/qj8xbq/police-aretelling-shotspotter-to-alter-evidence-from-gunshot-detecting-ai

[https://perma.cc/94V4-BECS].
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rightly be wary of an appeal to co-opt oversight through private contracting
arrangements.
Audits are not a complete answer to the dangers of surveillance technology.
Technical audits that identify privacy and civil liberties risks are only as good as
their design, scope, and implementation. ShotSpotter as a company might follow
best practices when it comes to privacy, but that does not mean that the police
using ShotSpotter follow those same practices. For example, in one city, the technology was used to identify the sounds of illegal fireworks.336 This use runs
against both the audit and company guidelines, but when police buy the technologies, police also control their use.3
4. Academic Response
The final example of a technocratic response to policing surveillance comes
from academia. In addition to conducting privacy audits for companies, the NYU
Policing Project has developed model policies on technologies such as predictive
policing, drones, social media surveillance, and automated license plate readers.33 8 The goal of creating the policies was to help governments that are attempting to comply with local surveillance ordinances or wishing to establish best
practices. Because drafting policies on technology is difficult in the best of circumstances, the model policies were meant to give police departments a head
start on compliance.
In a similar fashion, the Harvard Law School's Criminal Policy Program and
Stanford Law School's Criminal Justice Center collaborated to publish a Policy
Toolkit for Emerging Police Technology.339 The project was the result of two
years of discussions and research between twenty-four law, technology, policing,
and civil rights experts, as well as several teams of law students working on white
papers on different technologies. 340 The audience for the toolkit is policymakers
interested in thinking through the traps of new surveillance technology. The
document provides a series of worksheets for police chiefs filled with questions
about costs, governance, and community input that police departments should

336. See Caroline Haskins, Police Departments Are Using Gunshot-Tracking Technology to Pinpoint
Fireworks, BUZZEFED NEwS (July 2, 2020, 7:28 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
carolinehaskins1/police-surveillance-shotspotter-fireworks [https://perma.cc/ULP6-SZ92].
337. This fact is yet another data point that trap lens advocates would claim to demonstrate the lack
of remedies for police misuse.
338. See Resources, POLICING PROJECT, https://www.policingproject.org/featured-resources [https://
perma.cc/F3M9-E3U2] (last visited Oct. 24, 2021). I have directly worked, in an unpaid capacity, to
create some of the policies proposed by the Policing Project.
339. See generally CRIM. JUST. POL'Y PROGRAM, HARV. L. SCH. & STAN. CRIM. JUST. CTR., STAN. L.

A POLICY TOOLKIT (2020) [hereinafter POLICY TOOLKIT],
https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Emerging-Police-Technology-A-Policy-Toolkit.
SCH., EMERGING POLICE TECHNOLOGY:

pdf [https://perma.cc/J5LC-NTMT].
340. See id. at 3, 5. I was a paid Senior Visiting Fellow for the Harvard Law School Criminal Justice
Policy Program and consulted extensively on the toolkit. For additional information on the StanfordHarvard partnership on Policing and Technology, see Stanford Criminal Justice Center, Policing and
Technology, STAN. L. SCH., https://law.stanford.edu/projects/policing-and-technology/ [https://perma.

cc/H4WL-VZYV] (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
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consider. 341 The workflow requires front-end responses to minimize avoidable
errors in design and to address community concerns.
Finally, law school programs such as the Berkeley Samuelson Law, Technology,
& Public Policy Clinic, the University of Washington Tech Policy Lab, the
Georgetown Law Center's Center on Privacy & Technology Program, and the NYUaffiliated Al NOW and Brennan Center have invested significant resources to
respond to new policing surveillance technologies. Led by students and legal experts,
these groups have written research reports, lobbied for legislative changes, and generated public awareness on the negative impacts of new surveillance technologies.
Each of these solutions shares the common belief that trust should not be the
default for policing surveillance. Instead, some combination of external oversight, internal policy limits, and front-end accountability should be built into the
structure of policing. The basic goal is to reform and regulate the growing power
of police surveillance but not ban it outright. The push for reform centers on a
combination of experts and community engagement, but the approach is primarily led by lawyers and technologists.
C.

LIMITATIONS ON THE TECHNOCRATIC LENS

The technocratic lens suffers from real limitations on its effectiveness. Issues
of enforcement, vision, and capacity limit any real hope of reforming powerful
surveillance technologies in ways that do not continue to harm traditionally
marginalized communities.
The first limitation involves structural power. The power of technology companies, police departments, and governments all require coequal checks on that
power-checks that do not exist among technocrats or arise in academia. As a
simple matter, remedies are lacking. Regulation requires accountability mechanisms that are not built into technocratic reforms. There is little penalty for failing
to follow the policies. Even with strong legislative authority, real remedies are
lacking to make police comply with the rules. What can a city council really do if
the police fail to produce the required policies or audits? The currency of money
and power corrupt attempts to create real forms of accountability. And, as has
been discussed, this lack of accountability sits comfortably within the longstanding tradition of police departments resisting police reform. 342 An honest assessment of the first attempts at technocratic reform shows gains in transparency but
not necessarily a limitation on police power. 343

341. See generally PoLICY
342. Many

scholars

TOOLKIT,

have

supra note 339.

catalogued

the

failures

of police

reform. See,

e.g., Friedman,

Disaggregating, supra note 61, at 928-29; Harmon, supra note 47, at 809-16; Alice Ristroph, The
Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1182, 1188 (2017); Joanna C. Schwartz, Who Can
Police the Police?, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437, 438-39; Stoughton, supra note 46, at 613-14; Samuel
Walker, "Not Dead Yet": The National Police Crisis, a New Conversation About Policing, and the
Prospects for Accountability-Related Police Reform, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1777, 1779-83.
343. See Fidler, supra note 28 (describing how administrative governance has fallen short).
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The second limitation is also about power, but it is about how regulation reifies
existing power structures. 34" As discussed with the trap lens, one reason why
reform is a hollow victory for some advocates is that it normalizes the use of surveillance technology. The technocratic approach is basically a narrow reform
response to the New Jim Code, not a movement against the idea of police surveillance. The technocratic lens offers moderate progress but leaves in place systemic
inequality and increasing police power.345 In fact, the regulatory structure may
actually encourage the development of surveillance in ways that make it impossible to limit.346 By creating a regulatory framework, it presumes that surveillance
technology is needed and can be legitimatized with enough policies in place.
Trap advocates have powerfully argued that technocratic reform is just a trust
lens in different (and misleading) packaging. 34 7
The third significant limitation is about perspective. The technocratic solution
is almost always coming from a position of privilege. As can be seen in all of the
examples discussed above, the policies, laws, or policy toolboxes were developed
by lawyers and technologists (many from elite institutions) to be regulated primarily by the same groups. 348 These elite voices are protected by the privilege
that policing traditionally guards and thus may not be centered in the communities impacted by police power. Some are funded directly or indirectly by the
technology companies themselves, and most share a similar world view that
police have some place in social order. The complicity between civil-society lawyers, academia, and police as reformers of the status quo, as opposed to revolutionaries against the status quo, means protection of the status quo.3 4 9 This
344. See Bell, supra note 164, at 2147 ("The expansion of policing control has added to police
departments' coffers over the past three decades, leading to the growth of many forces. Yet even police
officers complain that the system expects them to play an outsized role in poor people's daily lives,
performing functions that supplant work ideally done by the welfare state and social services." (footnote
omitted)).
345. See Akbar, supra note 169, at 464-65 ("Two moves are essential to understand. First, the
traditional police reforms that have been put forward-training, body cameras, better policies, more
diverse police forces-do not address the underlying structural issues that manifest from and through
white supremacy and capitalism. These reforms address superficial symptoms and perpetuate a system
committed to anti-black racism. Second, the traditional reforms may make the problem worse. They
advance a discursive universe that maintains confusion around the nature of the problem. They increase
resources and legitimacy to the institutions that maintain inequality and systematic suffering."
(footnotes omitted)); see also Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L.
REV. 1613, 1618 (2019) (elucidating a vision for the future that focuses not on "alternative forms of
prevention and redress of crime" but on "displac[ing] policing and imprisonment").

346. See Khan & White, supra note 18.
347. See id.
348. See Patel, supra note 266, at 803 ("[D]eliberative democracy may be vulnerable to cooptation
by elite members of the deliberative process, becoming a 'useful legitimating device[] for an alreadydecided policy."' (second alteration in original) (quoting Carole Pateman, Participatory Democracy

Revisited, 10 PERSPS. ON POL. 7, 9 (2012))).
349. See generally ALEC KARAKATSANIS,

USUAL CRUELTY: THE COMPLICITY OF LAWYERS IN THE

CRIMINAL INJUSTICE SYSTEM (2019) (calling out the complicity of lawyers in the criminal legal system);
see also Karakatsanis, supra note 77, at 921-22 (arguing that elites "quell popular energy" for
transformative change because they "are happy with the legal system and want it to keep functioning
largely as it does").
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cultural myopia creates blind spots in terms of who is harmed and who has a
voice in the regulatory structures. 350

Worse, the assumption of democratic legitimacy fails to acknowledge the gaps
in democratic representation. 351 Many communities are, as Professor Monica
Bell has described, legally estranged from police reform policies, 352 and many
others are literally disenfranchised from the political process.3 5 3 A reliance on

democratic process when democracy is distorted by inequalities in cultural,
social, and economic power is not, in fact, equal. While the technocratic process
includes some voices of those impacted by the technologies and creates avenues
for community empowerment, it is not centered in the community.
The final limitations involve capacity, consistency, and cost due to the scale of
the policing systems in the United States. Policies are difficult to write.3 5 4 Audits
are expensive to conduct. Technologies change and then everything needs to be
updated. Staying on top of dozens of different surveillance technologies spread
out over almost 18,000 law enforcement agencies is an overwhelming task.
Worse, only a few groups have the technical and legal capacities to analyze and
audit the use of these technologies, and even these groups cannot keep up with
demand. In addition, the localized nature of government means an equally fragmented appetite for oversight with relevant knowledge being unequally distributed. Adding to the complexity is the danger that companies will co-opt the

350. Even this Article, carefully dissecting analytical strains of arguments, is an example of
privilege. The ability to discuss the abstract theories of surveillance governance without direct concerns
about police power or personal consequence comes from a place of academic privilege.
351. See Bell, supra note 164, at 2067 ("[A]t both an interactional and structural level, current
regimes can operate to effectively banish whole communities from the body politic."); see also Dorothy

E. Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project, 111 Nw. U. L. REV. 1597, 1598-99
(2017) ("[T]he law enforcement bureaucracy is designed to operate in an anti-democratic manner.
Therefore, democratizing criminal law requires an abolitionist . . . approach."); Jocelyn Simonson,

Democratizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and Resistance, 111 Nw. U. L. REV. 1609, 161013 (2017) (positing that "America's criminal justice system is anti-democratic" because it is
unresponsive to the needs of the people "most likely to come into contact with [it]," whose voices are
systematically "muted").
352. Bell, supra note 164, at 2066-67 (describing a theory of "legal estrangement to capture both
legal cynicism - the subjective 'cultural orientation' among groups 'in which the law and the agents of
its enforcement, such as the police and courts, are viewed as illegitimate, unresponsive, and ill equipped
to ensure public safety' - and the objective structural conditions (including officer behaviors and the
substantive criminal law) that give birth to this subjective orientation" (footnotes omitted) (quoting
David S. Kirk & Andrew V. Papachristos, Cultural Mechanisms and the Persistence of Neighborhood

Violence, 116 AM. J. Socio. 1190, 1191 (2011))).

&

353. See Laura M. Moy, A Taxonomy of Police Technology's Racial Inequity Problems, 2021 U. ILL.
L. REV. 139, 145 ("Structural inequity permeates American society to an extent that is impossible to
summarize here, but some notable examples that are relevant to police technology include race-based
residential segregation, a criminal legal system that perpetually disadvantages black people, political
disenfranchisement of people who have been convicted of crimes, a culture that ties blackness to
criminality, and a legal system that helps to insulate police behavior from scrutiny and accountability.").
354. As a result, for-profit groups have emerged to write policies for police. See Ingrid V. Eagly
Joanna C. Schwartz, Lexipol: The Privatization of Police Policymaking, 96 TEX. L. REV. 891, 892-99
(2018) (describing how private groups have been developing policies for police on a national level).
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oversight through financial incentives or corporate support.3" Issues around big
technology companies funding reform projects raise red flags about objectivity
and vision. Until communities can build public oversight capacity, there may not
be enough resources to even attempt a technocratic response to surveillance
technologies.
D.

CONCLUSION ON THE TECHNOCRATIC LENS

The technocratic lens is definitely an improvement over the trust approach
because it offers a measure of democratic accountability and oversight. But as
stated above, the inherent gaps and limitations make reliance on a pure technocratic approach a bit naive. Oversight should work, but the question is whether it
will work in practice without power to check policing institutions themselves.
Rules without remedies offer only paper promises without practical power. And,
as trap lens advocates note, reform may hide the real harms in bureaucratic language. 356 Embracing reform may appear constructive but, in practical effect, may
just enhance police power to protect property, privilege, and other powerful interests. As long as democracy remains co-opted by money, influence, and cultural
power, many marginalized communities will be without a vote to limit police
surveillance.
IV.

THE TYRANT LENS

In contrast to the technocrat's focus on plans and policy, the tyrant lens focuses
on power. Because surveillance technology offers government a new power to
monitor and control citizens, the response must check that power. The question is
how, and the answer is to assume the worst. Power will be abused, and constraints
must work backward from that cynical starting point. The tyrant lens assumes
that governmental power, including police power, must be checked (and checked
again) because the government will misuse it against the less powerful.
As a first principle starting point, the tyrant test remains deeply skeptical of
new forms of technological surveillance power, requiring equally powerful institutional checks that decenter government power into overlapping community
institutions with enforceable individual rights. Technocratic policies, best practices, and oversight steps are necessary but not sufficient to address the threat that
policing technology will be misused against those without power. At the same
time, the tyrant lens is not abolitionist, conceding the utility of some policing
technology under heavy restriction.

355. See, e.g., Alex C. Engler, Independent Auditors Are Struggling to Hold AI Companies
Accountable, EAST Co. (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.fastcompany.com/90597594/ai-algorithm-auditinghirevue.
356. See Karakatsanis, supra note 77, at 921 (arguing that "punishment bureaucrats create
confusion" by "marketing little tweaks as huge changes," or "quelling popular energy for dramatically
changing the punishment system").
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Tyranny-and the fear of arbitrary power-rests at the center of our constitutional order. 357 As will be detailed, the tyrant test can claim a historical pedigree
dating to the Founding of the country and the original spirit of the Fourth
Amendment. In addition, the tyrant test finds support in the Fourteenth
Amendment as a direct response to the arbitrary and oppressive Southern policing
practices that enforced slavery, peonage, and the broader structural power of
racial oppression. 358 Tyranny, be it British customs agents or Southern slave
patrols, manifested as forms of arbitrary police-surveillance power that necessitated a constitutionally grounded, structural response. 359
This Part attempts to reclaim the tyrant test as a better response to police surveillance technologies. The idea is to develop a first-principles framework to
assess surveillance that builds off Fourth Amendment insights. The goal is not to
suggest a new Fourth Amendment rule but to recognize that our old constitutional
responses to other tyrannical threats have application anew. America has faced
the threat of tyranny before and has responded using similar requirements, structures, and rights codified in our foundational law. 360 As metaphor and structural
framework, the original Fourth Amendment inspires a tyrant test that only certain
surveillance systems can pass.
A.

WHY A FOURTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK?

New surveillance technologies present the question of how to face the potential
threat of tyrannical power. The response to actual tyranny can take many forms:
protest, revolution, civil war, coup, or other forms of social and political change.
But the threat to potential tyranny-of democratically handing over the levers of
coercive state power to potential misuse-is a once-removed concern. What do
you do to at the front end to prevent the potential misuse of government police
power at the back end?
Although the U.S. Constitution is only one possible answer to this problem, it
is ours as Americans, and it offers some important insights about how to move
forward in the face of potential surveillance tyranny. 361 This Section examines
the lessons the Fourth Amendment offers against traditional forms of tyranny,
surveillance, and racial discrimination in an effort to develop future protections
for digital forms of mass surveillance. As originally understood, the Fourth
Amendment was far less trusting of government power than modern law

357. See infra Section IV.A.1.
358. See infra Section IV.A.3.
359. See infra Sections IV.A.2-3.
360. See Moran, supra note 35, at 958 ("The United States has not always been deferential to police.
To the contrary, distrust of law enforcement was a hallmark of the pre-Revolutionary War colonies, and
that distrust heavily influenced the founders of this country.").
361. See TIMOTHY SNYDER, ON TYRANNY: TWENTY LESSONS FROM THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

10

(2017) ("[T]he Founding Fathers sought to avoid the evil that they, like the ancient philosophers, called
tyranny. They had in mind the usurpation of power by a single individual or group, or the circumvention
of law by rulers for their own benefit.").
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allows.3 6 2 It was neither technocratic nor abolitionist, but instead it offered a
deeply skeptical compromise about power, the potential misuse of power, and the
structural restraints on power.363
Many scholars have debated the history of the Fourth Amendment. 364 Many
more have used Fourth Amendment history to craft new theories for a modern
age. 36' And, a few scholars have rightly cautioned that any historical analysis
based on an era without a professional police force, without exclusionary remedies, and without extensive criminal laws is a misleading place to begin an
analysis. 366
Conceding the complexities and inconsistencies of the historical record, two
(almost) uncontested principles emerge from an examination of the original
Fourth Amendment. First, the Fourth Amendment was a response to a threat of
tyrannical governmental power. 367 Second, the Fourth Amendment was a
response to authorized, but oppressive, government surveillance. 368 For our purposes-attempting to find first principles from which to approach new police surveillance technologies-this consensus suffices. The Founders feared tyranny
and government surveillance into private spaces and crafted a system of enforceable rights and decentralized power centers to protect the people from government
overreach. 369 The Founders viewed surveillance through a tyrant lens and so
should we.

362. See Eric F. Citron, Note, Right and Responsibility in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence: The
Problem with Pretext, 116 YALE L.J. 1072, 1078 (2007) (describing the "power-skeptical" stance of the
Fourth Amendment).

363. See infra Section IV.B.
364. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759
(1994); Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers' Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86
IND. L.J. 979, 983-84 (2011); Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for History, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1720-43 (1996); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98
MICH. L. REV. 547, 576-78 (1999); Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L.

REV. 1181, 1185-93 (2016); Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional
Law: "Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again," 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1561-63 (1996); Tracey
Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 929
(1997); David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1805

(2000); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 846-57
(1994).
365. Any string cite of scholarship would not do justice to the scores of excellent articles on new
technology and the Fourth Amendment. You know who you are and thank you.

366. See, e.g., Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885, 1921
(2014) ("Due to the lack of police, the Fourth Amendment received relatively little judicial attention for
most of the nineteenth century."); Steiker, supra note 364, at 824 ("[A]t the time of the drafting and
ratifying of the Fourth Amendment, nothing even remotely resembling modern law enforcement
existed.").
367. See, e.g., David Gray, Fourth Amendment Remedies as Rights: The Warrant Requirement, 96 B.

U. L. REV. 425, 452-53 (2016) ("Like many provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment was
motivated by the experiences of colonials and their British brethren with abuses of power.").
368. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the

Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2002).
369. See infra Sections IV.A.1-2.
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1. Tyranny
Tyranny is a strong charge. Evocative in argument and rhetorically powerful, it
conveys a fear of despots and kings. 37 But such was the actual fear at the time of
the Founding. Having lived through the reign of King George III, the Founding
Generation did not want to empower a new federal government only to repeat the
same abusive mistakes. 371 The Constitution was a hedge against tyranny.
This focus on tyranny, literal and theoretical, can be found in the words of the
Founding Generation, which directly evoked fears of tyranny as a justification for
the constitutional system.312 These fears have been echoed in court cases spanning centuries on the justification behind the Fourth Amendment. 373 The feared
tyranny took many forms: concerns about political repression, arbitrary investigations, economic confiscation, and a host of now familiar grievances that led to the

370. See Stephen F. Rohde, Presidential Power vs. FreePress, L.A. LAW., Oct. 2017, at 26, 26 ("The
political thinkers who founded America designed a government to serve as a barrier against the tyranny
they had experienced under King George III and the history of European despots they knew only too
well.").
371. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 63-64 (2005) (describing the
separation of powers as a means to protect against tyranny).
372. See Donohue, supra note 364, 1250 ("Otis denounced general warrants as a tyrannical exercise
of power. 'I will to my dying day oppose,' he stated, 'with all the powers and faculties God has given
me, all such instruments of slavery on the one hand, and villainy on the other, as this writ of assistance
is."' (quoting M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 552 (1978))); Potter Stewart, The Road to
Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-

and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1371 (1983) ("Political historians have debated whether
.

and by how much the writs of assistance contributed to the coming of the Revolution. . .
What is important is that the fourth amendment emerged from the colonists' experiences with general
warrants and writs of assistance as tools of censorship and tyranny.").

373. See, e.g., United States v. Hunt, 505 F.2d 931, 936 (5th Cir. 1974) ("The [Fourth] Amendment
was enacted while the memory of British tyranny was fresh in the minds of the Founding Fathers.");

Wrightson v. United States, 222 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ("The [Fourth] Amendment protects the
people against the seizure of their persons as well as against the search of their houses.... Such searches
and seizures are the embryo of tyranny, and [the Founders] well knew it. Once those safeguards are
gone, the supremacy of force is complete, potentially even if not presently factually."); United States v.

Zemlyansky, 945 F. Supp. 2d 438, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("The Fourth Amendment requires that
warrants state with particularity the items to be searched and seized. This requirement traces directly
back to the Framers' experience of tyranny before this Nation's founding ....
"); United States v.

Browning, 634 F. Supp. 1101, 1102 (W.D. Tex. 1986) ("The Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution was written to protect Americans from government tyranny."); United States v. Silverman,

166 F. Supp. 838, 840 (D.D.C. 1958) ("The history of the Fourth Amendment shows that it was based on
the famous decision of Lord Camden, as well as the experience of the colonies in connection with writs
of assistance and was intended to bar exploratory domiciliary searches that were obviously oppressive

and savored of tyranny."), aff d, 275 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1960), and rev'd, 365 U.S. 505 (1961);
Underwood v. State, 78 S.E. 1103, 1106 (Ga. Ct. App. 1913) ("They are the sacred civil jewels which
have come down to us from an English ancestry, forced from the unwilling hand of tyranny by the
apostles of personal liberty and personal security. They are hallowed by the blood of a thousand
struggles; and were stored away for safe-keeping in the casket of the Constitution. It is infidelity to
forget them; it is sacrilege to disregard them; it is despotic to trample upon them. They are given as a
sacred trust into the keeping of the courts, who should with sleepless vigilance guard these priceless gifts

of a free government.").
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U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 374 Tyranny was thus not just a motivating
force but a framing fear of the constitutional order. 375
A modern tyrant test draws from this historical background. The tyrant is not
just a rhetorical trope but a real fear of lawful, but oppressive, government.
Although the democratic process has distanced us from this proverbial tyrant (for
the most part), the fear of government overreach remains. Designing legal structures to prevent tyrannical power via surveillance technology is consistent withif not required by-the constitutional plan.
2. Surveillance Power
The colonial threat of tyranny was not abstract but concretely manifested in
specific policing powers. 376 Customs agents and royal government ministers
policed the colonies by authorizing broad searches and seizures of people, property, and goods. 377 The colonists lived in a quasi-surveillance state with British
agents tasked to monitor, inspect, and control towns for economic and political
reasons. 378 In preconstitutional revolutionary days, the potential use of general

374. The Fourth Amendment worked as a bulwark against tyranny in conjunction with other
constitutional rights such as the right to a jury and the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478
U.S. 364, 383 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment can serve as a constant reminder
of the high standards set by the Founding Fathers, based on their experience with tyranny." (quoting
ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 81 (1955))); Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 337
(2d Cir. 2005) ("The right to trial by jury has long been an important protection in the civil law of this
country. According to the Founding Fathers, the right served as 'an important bulwark against tyranny

and corruption.'" (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting))).
375. See Charles E. Moylan, Jr. & John

Sonsteng, Constitutional Constraints on Proving

"Whodunnit?," 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 171, 182 (1990) ("Many of the leading figures from the
independence movement such as Patrick Henry, Samuel Adams, Governor Clinton of New York and
Governor Randolph of Virginia vehemently opposed the proposed constitution as 'a return to
tyranny. ").
376. See Gray, supra note 367, at 453 ("Among English courts' primary reasons for outlawing
general warrants was their effect on collective security. The courts reasoned that nobody could feel
secure if forced to live under a regime where executive agents had the authority to engage in programs
of broad and indiscriminate search, limited only by their own unfettered discretion." (footnote omitted));
James J. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: The Walls Close in on the Warrant Requirement, 29 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1103, 1134 (1992) ("The Framers objected to general warrants and writs of assistance
because they resulted in arbitrary deprivations of privacy, property, and liberty. Those deprivations were
arbitrary in part because officers were authorized to search and seize upon bare suspicion. They were
also arbitrary and dangerous because agents of the executive were given 'unlimited discretion' to choose
whom, where, and what to search and seize." (footnotes omitted)).
377. The protections ran to commercial establishments as well. See Donohue, supra note 364, at
1261 ("John Dickinson wrote Letters from a Pennsylvania Farmer, a series of essays decrying the
Townshend Acts. 'By the late act,' he wrote, [']the officers of the customs [were] impowered to enter
into any HOUSE, warehouse, shop, cellar, or other place, in the British colonies or plantations in
America to search for or seize prohibited or unaccustomed goods, etc. on writs granted by the superior
or supreme court of justice, having jurisdiction within such colony or plantation respectively.[']"
(second alteration in original)).
378. As is well understood, the blanket authority granted to British agents to search and seize goods
created frustration and resentment in the colonies. General warrants allowed almost indiscriminate
searches, authorizing the holder of the warrant almost unlimited access to go into homes and businesses
to search for contraband, seditious material, or untaxed goods. Writs of assistance were particular forms
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warrants and the writs of assistance as enforcement authorities mobilized colonists to rebel.379 After independence, the fear of federal search powers motivated
states to pass search and seizure protections, which eventually inspired the Fourth
Amendment.3 80
Responding to potential invasive surveillance powers thus was at the center of
the original Fourth Amendment. 381 These government powers involved mechanisms of social control and policing. For example, general warrants were overbroad and essentially permanent, granting surveillance powers without geographic
or temporal boundaries. 382 In addition, general warrants allowed for arbitrary
monitoring and confiscation, placing discretion in the hands of individual agents
of the state. 383 Third, the surveillance directly impacted specific interests, such as

of general warrants that authorized searches in Boston and other colonial cities in the mid-1700s. The
anger that arose in response to these broad grants of unchecked power sparked the American Revolution.

See David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 70 (2013)
("Before America's founding, British agents routinely abused general warrants, including writs of
assistance, to subject our forefathers to the eighteenth-century equivalent of a surveillance state.").
379. See Gray, supra note 367 ("The Fourth Amendment's principal betes noires were general
warrants, including writs of assistance.").
380. See Sklansky, supra note 364, at 1792 ("[D]uring the debates at the state level over ratification
of the proposed Constitution, those concerned about the search-and-seizure powers of the federal
government consistently called for an amendment restraining those powers 'within proper bounds,' or
forbidding 'all unreasonable searches and seizures."').

381. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) ("Our cases have recognized that the
Fourth Amendment was the founding generation's response to the reviled 'general warrants' and 'writs
of assistance' of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an
unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity. Opposition to such searches was in fact one of the
driving forces behind the Revolution itself."); see also Donohue, supra note 364, at 1284 ("Concerns
about general warrants, and about ensuring that specific warrants contained sufficient particularity,
figured largely in the conversation, which centered on ensuring that the rights of the people would be
secure against government overreach.").

382. See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965) ("Vivid in the memory of the newly
independent Americans were those general warrants known as writs of assistance under which officers
of the Crown had so bedeviled the colonists. The hated writs of assistance had given customs officials
blanket authority to search where they pleased for goods imported in violation of the British tax laws.
They were denounced by James Otis as 'the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of
English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book,'
because they placed 'the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer."'); Wheeler v. State,
135 A.3d 282, 297 (Del. 2016) ("[I]nitial efforts at crafting a Federal Constitution met strong opposition
due, in part, to the drafters' failure to impose limits on the government's power to search. These
objections ultimately led to the inclusion of the Fourth Amendment in the Federal Bill of Rights."
(footnote omitted)).

383. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) ("It is familiar history that
indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of 'general warrants' were the
immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment."); Camara v. Mun.
Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) ("The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless
decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions

by governmental officials."); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 319-20 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("When the Constitution was up for adoption, objections were made that it contained no Bill
of Rights. And Patrick Henry was one who complained in particular that it contained no provision
against arbitrary searches and seizures: '... general warrants, by which an officer may search suspected
places, without evidence of the commission of a fact, or seize any person without evidence of his crime,
ought to be prohibited. As these are admitted, any man may be seized, any property may be taken, in the
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the home, persons, papers, and effects. 384 Compared to modern law enforcement,
early police had few investigative powers, but the fear of authorizing greater surveillance power remained real. The debates about how to respond to those future
surveillance threats involved considering how to control overbroad, arbitrary,
and invasive surveillance capabilities.385
3. Race and Tyranny
A century removed from the Founding, a different sort of tyranny motivated
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the focus in the constitutional
text is on equal protection and due process 386-and the horror of slavery was paramount to its passage-arbitrary and abusive racialized-policing practices also
played an important background role. Reconstruction surveillance tactics offer a
striking historical parallel in terms of arbitrary and overbroad police powers
directed at the African-American community. 387
The late Professor Andrew Taslitz wrote the definitive history of the Fourth
Amendment and the Reconstruction Amendments. 388 In his scholarship, he examines how Southern states responded to abolition and the fight to end slavery with
oppressive and intrusive policing practices. 389 Some of these policing powers
resembled general warrants in their scope, breadth, and granting of discretionary
authority to law enforcement officials. Others involved harsh search and seizure
tactics seeking to target abolitionists and those supporting the abolitionist cause.
most arbitrary manner, without any evidence or reason. Every thing the most sacred may be searched
and ransacked by the strong hand of power."').
384. See Donohue, supra note 364, at 1240 ("At the most general level, early American colonists
reviled search and seizure on the grounds that they unduly interfered with private life. Colonial enmity
extended beyond general warrants to any government entry into the home. Response to such searches
tended to be immediate and visceral-not part of an intellectualized objection to promiscuous search.");
see also Davies, supra note 364, at 576-77 ("The Framers sought to prevent unjustified searches and
arrests from occurring, not merely to provide an after-the-fact remedy for unjustified intrusions. For
example, the complaints they voiced about searches concerned the breach of the security of the house.
Likewise, the constitutional texts they wrote did not simply seek to provide a post-intrusion remedy or
condemn only the actual use of a general warrant; rather, the constitutional texts adopted a preventive
strategy by consistently prohibiting even the issuance of a too-loose warrant." (footnote omitted)).
385. See Gray, supra note 367, at 457 ("One of the principal concerns confronting those who met in
Philadelphia during the hot summer of 1787 was controlling the newly constituted federal government.
Conventioneers harbored particular concerns about the power and authority of the central government
and its ability to override protections afforded by state constitutions and the common law.").

386. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
387. See Michael Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis over Hinton Helper's Book, the Impending Crisis:
Free Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on the Meaning of the First Section of the Fourteenth

Amendment, 68

CHI.-KENT

L. REv. 1113, 1117 (1993) ("Republicans invoked rights referred to in the

First Amendment (here involving antislavery speech, press, and religion), the Fourth Amendment
(involving unreasonable searches and seizures aimed at antislavery activists and publications), and the
Eighth Amendment (involving cruel and unusual punishments for opponents of slavery) in the years
1859 to 1866 to criticize state political repression that the 'slave power' aimed at opponents of slavery.
In this respect the battle between antislavery and slavery replicated earlier battles for political liberty in
which dissenters invoked basic liberties, including criminal procedure guarantees later set out in the

American Bill of Rights.").
388. See generally TASLITZ, supra note 34.

389. Id. at 12.
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For people subject to these arbitrary (but lawful) grants of government power,
their complaints sounded in tyranny. For example, police agents enforced the
rules of slavery, including all of the attendant invasions of liberty, privacy, and
constant surveillance that came with human bondage. 390 After slavery, police and
deputized agents enforced the Black Codes and laws that restricted movement
through physical stops and seizures. 391 This resulted in a pattern of police encounters, searches, and kidnappings under legal authority.3 92 In parallel to the
Founding, states responded to abolitionist dissent with crackdowns and searches
seeking to suppress political speech that criticized the practice of slavery. 393
Government power was used in an arbitrary and violent manner to control ideas,
movement, and the cause of abolition. Again, similar to the revolutionary complaints of the Founders, the abolitionists faced physical searches, increased surveillance, and arbitrary seizures that restricted movement and intruded on private
lives and papers. 394
This fear of tyranny and police power thus influenced the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 395 While minimized in modern understandings of the
ratification, protection from police searches and seizures was central to the ideal
of constitutional equality. Professor Taslitz wrote, "The Republicans who
debated the Fourteenth Amendment understood the close connection among the
kinds of rights that the Fourth Amendment protected, free speech and press, and
390. Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the FourthAmendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 43
(2003) ("[S]lavery was partly defined by the deprivation of Fourth Amendment interests in freedom of
movement, privacy, and property.").
391. Justin S. Conroy, "Show Me Your Papers":Race and Street Encounters, 19 NAT'L BLACK L.J.
149, 159 (2006) ("Slavery is closely entwined with the Fourth Amendment's relationship with street
encounters. The pass system, which limited the movements of African Americans, gave way to the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments."); Taslitz, supra note 34, at 746 ("The Black Codes sought to
reinstitute the functional equivalent of slavery by impinging upon Black privacy, property, and freedom
of movement. The Codes provided for the arrest and return of Blacks who breached labor contracts with
their employers, prohibited Black servants from leaving their masters' premises, and authorized hiring
out Black children and Blacks unable to pay vagrancy fines. The Codes made certain conduct criminal
for Blacks, but not for Whites." (footnotes omitted)).
392. See Taslitz, supra note 34, at 747 ("The Codes thus sought to repress Black freedom of
movement, privacy, and property as an expression of an intolerable idea of equality."); id. at 748 ("The
Fourteenth Amendment was partly intended to ensure the constitutionality of the 1866 Civil Rights Act,
which effectively outlawed the Black Codes.").
393. See id. at 714 ("The drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment were concerned with protecting
Republican and abolitionist critics of slavery and of the post-slavery reactionary policies of the Southern
regime, whose governments had subjected those critics to abusive searches and seizures to silence
dissent."); id. at 738 ("The ultimate spread of universal suffrage, the rising public attention to the
abolitionist cause, and fear of their own slaves led [antebellum plantation owners] toward an evergreater hysteria about abolitionist thought. They reacted with repressive measures designed to squelch
free speech and press. Unjustified and discriminatory searches and seizures were among their primary
weapons for silencing dissenters and promoting citizen ignorance." (footnotes omitted)).
394. See id. at 740 ("Repressive searches and seizures were not directed solely at those engaged in
blatant political speech. The South had a growing fear of slave revolt and violent retribution.").
395. See id. at 749 ("Senator Howard quoted Corfield v. Coryell on the Senate floor and listed the
'right to be exempt from unreasonable searches and seizures' among the privileges of national
citizenship. There is little serious doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to ensure the
application of the Bill of Rights, including the Fourth Amendment, to the states." (footnotes omitted)).
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the nature of free movement and privacy as central aspects of the expression of a
message of equality." 396 Thus, the original constitutional guidance against tyranny emerged again in the fight for racial equality in the states.39 7 From before
the Fourteenth Amendment to the present day, police power and government surveillance has been connected to Fourth Amendment values.
4. A Tyranny Paradigm
Historical parallels provide guidance, but not clear justification, for why society should adopt the tyrant test for new surveillance technologies. Just because
one can make a historical connection or two does not mean history should shape
analysis. Similarly, reference to constitutional values outside of doctrinal interpretation offers interesting insights but no requirement of fidelity.
Yet, if one is looking for common first principles on which to build agreement
around new technologies, looking at existing shared understandings can help. As
I argue below, a tyrant test combines both the abolitionist sentiment against
police power and the technocratic promise of a way forward to limit, regulate, but
not completely ban future police technologies. While a bit oversimplified, the
Fourth Amendment was a reaction to the problem of potential tyranny, allowing
a limited grant of government surveillance power but only within an interlocking
structure to prevent abusive and arbitrary enforcement. 398
B.

THE TYRANT TEST

Because the threat of tyranny comes from those with power (even democratically authorized power), the remedy must respond to that power. Limiting the
authority of those allowed to use state power through legislation and legally enforceable rights was one such remedy. 399 Situating power in community institutions with full power to check the otherwise legitimate government (such as
juries and grand juries) was another such response. 400 Carving out private areas
and personal spaces forbidden to police investigation power was a third.401
Intriguingly, the early theory of the Fourth Amendment-centered around written
restrictions, judicial review, civil tort remedies, juries and grand juries, and substantive search limits-offers a jumping off point for modern-day application to
surveillance. The goal here is not to bring the past into the future but to use the
past to reimagine a new future.
This Section imagines a tyrant test based on Fourth Amendment values. The
tyrant test works on two levels. First, it invites a question that new policing
396. Id. at 748.
397. See id. ("The Reconstruction Congress meant to halt the designation of Blacks as special targets
for various searches and seizures.").
398. See Steven I. Friedland, Of Clouds and Clocks: Police Location Tracking in the Digital Age, 48
TEX. TECH L. REV. 165, 172 (2015) ("The Fourth Amendment was intended to be a limitation on an
organic and developing government, requiring some checks and balances as a regulatory limitation on
government while also respecting the division between the public and private spheres.").
399. See infra Section IV.B.1.a.
400. See infra Section IV.B.1.e.

401. See infra Section IV.B.2.
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technologies must answer: Can a proposed technology pass the tyrant test? In
practical form, this means asking whether a structural-power sharing system has
been designed and implemented to curtail the tyrant's potential use of the technology. A technology only passes the tyrant test if the proponent can show that
the risks and threats have been mitigated by establishing these structural checks
on power. Second, the tyrant test reflects a commitment to legal and political
oversight, combining the establishment of formal authorizing legislation, judicial
oversight, executive branch limits, community-based institutional checks, and
individual rights and remedies.
The tyrant test is neither a judicial test nor a constitutional test. It is a first-principles framing theory that builds off lessons learned by studying the Fourth
Amendment as a constraint on government power. Two overlapping themes
emerge, focusing on structural protections and substantive limitations. Both
themes build off the debates around the original Fourth Amendment as a response
to potential tyrannical power.
1. Structural Checks
The Fourth Amendment signifies a structural protection against arbitrary government power.40

2

Written into the Constitution-our controlling law-it enco-

des a distrust of all branches of government. 403 The Fourth Amendment forbids
legislatures from granting authority to unreasonably search or seize persons,
papers, homes, or effects or to weaken warrant requirements below a probable
cause standard.404 The Amendment restricts executive branch agents from effectuating generalized searches or seizures.4 05 And, while the Fourth Amendment
requires judicial involvement-a nod to the checks and balances in the systemit also reflects a distrust of those same judges. In the Founding Age, judges were
not to be trusted.4 06 Thus, as a structural matter, the Fourth Amendment limits

government power through a series of interlocking power sources centered on enforceable individual rights. As discussed earlier, the need for such a protection
came from the assumption that government (in all forms) would abuse its power,
402. See Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74

N.Y.U. L. REv. 956, 991-92 (1999) ("The language of the [Fourth] amendment appears to have been a
direct response to the concerns of political minorities of the time that a federal government would
trample the individual rights of those groups or individuals who were held in disfavor. Thus, the
amendment operated as a structural protection against unregulated police power." (footnote omitted)).
403. See Moran, supra note 35, at 959 ("When the Framers drafted the Constitution and the
subsequent Bill of Rights, they had in their minds an imperfect and untrustworthy government which, if
not kept in check, would disregard fundamental liberties, particularly the liberties of minority groups
lacking political power.").

404. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
405. See Donohue, supra note 364, at 1322 ("The Founders' concern went beyond the amassing of
tyrannical power in one place to the impact such an accumulation of power would have on the separation
of powers. General warrants gave power to the executive branch, without constraint on how the power
could be used. General warrants amounted to the proverbial fox guarding the hen house.").
406. See Travis Christopher Barham, Congress Gave and Congress Hath Taken Away: Jurisdiction

Withdrawal and the Constitution, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1139, 1169 (2005) ("[T]he Founding
generation viewed the judiciary with great skepticism.").
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and only written, enforceable, and individually assertable rights would-collectively-check the potential abuse. 407
The tyrant test borrows from this cynicism of governmental self-restraint and
designs structural protections against new surveillance technologies. It is certainly not enough to trust police, as the Fourth Amendment's design does not trust
government power. But it also would not be enough simply to trust laws or policies to restrain government. Those could be, as has been argued by those who
favor the trap lens, too easily co-opted and weakened by the powerful. Lawful
surveillance abuses were still abusive, and as Professor Thomas Davies has
argued, the Fourth Amendment was primarily concerned with restraining future
legislative grants of abusive (but lawful) surveillance power. 408 The tyrant test
thus goes beyond legislative and technocratic checks to a more holistic system of
checks involving interlocking and overlapping powers, individual rights and remedies, and limited grants of authorization, so no branch of government can abuse
the power.
a. Legislative Checks
As a structural matter, the tyrant test begins with the principle of negative liberties and the requirement of democratic authorization. 409 Police would only be
granted surveillance power by explicit authorizing acts from the legislative
branch. Liberty from surveillance would be the norm, and public and democratically accountable authorization in written law would be the only exception. In
other words, no surveillance technology would be allowed to be used without
specific democratic authorization. This structural limit reinforces separations of
power and democratic legitimacy, and it offers a measure of checks on police
power.
Practically, this would mean any new technology (for example, predictive policing or facial recognition) would need authorizing legislation granted by a democratically enabled body before use. Unlike the last decade of pilot projects,
opaque procurement, and tactical secrecy, new technologies would need to be
publicly approved before use, akin to the CCOPS model. 410
In addition, legislation would establish a series of executive branch, judicial,
and community checks, as well as grant enforceable rights of action for breach of
the authorizing legislation. These protections, which will be discussed in the next
few Sections, are centered in legislative rules.

407. See supra Section IV.A.1.
408. See Davies, supra note 364, at 590 ("[The Framers] were concerned about a specific
vulnerability in the protections provided by the common law; they were concerned that legislation might
make general warrants legal in the future, and thus undermine the right of security in person and house.
Thus, the Framers adopted constitutional search and seizure provisions with the precise aim of ensuring
the protection of person and house by prohibiting legislative approval of general warrants.").
409. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Alaska Constitution and the Future of Individual Rights, 35
ALASKA L. REv. 117, 121-22 (2018) ("It has often been said that the United States Constitution is about
negative liberties-prohibitions on what the government can do.").

410. See supra Section III.B.1.
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b. Executive Branch Checks

Second, all such rules around authorization would be written down and publicized consistent with rule of law principles. Reflecting the insights of a written
constitution (although embracing the practicality of technocratic use policies),
the tyrant test would also require formal rulemaking and strict use limits via enforceable policies. These limits would be executive branch checks enabled and
acted on by executive officials.
The tyrant test embraces all of the earlier discussed technocratic solutions to
hold police surveillance technology accountable. 41 For example, to ensure a
measure of executive branch self-limitation, formal policies, formal audits, formal accountability measures-like the Seattle CCOPS inspired ordinance-must
be built into the regulatory structure at the front end. This would include frontend civil rights and civil liberties audits, which would be publicized and turned
into written and enforceable policies. In addition, back-end internal accountability systems must be created. New rules around training must teach the limits of
using the new technologies, and certifications around accuracy and effectiveness
must be designed from the beginning. Finally, the reporting mechanisms must be
internal to police and also reflect outwards to legislative authorizing bodies, community oversight bodies, and the people. Internal police policies without external
accountability mechanisms are not sufficient, just like mere technocratic reforms
are insufficient. As will be discussed, violations of the policies and internal rules
must have remedies via legislative, judicial, community, and individual rights
mechanisms. 412 These are not mere reforms around the edges but structural prerequisites for adopting any new technology.
Adding layers of rulemaking is a double-edged sword for accountability. On
the one hand, it offers a way to observe, manage, and hold technology to account.
On the other hand, the rulemakers concentrate control in the hands of those with
power. 413 This type of technocratic solution alone is not enough to control police
power, but it does offer a mechanism for transparency, enabling other structural
checks, such as lawsuits and community advocacy, to work. For new policing
technologies, this would mean that any proposed use must be regulated by public
rules, policies, and use restrictions before and after implementation.
c. JudicialChecks
In addition to legislative authorization and executive self-regulation, the tyrant
test also requires judicial involvement. Although distrustful of judicial officers,
the Founders did envision that courts could play a role to check the other branches

411. See supra Sections III.B.1-4.
412. See infra Sections IV.B.1.d, IV.B.1.f.
413. See infra Section IV.C.
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of government. 414 The Fourth Amendment's inclusion of the Warrant Clause
acknowledged the judicial role in limiting government power. 415
The modern Fourth Amendment has relied even more heavily on judicial approval for invasions of liberty. 416 The tyrant test borrows a bit from both old and
new approaches. Two separate but related checks are important. One check is
that there must be an independent, third-party process for approving surveillance
use that sits outside the executive branch. The second check is that the procedural
approval must be based on an elevated standard of proof that balances government need and individual liberty in favor of the individual.
First, as to process, the tyrant test would involve a judicial check akin to a warrant for many use cases involving individualized suspicion and surveillance technology. 417 In practical terms, the government would need a signed judicial
warrant to conduct a facial recognition search or collect smart data from a targeted person or a third party. The government already follows this probable cause
warrant approach before using certain invasive surveillance technologies such as
cell site location information tracking, GPS tracking, and Stingray international
mobile subscriber identity surveillance. 418 Parallel to the traditional warrant
414. See Yanez-Marquez v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 434, 464 (4th Cir. 2015) ("General warrants and writs
of assistance bestowed upon the executing officials a high degree of deference and, crucially, 'provided
no judicial check' on a judicial officer's determination that an intrusion into a home or dwelling house
was justified. The Founders imposed that missing 'judicial check' by adopting the Fourth Amendment,
which requires neutral and detached judicial officers to assess whether probable cause has been shown
for searches of persons, houses, papers, or effects." (citation omitted) (quoting Steagald v. United States,

451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981))).
415. See Davies, supra note 364, at 650 ("The common-law sources also shed considerable light on
why the Framers objected only to general warrants, but not to specific warrants. At common law,
specific warrants provided several layers of protection against arbitrary searches. First, and perhaps
foremost, the specific warrant gave a particularized command to the officer, thereby circumscribing the
officer's exercise of his own judgment as to whom to arrest, what place to search, or what items to seize.
The specific warrant controlled the officer.").
416. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ("Searches conducted without warrants
have been held unlawful 'notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause,' for the
Constitution requires 'that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . be interposed
between the citizen and the police . . ..' (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (first quoting Agnello

v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925); then quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82
(1963))).
417. See, e.g., Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 20 (1984) (per curiam) ("[W]e have consistently
reaffirmed our understanding that in all cases outside the exceptions to the warrant requirement the
Fourth Amendment requires the interposition of a neutral and detached magistrate between the police
and the 'persons, houses, papers, and effects' of citizens.").

418. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215, 2221 (2018) (cell site location
information); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405-08 (2012) (GPS); United States v. Lambis, 197
F. Supp. 3d 606, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (international mobile subscriber identity devices) ("[T]he
Department of Justice changed its internal policies, and now requires government agents to obtain a
warrant before utilizing a cell-site simulator." (first citing Press Release, DOJ, Justice Department

Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators (Sept. 3, 2015), 2015 WL 5159600; and
then citing Richard Downing, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Dep't of Just., Deputy Assistant Attorney
General Richard Downing Testifies Before House Oversight and Government Reform Committee at

Hearing on Geolocation Technology and Privacy (Mar. 2, 2016), 2016 WL 806338 ("The department
recognizes that the collection of precise location information in real time implicates different privacy
interests than less precise information generated by a provider for its business purposes."))).
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requirement, a formal process to use a new surveillance technology for investigative purposes would require an independent judge to sign off.
An even stronger protection would be to analogize to the authorities of Title III
of the Wiretap Act 419 and require a "super warrant" before using a technology. In
the facial recognition context, I have previously sketched out how a super warrant
(parallel to Wiretap Act requirements) should apply to certain surveillance technologies. 420 In simple terms, authorizing legislation would require police to: (1)
obtain judicial approval to use certain liberty-infringing technologies, (2) limit
use to serious violent felonies, and (3) rely only on the technology after other nontechnological investigation mechanisms have been deemed unhelpful.4 2 1
Mirroring existing Title III Wiretap Act authorization, the tyrant test would
require similar police surveillance authorization. While wiretap authorities are
not without criticism, involving ever-expanding use and routinized approval,
oversight is stronger than standard probable cause warrants or the status quo (of
no warrants at all).
The second check involves the requirement of probable cause before the surveillance technology can be authorized via judicial warrant. Warrants without
legal standards offer little protection. The constitutional terminology of probable
cause (although diluted in recent eras) provides a baseline level of proof to justify
an invasion of liberty. 422 The tyrant test would also require at least a probable
cause standard to justify police use of any technology. Police would need to assert
under oath the rationale for why a certain technology was used in a particular
criminal investigation. The probable cause standard is not terribly protective, but
it does generate a written record of the ex ante grounds of suspicion and acts as a
forcing mechanism to justify use. 4 23

419. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968

§

802, 18 U.S.C.

§

2518. Under this

federal statutory provision, investigators can ask a judge for a wiretap order to listen to conversations
from a suspect's home or cell phone. id. § 2518(1). The level of suspicion for a wiretap warrant is
probable cause, but investigators must also detail why there are no other alternatives, what will be done
to minimize incidental collection, and the time and limits of the proposed collection. See id. § 2518(1)

(b)-(d), (3)(a)-(b). Wiretap orders must be signed off on by a judge. Id.

§

2518(3). Because of the

invasive nature of the request-receiving permission to listen to the content of personal conversationsthe standards are higher than a judicial warrant and taken seriously. The colloquial term super warrant
signifies the heightened legal standard, seriousness, and limits compared to an ordinary judicial warrant.
420. See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 1202-07 (suggesting a Wiretap Act-like process for use of some
facial recognition matching technology).

421. Id. at 1204-05.
422. Andrew Manuel Crespo, Probable Cause Pluralism, 129 YALE L.J. 1276, 1279-80 (2020)
(discussing the history and puzzle of probable cause).
423. See State v. Patterson, 515 P.2d 496, 502-03 (Wash. 1973) ("In a search warrant issued under
law by a judicial officer, however, there is more than the protective shield of probable cause. The written
record surrounding the judicial issuance of a search warrant probably affords greater protection to the
individual against abuse of power by the police than does the generalized requirement of reasonableness
and probable cause. The warrant itself is a direct command to the peace officers to proceed
circumspectly, to make a record of their actions in executing the search and to make a return to the
issuing judge. Thus, the police must serve the warrant within the time specified in it, or within a
reasonable time of its issuance or within a time specified by law; they must make a report to the court in
writing particularly describing the articles seized and describing the place or persons from whom taken.
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A probable cause-warrant approach, however, does not easily fit passive,
mass-surveillance technologies that are always collecting data, such as automated
license plate readers or video surveillance cameras. 424 One of the problems of
new surveillance technologies is that they apply broadly without particularity and
collect data continuously. Probable cause-as a standard of individualized suspicion-cannot be met without a particularized target or crime.425 The consequence
of a probable cause requirement for these data collection systems is that it would
essentially ban them because, by design, they are never based on individualized
probable cause.
The solution-as other scholars have recognized-is to focus on use, not collection. 426 A probable cause requirement to search within the established collection systems could be required by an authorizing statute. Although outside the
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, which focuses on collection and not use,
there is nothing preventing enabling legislation from requiring judicial-warrant
equivalents for particular use within surveillance systems. 42 7 So, for example, a
probable cause warrant could be required for examining footage within the network of digital surveillance cameras or within the collected license plate database. Investigating officers would need to be able to point to probable cause of a
suspected crime (for example, a bank robbery) and probable cause that the dataset
will contain useful information (for example, that the license plate of the getaway
car is likely in the automated license plate reader dataset). All of these procedures
would need to be implemented before use to satisfy the tyrant test. The corollary
(and cost) to this requirement is that generalized surveillance using these technologies would almost never be allowed. Generalized use of facial recognition or
mass collection of geolocational data-because it has no individualized target or
suspicion-would be disallowed. The only use of the technologies would be with
a high enough level of suspicion to survive judicial scrutiny and a warrant.
Again, this is not a Fourth Amendment argument for why probable cause warrants are required to use surveillance technology but an analytical model on how

These requirements of a written record as a basis for the warrant and a written return to the issuing
judicial officer showing exactly what actions were done under its authority probably affords the
individual and his house, his papers and his effects conceivably as great a protection from unwarranted
police intrusion than the minimal standards of reasonableness mentioned in the constitution.").
424. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 143-84 (2017).
425. See Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What's "Reasonable": The Protections

for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 320 (2016); see, e.g., United States v. Gatto, 313 F. Supp. 3d
551, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) ("The Fourth Amendment mandates 'that a search warrant describe with
particularity the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.' To be sufficiently
particularized, a warrant must, (1) 'identify the specific offense for which the police have established
probable cause,' (2) 'describe the place to be searched,' and (3) 'specify the items to be seized by their
relation to designated crimes."' (footnote omitted) (first quoting United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56, 61

(2d Cir. 2010); and then quoting United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 99 (2d Cir. 2017))).
426. See, e.g., Rebecca Lipman, Protecting Privacy with Fourth Amendment Use Restrictions, 25

GEO. MASON L. REV. 412,440 (2018).
427. See Orin S. Kerr, Executing Warrantsfor Digital Evidence: The Casefor Use Restrictions on

Nonresponsive Data, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 17-18 (2015).
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to structure legislative checks to restrain the metaphorical tyrant. The operating
authority is still legislative and regulatory but requires judicial checks.
d. Rights-Based Checks
Fourth, enforceable remedies akin to constitutional rights for surveillance
abuses would be included in any authorizing law. In effect, this means granting
individual causes of action for violations of controlling laws in the authorizing
statutes. Creating affirmative and enforceable legal rights for violations of the
authorizing legislation would allow individuals to challenge the technology in
court. Even if the existing litigation barriers of cost, time, and expertise exist, a
clear remedial mechanism for individual rights with access to the judiciary would
act as another check on police power.4 28 These rights would allow individuals
and communities to sue if the surveillance technology exceeds authorization, violates policy rules, is used to invade constitutional rights under the First or Fourth
Amendments, or discriminates on the basis of race.
Rights on paper cannot be protected if legal barriers to court exist. Reasons
why litigation has been an unsuccessful check on surveillance include the legal
doctrines around standing, immunity provisions, and the cost of litigation.4 29
Grants of third-party standing, removal of immunity provisions, and other litigation barriers will need to be addressed in the authorizing legislation. 430
Rights-enforceable in court without the usual barriers to litigation-need to
be front and center of the protections for groups to bring legal challenges. For
example, if a surveillance technology were used in violation of an authorizing ordinance or exceeded the grant of authority, the impacted individuals and community institutions should be able to file a lawsuit. 41 The suit could involve an
injunction to end the unauthorized use of the technology or monetary damages
(or both) and be enforceable via a tort suit. Local jurors might hold police departments to account for misuse of existing grants of power. The tort suit would be
similar to the original manner by which Fourth Amendment violations were
brought in civil court with civil damages in front of local juries. 432 In fact, the
entire logic of the original Fourth Amendment depended on an enforceable civil

428. A good example of this type of legislatively granted right is the Illinois Biometric Information
Privacy Act, which allows Illinois citizens to sue for illegally harvested biometric data. 740 ILL. COMP.

STAT. 14/20 (2021).
429. This is not to say that there have not been successful lawsuits. Community groups and the
ACLU brought a legal suit against the Baltimore Police Department, challenging the use of aerial
technology-"planes equipped with high-tech cameras"-in Baltimore. Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle

v. Balt. Police Dep't, 2 F.4th 330, 333 (4th Cir. 2021) (en banc).
430. Each of these barriers to litigation is formidable. The recent debates to modify qualified
immunity crystalize how hard it will be to establish legislation that allows individual accountability
mechanisms. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity and Federalism All the Way Down, 109
GEO. L.J. 305, 307-08 (2020) (discussing the recent proposals to change qualified immunity).
431. The CCOPS draft legislation includes an individual remedies section, providing attorney's fees,
whistleblower protection, and other litigation protections. ACLU, supra note 277, at 7-8.
432. See Amar, supra note 364, at 786 ("Tort law remedies were thus clearly the ones presupposed
by the Framers of the Fourth Amendment and counterpart state constitutional provisions.").

278

THE GEORGETOWN LAw JOURNAL

[Vol. 110:205

remedy. 433 This type of plaintiff-friendly legal regime would add legal costs to
the surveillance regime. Impacted individuals would sue and likely would regularly challenge misuse of surveillance technology. But the threat of litigation and
the individually enforceable suits would offer a mechanism to counterbalance
police power. While litigation cannot prevent the abuse of surveillance, it might
offer a mechanism to remedy surveillance harms. In addition, in the authorizing
legislation, the provision of attorney fees and waivers of traditional government
immunity provisions must be included to encourage litigation.
Lawsuits challenging surveillance would not mean that the litigants would
win. Lawyers still would have to demonstrate to juries why the misuse was
harmful. And traditional juries-old and new-may not be perfect vehicles to
implement a tyrant test. That said, the idea of creating a local body of community agents randomly tasked with curtailing the abuses of government power
may offer more protection than the technocratic, rule-focused response of
elites.
Rights also have a symbolic function of reasserting the power balance desired
by society. As part of the tyrant test, this balance favoring individual rights over
government surveillance must be reestablished. In any enabling legislation, the
individual, collective, and community rights to privacy, liberty, security, and
freedom from discrimination must be articulated and given recognition. This declaration of rights in the enabling acts must be publicly stated in ways that reflect
the changing power of digital surveillance. 434
Finally, definitions in these rights-granting laws must expand currently narrow or
contested interpretations around digital privacy. For example, much debate has centered around how to reconceive privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment fixtures
such as homes, persons, papers, and effects. 435 These physical concepts now have
digital analogues, leading to open questions about the scope of protection. Enabling
legislation limiting police surveillance can be drafted to incorporate digital equivalents of these constitutionally protected interests and fill the lacuna created by the
digital world.4 36 Constitutional gaps around issues of collective privacy,437 fiduciary

433. See Davies, supra note 364, at 624-25 ("At common law, a search or arrest was presumed an
unlawful trespass unless 'justified.' Thus, law enforcement authority as such consisted simply of those
justifications for arrests or searches recognized by the common-law treatises and cases. . . . Furthermore,
the victim of an unlawful arrest or search could sue the offending officer for trespass damages. The
common law recognized no broad doctrine of official immunity." (footnote omitted)).
434. For example, Illinois legislated additional privacy protections for biometric information, some
of which is captured by digital surveillance technologies such as facial recognition. See Biometric
Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10, 15, 20 (2021).
435. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The "Smart" Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 547, 55253 (2017) (exploring the constitutional gaps in Fourth Amendment law).

436. See id.
437. See David Gray, Collective Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 77,
79 (2018); David Gray, A Collective Right to Be Secure from Unreasonable Tracking, 48 TEx. TECH L.

REV. 189, 191 (2015).
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protections, 4 38 third-party access, 439 and mass surveillance 440 could be addressed

at the front end in legislative text. New technologies will raise hard questions that
cannot all be answered in enabling legislation, but many gaps have already been
identified and could be addressed, including expanded definitions of harms,
grants of community standing to sue, and future proofing protections to help with
interpretation of how traditional, analog protections should be evaluated in the
digital age. What matters is that the tyrant test includes individual and collective
legal rights to challenge the tyrant's use of power within the authorizing statute.
e. Local ParticipatoryChecks
Fifth, structures of citizen participation should be created in the authorizing
legislation. Local institutions could be given absolute approval power before
adopting any technology. This shift to localized control is one of the markers of
the tyrant test. The key is decentering power away from the government institutions and reallocating it to the community. This citizen-participation element
deserves some exposition because it offers a more fundamental power shift
beyond legislative, executive, and judicial checks.
One model for citizen-based institutional limits on government power is the
grand jury. At the time of the Founding, grand juries were decentralized checks
on government power. 1 Grand jurors were given a whole host of broad quasilegislative powers to regulate their communities, including initiating investigations and tax collection. 442 Grand juries were not considered an arm of the prosecution but an independent community check to oppose executive power.
Similarly, trial jurors played a much more significant role in criminal cases,
deciding both law and fact. 443 It was also the civil jury that decided the reasonableness of a government search and thus whether the search was a violation of

438. See generally Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REv.
611, 649-57 (2015) (laying the groundwork for determining who are Fourth Amendment fiduciaries).

439. See Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 357, 378 (2019)
(summarizing Carpenter's three-factor test that should be applied based on the category of information
being sought, not the specific facts of a case).
440. See Rushin, supra note 9, at 286-87.
441. Brent Tarter & Wythe Holt, The Apparent Political Selection of Federal Grand Juries in

Virginia, 1789-1809, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 257, 260 (2007) ("Grand juries were of equal importance
with trial juries. Anglo-American traditions of popular liberty required not only citizen participation in
the adjudication of the guilt or liability of their fellows, but also that citizens participate in the process of
charging fellow citizens with crimes.").
442. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Innovation: Toward a Functional Makeover of the

Ancient Bulwark of Liberty, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 339, 354 (2010) ("[G]rand juries in colonial
America levied taxes, allocated public works spending, appointed government officials, and helped to
manage other affairs of local government.").
443. See Douglas A. Berman, Making the Framers' Case, and a Modern Case, for Jury Involvement

in HabeasAdjudication, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 887, 888, 892 & n.24 (2010) ("[I]t was widely believed in the
Framing era that juries could and should have authority to decide matters of both law and fact when
rendering a general verdict about a defendant's fate.").
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the Fourth Amendment.444 Therefore, the juror as a citizen and the jury as institution represented the community and had a central voice in controlling government power and checking tyrannical impulses.
Now imagine that before a surveillance technology were adopted, a city had to
receive a local institution's approval-the equivalent of a grand jury-made up
of local citizens.44 5 Twenty-three randomly selected citizens-guided by tech
experts, lawyers, and researchers-would approve or disapprove surveillance
technologies based on their local views. 446 The geographic areas could be kept
small, and different areas of a city might come out with different outcomes.
This democratic approval of policing power would be local-centered on communities impacted by police surveillance, with juries selected from these areas.
Whether seen as an example of federalism or a practical acknowledgment of the
fragmented, local differences in policing, the locus of authorization must be from
the community. Formal civilian oversight boards with final authorizing power
and other forms of direct participation would be built into the system of approval
and accountability. It could be the case that a networked series of cameras would
be allowed in one neighborhood but banned from another. Local groups might
make different local choices. This has been the call from some Black Lives
Matter activists and others engaged in localizing the process of police reform. 7
Unless approved by a locally constituted authority with authentic community
input, police surveillance technologies would not be allowed to operate.
A loose, city-wide model for these community-based oversight bodies can be
found in Oakland's Privacy Advisory Commission. 448 As described earlier, the
444. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Privacy Is the Problem, 19 WIDENER L.J. 873, 886 (2010) ("[T]he
Founders believed that "'the people,"' and not judges, were 'to protect both individual persons and the
collective people against a possibly unrepresentative and self-serving officialdom.' The people
exercised considerable power in these preconstitutional cases because juries, not judges, determined the
reasonableness of a search." (footnote omitted) (quoting AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

68 (1998))).

445. See Adams & Rameau, supra note 161, at 530 ("Ending the occupation and initiating truly
democratic Community Control over Police in the Black community must manifest in the form of
civilian boards, comprised of residents subject to police jurisdiction, with 100%-complete authority over
the priorities, policies, and practices of the police. Such boards are essential to realizing the 'consent of
the governed,' as the governed would exercise control over those who carry arms and have the right to
enforce laws, deny people their freedom, and even, in extreme circumstances, take lives in the name of
the governed."); Udi Ofer, Getting It Right: Building Effective Civilian Review Boards to Oversee

Police, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 1033, 1044 (2016) (proposing a civilian review board in which the

.

"majority of the board is nominated by civic organizations that have an interest in the safety of the city
and in the civil rights of community members" and that has actual disciplinary power).
446. Adams & Rameau, supra note 161, at 536 ("A randomly selected board, based on demonstrable
residency in the policing district, is vital to advancing the democratic ideal of informed consent of the
governed and is the only way to achieve true Community Control over Police.").
447. See Akbar, supra note 169, at 434 ("The demand for community control is a rejection of the
community policing frame. Community control instead posits the problem as one of power and
accountability: that Black communities do not have meaningful power or input in how the police forces
that govern them operate."); Community Control, supra note 216 ("We demand a world where those
most impacted in our communities control the laws, institutions, and policies that are meant to serve us
448. See supra notes 301-02.
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Oakland Privacy Commission has been a good example of a city-wide community oversight institution with influence.44 9 The difference would be that in addition to the appointed commissioners in Oakland-who might reflect interests of
lawyers, activists, technologists, or law enforcement 45 -the tyrant test model
would also have members of the community selected through a random, jury-like
lottery. In fact, the same jury selection system could be used. In addition, unlike
the city-wide model, the tyrant test would be more localized, centered in neighborhoods and smaller jurisdictional areas.
The tyrant test version of this type of local oversight-surveillance jury would
also balance community interests and expertise.45 The goal would be to create a
mix of technology-informed experts who can address the acknowledged concerns
of new technology and ordinary citizens, summoned just like jury duty, who
would represent the community. Together-experts and the impacted community
-would decide whether to approve any new, legislatively authorized surveillance technology.
If one's reaction to such an embrace of local power is that it is unworkable,
inefficient, or debilitating to good governance, the Founders might disagree. 452 In
fact, the reason for the grand jury was to make it hard for such government
powers to be used, and local criminal juries were explicitly designed as antityranny institutions. Seeing the grand jury and petit jury as this radically localized
power center (onerous enough to thwart potential tyranny) is exactly the point. 4 3
Although co-opted by judicial and prosecutorial power today, the original jury
and grand jury were thorns in the side of government power and meant to protect
against tyranny.454 The same role can be played by citizen-based surveillance

449. See supra notes 299-309 and accompanying text.
450. The Oakland Ordinance suggests that the commission's membership include a variety of criteria
covering the above categories. See Oakland, Cal., Ordinance 13349 (Dec. 17, 2015), https://cao-94612.
s3.amazonaws.com/documents/Privacy-Advisory-Commission-final-Ordinance-13349-CMS.pdf

[https://perma.cc/A4LH-XWAE].
451. See Ofer, supra note 445, at 1042 (describing how many police oversight boards are "overseen
by a review board that is majority nominated and majority appointed by the mayor (or in combination
with the head of the police), thus minimizing the independence of such boards").
452. See Berman, supra note 443, at 893 ("[T]he Framers were eager to create a permanent role for
juries in the very framework of America's new system of government. The Constitution's text was
intended to make certain that the citizenry could and would serve as an essential check on the exercise of
the powers of government officials in criminal cases.").
453. For several examples of parallel ideas of community control over policing, see Akbar, supra
note 169, at 433 (explaining that community control "includes 'democratic community control' of
police, so that 'communities most harmed by destructive policing have the power to hire and fire
officers, determine disciplinary action, control budgets and policies, and subpoena relevant agency
information"' (quoting Community Control, supra note 216)); Redmond, supra note 162, at 232 ("The
current system of police oversight is not working for the benefit of the people. It is working for the
benefit of the economic elite. It is time for a paradigm change. It is time to put control of the police in the
hands of the people.").

454. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968) ("The guarantees of jury trial in the
Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be
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juries when it comes to surveillance technology.4 5
The key to success would be that these community organizations would be
given final decisionmaking authority to approve or disapprove the technology.
Although these decisions could be reevaluated over time, the decisions would be
final until a change. So, even with an authorizing law, judicial checks, and legal
rights, the technology could not be implemented if the local citizen-based surveillance juries rejected use in their community.

f.

EqualProtectionChecks

Sixth, and finally, the legislation would include principles of equal protection
to ensure nonracist use of the technology and remedies for breach. Reflecting the
animating concerns of the Fourteenth Amendment, these equal protection principles would require preapproval, ex post audits, and remedial legal mechanisms to
evaluate disparate impact and effect.
If Fourth Amendment equal protection safeguards were in one measure a
response to arbitrary and abusive police power based on racial tyranny, a tyrant
test must explicitly address the racial inequity in the use of police technologies. A
first step would be to require a form of nondiscriminatory preclearance proof
before adoption. Simply stated, a technology would need to show that it does not
racially discriminate before adoption. This preclearance process would need to
be attuned to race-neutral proxies for racial inequality, but the testing and standards are possible. Facial recognition technology is tested for racial bias by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology and other independent organizations. 4 56 Predictive policing has been tested for possible racial bias inherent in its
use. 457 Although not perfect by any means, the capacity to test for racial bias
exists."'

enforced and justice administered. A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to
prevent oppression by the Government. Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and
experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate
enemies and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority. The framers of the
constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection against
arbitrary action. Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or
eccentric judge." (footnote omitted)).
455. See Patel, supra note 266, at 798 ("Rather than viewing the various methods of police reform as
consensus building, legitimizing, or transparency mechanisms, I suggest community engagement
elevates the role of stakeholders and affected individuals through a contested process. In some
circumstances this contestation creates the potential for a shift in power between communities and the
456. See, e.g., PATRICK GROTHER, MEI NGAN & KAYEE HANAOKA, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS

&

police.").

nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2019/NIST.IR.8280.pdf [https://perma.cc/WV7R-G8BP];

Buolamwini

&

TECH., FACE RECOGNITION VENDOR TEST (FRVT) PART 3: DEMOGRAPHIC EFFECTS 1-3 (2019), https://

Gebru, supra note 270, at 8-11.
457. See generally Brantingham et al., supra note 246 (testing for racial biases using arrest data from
a predictive policing experience in Los Angeles).
458. Cathy O'Neil, a national expert on algorithmic fairness and auditing, has created a consulting
service to audit for racial and gender inequities. See O'Neil Risk Consulting & Algorithmic Auditing: It's
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Preclearance is only the beginning. Audits to determine racial impacts and
inequities must also be created at the back end. Many well-meaning projects
result in unintended, unequal outcomes. As a result, audits must be created in the
authorizing legislation to ensure that racial bias does not undermine the fairness
of the technology. 459 Finally, remedies within the authorizing statutes must allow
equal protection challenges to be bought in court if it could be shown-based on
the audits-that the surveillance technology was designed or implemented in a
way that demonstrated racial bias.
g. Systemic Checks
Each of these procedural protections could be implemented by legislation.
Although modeled on constitutional insights, the enabling power would likely
need to be legislative and not constitutionally grounded. In many ways, the tyrant
test builds off of the strong version of the technocratic model but with a more
cynical starting point and a stronger shift in power toward community institutions
and individual rights. If the technocratic approach centers power on the legislature to democratically approve surveillance, the tyrant test centers power on the
community to democratically resist surveillance. The end goal would be to create
a legislatively enacted but community-based power structure-a practical, interlocking system of checks, rights, and laws that would limit even the worst actor
from misusing the technology in an arbitrary or generalized manner.
2. Substantive Limitations on Surveillance Power
Although the procedural parts of the tyrant test build off technocratic-seeming
limitations, the substantive parts reflect more abolitionist and trap lens values.
Certain types of searches would be prohibited no matter the procedural niceties
followed. This substantive limitation also tracks a more traditional understanding
of the Fourth Amendment, which restricted certain types of searches of personal
papers. 460 Professor Morgan Cloud has written: "The substantive limit precludes
searches and seizures of some property, even if the Amendment's procedural
requirements are satisfied. Private papers are the archetype of tangible property
deserving greater protection than other kinds of property. Papers are special
because they contain the physical manifestations of the author's thoughts." 461
Although absent from today's Fourth Amendment debates, the early

the Age of the Algorithm and We Have Arrived Unprepared, ORCAA, https://orcaarisk.com/[https://

perma.cc/22T4-FXPZ] (last visited Oct. 28, 2021).
459. As an example, Congress has proposed bills that would require such data audits. See, e.g.,

Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. (proposed Apr. 10, 2019).
460. Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and

Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 620-21 (1996).
461. Id. at 620; see id. at 620-21 ("Boyd and Weeks rested in large part on the conclusion that
because of the inherent testimonial attributes of papers, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run together
to create a zone of privacy into which the government cannot intrude unless the papers are stolen
property, contraband, criminal instrumentalities, or required records-papers in which the government
can assert an independent interest, or over which it can assert independent authority.").

284

THE GEORGETOWN LAw JOURNAL

[Vol. 110:205

understanding of the Fourth Amendment involved a far more privacy-protective
vision of government monitoring and surveillance powers. 462
Again, for our purposes, the references to Fourth Amendment history and
theory are offered as a way to develop a tyrant test model of regulatory constraint,
not as a constitutional argument. The tyrant test is not the Fourth Amendment,
and the Fourth Amendment is not the tyrant test. The point here is that one way to
think about reducing police surveillance powers is to recognize that some private
areas were once protected from all government monitoring and could be again. 463
a. Papersand Tyranny

At the outset, it is important to acknowledge that all originalist understandings
of the Fourth Amendment are contested. 464 That said, one interpretation of the
early cases that inspired the Fourth Amendment suggest a much stronger substantive bar on certain types of government monitoring of papers and ideas. 465 The
argument here is not that the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to bar
these types of searches (although perhaps it should) but that a tyrant test modeled
on the Fourth Amendment's response to tyranny should protect against these
types of invasions.
To go back to the seminal search cases that influenced the drafting of the
Fourth Amendment, one thing was clear-certain types of searches were especially concerning. For example, the searches in Entick v. Carrington466 and
Wilkes v. Wood 67-two cases that influenced the Founding Generation-were
vilified not because they were unauthorized (in fact they were duly authorized)
but because of what they sought: the papers and private ideas of individuals. 468
Much ink has been spilled explaining the influence of Entick on the Framers of
the Fourth Amendment. 469 The case involved a political dissenter's lawsuit
462. Id. at 618-19 ("The text and history of the Fourth Amendment demonstrate that it exists to
enhance individual liberty by constraining government power." (footnote omitted)).
463. See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment "Reasonableness,"

98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1646 (1998); William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and
the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 561 (1992) ("[I]f Fourth Amendment law is to have any
real bite, there must be substantive restraints on government power.").

464. See Brian Sawers, Original Misunderstandings: The Implications of Misreading History in
Jones, 31 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 471, 477 (2015) ("The original understanding of the Fourth Amendment is
one of the most contested issues in constitutional originalism."); see also sources cited supra note 364.
465. Cloud, supra note 460, at 619 ("The fourth amendment enacts a vision of the individual as an
autonomous agent, empowered to act and believe and express himself free from government
interference.").

466. (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (KB).
467. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (KB).
468. See Donohue, supra note 364, at 1198 (discussing Entick v. Carrington: "[I]t was not the
physical break-in or the rummaging in drawers that constituted the essence of the Crown's misconduct,
but rather the invasion of the indefeasible rights of personal security, liberty, and private property. Every
man in his home was entitled to live free from the gaze of the Crown. The right to privacy ought not to
be infringed. The wrong occurred not just when property was confiscated or incriminating evidence
obtained, but at the moment the King's messengers entered." (footnote omitted)).

469. See T.T. Arvind & Christian R. Burset, A New Report of Entick v. Carrington (1765) 2 (Notre
Dame Legal Stud., Paper No. 200131) ("The Supreme Court has described [Entick] as 'the true and
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against the government officials who ransacked his home looking for written
proof of his seditious complaints. 470 Lord Camden's condemnation of this search
influenced American revolutionaries who wished to protect their own dissenting
views from future government overreach. 471 Entick suggests that surveillance of
private ideas should be prohibited regardless of warrant procedures and wellfounded suspicion. 472 Simply stated, it was the search that was condemned, independent of the legal justifications and authorities. Even if treasonous, even if
criminal, the papers of Entick or Wilkes were not to be exposed to government
eyes, even with a particularized warrant. 4 73
These cases influenced American lawyers who drafted the Fourth
Amendment. 474 The harm that the Fourth Amendment was supposed to protect
against was government surveillance of private ideas in protected spaces such as
homes. It was not just the harm of confiscating the papers or rummaging through
private spaces but also the threat to liberty of monitoring private lives. 475
The Supreme Court's first significant Fourth Amendment case reaffirmed this
privacy-protective view. In Boyd v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a
government court order for business records violated the Fourth Amendment. 476
The Court determined that such an invasion into private papers (specifically, in
that case, business records) violated the spirit of Entick and thus the Fourth
ultimate expression of constitutional law' for the Founding generation, a case that not only illuminates
the Fourth Amendment but helped to inspire it." (footnote omitted) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116

U.S. 616, 626 (1886))); Donald A. Dripps, "DearestProperty": Digital Evidence and the History of
Private "Papers"as Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 104
(2013) ("American courts recognized Entick as part of the received body of English common law.").

470. See Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. 807.
471. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment's Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L.

REV. 977, 985-87 (discussing Entick).
472. See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of CriminalProcedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 399
(1995).
473. See Clancy, supra note 471, at 987 ("Camden also rejected the government's ability to search
papers as a means of discovering evidence in either criminal or civil cases. To emphasize the strength of
that substantive restriction on the government's ability to search, he said: 'yet there are some crimes,
such for instance, as murder, rape, robbery, and house-breaking, to say nothing of forgery and perjury,
that are more atrocious than libeling. But our law has provided no paper-search in these cases to help
forward the conviction."' (footnote omitted) (quoting Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. 807)); Arvind & Burset,
supra note 469, at 31 ("For authors who opposed those warrants, the key danger was not the brief
trespass they enabled but the more enduring damage they might inflict by exposing the secrets of the
government's critics.").

474. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2264 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that "[t]he Fourth Amendment came about in response to a trio of 18th century cases,

including Entick); City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 247 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in

.

the judgment) (stating that Entick "profoundly influenced the Founders' view of what a 'reasonable'
search entailed").
475. Morgan Cloud, Property Is Privacy: Locke andBrandeis in the Twenty-First Century, 55 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 37, 54-55 (2018) ("Seizing all of a person's papers then exposing them to scrutiny by
others was a particularly odious transgression because papers were a unique form of property.
Reading the contents of papers was worse than a physical trespass because reading ideas contained in
private papers enabled searchers to invade the writer's mind. Value attached not to the physical paper
but to the intangible thoughts expressed in written language.").

476. See 116 U.S. 616,622 (1886).
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Amendment. 47 7 As Professor Donald Dripps has written, the Boyd Supreme
Court included members who had breathed the same air as the Founders 478 and
who were legal historians of the Founding Age.479 Their reliance on Entick, and
application of the Fourth Amendment to private papers, shows how broadly the
original Fourth Amendment swept to protect the privacies of life. 480 Boyd thus
reaffirmed that certain types of government surveillance into private spaces,
including private papers, were off-limits to government actors (even with legal
authority).4 81
This substantive search limitation has been ignored for almost a century and
holds little currency in the modern Supreme Court. 482 But such substantive limitations on what could be searched were a part of the original understanding shaped
by a fear of tyranny. 483 This was so, not because Colonial-Era surveillance was
unable to discover the offending materials but because liberty principles prohibited collection in the first place (even in the face of suspected treasonous activity). 484 Papers recording private ideas, religious beliefs, and dissenting views

477. Sklansky, supra note 364, at 1740 ("Justice Bradley's majority opinion in Boyd v. UnitedStates,
the Court's first major interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, drew broad lessons from the eighteenthcentury controversies in England and America to which the Amendment responded.").

478. Dripps, supra note 469, at 102-03 ("The Boyd majority should not be dismissed too lightly. For
one thing, the opinion was written less than a century after the ratification of the Fourth Amendment.
The Justices had walked the earth with the Founding generation.").
479. Id. at 103 ("[0]ne of the members of the Boyd majority was Horace Gray, a legal historian who
compiled the first archive of primary sources related to the Writs of Assistance controversy.").
480. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 ("The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of
constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before the
court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and
its employ6s of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors,
and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has never
been forfeited by his conviction of some public offence,-it is the invasion of this sacred right which
underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment.").
481. Cloud, supra note 475, at 51 ("[Boyd] implemented robust protections for private papers that
amounted to a ban on most searches for papers. This special treatment of papers was not a nineteenth
century innovation by the Court. It was derived from English cases decided a decade before the
Revolution that had influenced ideas about unreasonable searches and seizures in America during the
founding period and after.").
482. See Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Documents and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48 U. PITT.
L. REV. 27, 37 (1986) (noting that the Court rejected Boyd in terms of subpoenas).

483. See United States v. Hunt, 505 F.2d 931, 936 (5th Cir. 1974) ("Boyd was an affirmation of the
principle that some things cannot be searched or seized regardless of whether a proper procedure is
followed, that a search of private papers is per se an 'unreasonable search."').
484. Donohue, supra note 364, at 1307 ("In 1868, Thomas Cooley, chief justice of the Michigan
Supreme Court, reiterated the importance of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on using a warrant to
obtain evidence of guilt. Further, he noted: '[F]ound also in many State constitutions, [the Fourth
Amendment] would clearly preclude the seizure of one's papers in order to obtain evidence against him;
and the spirit of the fifth amendment-that no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to give
evidence against himself-would also forbid such seizure."' (alterations in original) (footnote omitted)
(quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 431 n.4 (Victor H. Lane ed., 7th ed.

1903))).
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were to be protected even in the face of lawful and procedurally sound search
authority.
This is not to say that the Fourth Amendment was an absolute ban on all
searches or seizures 485 but only that it was much more skeptical of government
search power than modern cases hold. The point of this Article is that this skeptical understanding should guide the tyrant test. This skepticism directly implicated
judges whom the Founders presciently feared would legitimate privacy-invasive
searches. 486 This skepticism implicated legislatures likely to overreach in
power.4 8 7 And the skepticism directly targeted the enforcers, the existing law
enforcement agents. 488 These precursors to today's police were neither trusted
nor trustworthy. 489 While we have lost this understanding of the Fourth
Amendment today, the scope of the original Fourth Amendment suggests a more
skeptical and radical view that prohibits governmental collection of private information, including use of new policing technologies.
b. Data and Tyranny

A tyrant test, thus, would carve out certain areas that could not be searched,
seized, or monitored, no matter the legal authorization. Specifically, private
papers, including digital papers in the home, could be simply inaccessible to law
enforcement surveillance, even with a warrant. 490 Going one step further, this
limit also could include not just physical or digital papers but the data revealed
from constitutionally protected things-homes, effects, and persons. As smart
objects reveal more of our patterns, questions, and habits, the private information
becomes more akin to revealing our thoughts and beliefs. As I have written previously, the informational security in constitutionally protected interests should

485. See Dripps, supra note 469 ("[E]ven under the rigid rule of Boyd it was 'reasonable' to seize
stolen papers, obscene books, and criminal libels.").
486. See Davies, supranote 364, at 561 (recognizing the irony that the colonial court upheld the writs
of assistance case argued by James Otis).
487. See id. at 590 (recognizing that the Framers were concerned with legislative grants of power like
the general warrant).
488. See id. at 578 ("The common-law tradition viewed any form of discretionary authority with
unease - but delegation of discretionary authority to ordinary, 'petty,' or 'subordinate' officers was
anathema to framing-era lawyers.").
489. See id. at 577-78 ("[T]he Framers' perception of the untrustworthiness of the ordinary officer
was reinforced by class-consciousness and status concerns. It was disagreeable enough for an elite or
middle-class householder to have to open his house to a search in response to a command from a high
status magistrate acting under a judicial commission; it was a gross insult to the householder's status as a
'freeman' to be bossed about by an ordinary officer who was likely drawn from an inferior class.");
Stoughton, supra note 163, at 122 ("Elected sheriffs and constables were the face of public law
enforcement, but neither was particularly attractive. 'Corruption ... was quite common, with sheriffs
accepting bribes from suspects and prisoners, neglecting their civil duties, tampering with elections, and
embezzling public funds."' (alteration in original) (quoting KRISTIAN WILLIAMS, OUR ENEMIES IN BLUE:
POLICE AND POWER IN AMERICA 32 (2007))).

490. See City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 247 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (recognizing Lord Camden's extreme position).
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extend to when our homes, effects, and bodies generate protected data streams.491
Such protections may become even stronger when the substance of the protection
concerns family matters, political views, religion, or other liberty or autonomy
values. The argument here is that although scholars (including myself) have
argued that the Fourth Amendment's protections should extend to these digital
analogues of physically private spaces, 492 a legislative ban could obviate the need
for Fourth Amendment interpretation. Simply stated, legislatures could carve out
certain private areas beyond the scope of government surveillance or acquisition.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to describe the extent of substantive limitations, but the goal here is to recognize that some substantive limitations would
be consistent with a tyrant test inspired by the Fourth Amendment. For example,
smart devices recording questions asked in our homes or monitoring our intimate
habits or documents stored on home computers and smartphones could simply be
carved out as completely protected-despite the potentially incriminating evidence involved. If precolonial treason (as in Entick) is the starting point for protected ideas, the bar is high for justifying government intrusion into private
documents. This change in existing practice is radically privacy-protective and
likely anathema to law-enforcement interests. But the Founding Generation were
radicals when it came to thwarting tyranny and would have questioned police
reading their virtual diaries, rummaging through their electronic papers, and if
they could have envisioned it, listening in on conversations and activities in their
homes. 493 Determining where the lines are drawn around the areas that should be
completely off-limits is admittedly difficult, but raising the issue of substantive
carveouts is important. Some types of invasive technologies may simply be
banned because they would involve the surveillance of personal beliefs, ideas,
writings, and views on politics family, or religion-independent of the cost to
law enforcement interests.
C.

LIMITS ON THE TYRANT TEST

The tyrant test can be criticized as being both under and overprotective. On the
one hand, the trap lens advocates might criticize the tyrant test as just being a
stronger technocratic approach with a few more interwoven rights and remedies
but still subject to the same structural power problems. 494 After all, community
oversight over police surveillance concedes the necessity of police surveillance. 495

491. See Ferguson, supra note 435, at 551 (discussing whether a warrant should be required to obtain
this data).

492. See id.
493. WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602-1791,
at 601-782 (2009) (providing an example where a Son of Liberty opposed searches because they
subjected "our bed chambers" to "the brutal tools of power," exposing "[the] most delicate part of our
families ... to every species of rude or indecent treatment" (quoting A Son of Liberty, N.Y. J. & WKLY.

REG., Nov. 8, 1787, at 3)).
494. See VITALE, supra note 24, at 30.
495. See Reformist Reforms vs. Abolitionist Steps in Policing, supra note 213 (stating that pushing
for community oversight boards "further entrenches policing as a legitimate, reformable system, with a
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In fact, almost every trap lens criticism of the trust and technocratic approach can
also be leveled at the tyrant lens. It is definitely stronger medicine-but not a cure.
On the other hand, the trust lens advocates will complain that the restrictions
are too onerous and police innovation will stagnate as a result. This claim is accurate. Looming litigation and additional requirements to report, audit, and educate
will create significant roadblocks to efficiency. Equally difficult, including ordinary citizens in complex policy decisions will interject uncertainty, inconsistency, and delay. Finally, and unquestionably, those seeking to slow adoption or
limit use of technology will resort to litigation and community pressure to stop
the surveillance. Even the technocratic requirements of surveillance oversight
will be weaponized in practice. These costs of avoiding tyranny are real, and the
tyrant test accepts them as necessary to avoid the dangers inherent in the surveillance technology.
Others might critique the Fourth Amendment, which has been an imperfect
guarantor of personal liberty. The lessons of the last two centuries are filled with
examples of police abuse, failed police reforms, eroded privacy, and unchanging
police-citizen power all under the authority of existing Fourth Amendment
law. 4 96 Some trap lens advocates might rightly question why relying on a failed
legal principle would offer any hope for a different result now. These are fair critiques and can go deeper. Even the original Fourth Amendment left out many
people from its protective theory. 497 Those without the education, status, or political power to challenge government invasions through tort law were left without a
remedy. Those without privilege or legal status were excluded. These are legitimate critiques without clear responses, except for the argument that the Fourth
Amendment analogy offers a path for possible improvement on admittedly unstable ground. In the end, policing power will be reduced with multiple levels of
democratic and popular approval required.
Finally, some might even challenge using the U.S. Constitution itself as a
framework because of the racial, gender, and class compromises that infected the
original American compact. 498 Constitutional protections in the face of constitutional failings may not be the right goal. This too is a fair criticism because constitutional rights have remained more aspirational than actual for far too many
people. A constitutional system that began unequal and birthed a country that has
remained unequal in terms of race, gender, and economic status may be unable to
'community' mandate" and that "[s]ome boards, tasked with overseeing them, become structurally
invested in their existence").
496. See generally Akbar, supra note 169 (contrasting the DOJ's Ferguson and Baltimore reports
with the Vision for Black Lives, and discussing the different conceptualizations of the problem of
policing and approaches to reform).
497. See Davies, supra note 364, at 577-78 (detailing the class bias in the original Fourth
Amendment that protected higher status men over everyone else).
498. See Roberts, supra note 161, at 122 ("On the one hand, there is good reason to renounce the
Constitution because constitutional law has been critical to upholding the interests of the racial capitalist
regime while advancing legal theories that justify its inhumanity. On the other hand, there is utility in
demanding that the Reconstruction Constitution live up to the liberation ideals fought for by
abolitionists, revolutionaries, and generations of ordinary black people.").
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escape these structural power imbalances. For many in America, the tyranny
never lifted but only shifted to other forms of social control and monitoring.
Depending on one's privilege within the political, cultural, social, and economic
system, this promise of escaping tyranny may never be realized.
Despite these fair criticisms, the tyrant test offers a first-principles path forward. Viewed carefully, the tyrant test blends insight from the trap and technocratic lenses to provide a compromise that might allow some new surveillance
technologies to be used with careful (perhaps even onerous) regulation. More
importantly, the center of power would shift from the police (and even the government) to the community and the people. While imperfect and reliant on individuals to use the tools to resist power, so too is the Constitution and American
democracy. The hope is that the tyrant test can provide a more protective theory
for a first-principles debate about the way forward.
CONCLUSION

After a decade of experimenting with big data policing, the time has come for
a new first-principles approach. Fearing the metaphorical tyrant offers an appropriate starting point for debate. The risks are real, and the way society approaches
the rise of new privacy-destroying technologies is critically important to the
future power balance between the police and the people.
Moreover, as discussed, the tyrant test improves upon existing practices. The
trust test has failed to address the growing concerns of new surveillance technologies and police misuse of power. Similarly, the trap lens may err too much on the
side of disallowing any digital evolution, even technology that might not provide
an enhancement of police power. And although the technocratic test offers a
workable improvement, it fails to grapple with the structural power dynamics that
make internal reforms too weak a response to the growing surveillance threat.
This Article has argued for the tyrant test as a new model to address growing
police surveillance. By borrowing from Fourth Amendment history and modeling
constitutional principles to emphasize interconnected structural protections,
rights, remedies, community participation, equality, and limited enumerated
grants of policing power, a system of democratically based, community-centered
oversight can be created to allow the use of some surveillance technologies and
not others. More importantly, a conversation about how to move the debate forward will share common first principles.

